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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, questions of public access and government
accountability during the process of negotiation of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1 became issues of intense polit-
ical debate and importance prior to congressional approval of the
agreement.2 Regional trading arrangements have become the engines
driving nations in the Western hemisphere toward new, regional forms
of power, regulation, and economic status exceeding the geography
and traditional limits of the nation-state.3 Questions of public access
and government accountability, which arose during the debate preced-
ing the enactment of the NAFTA, are part of a larger inquiry into the
development of the Free Trade Area (FTA) as a new political space.
How to define this new polity, its current boundaries, its internal and
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, United States-Canada-Mexico, 32
I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2 Ronald Steel, The Domestic Core of Foreign Policy, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1995,
at 85.
3 Charles F. Doran, Building a North American Community, CURRENT HIsTORY, March
1995, at 97, notes that North Americans "want maximum efficiency from NAFTA, but without
giving up any sovereignty." He also argues that increasing interdependence and awareness of
itself as a region is inevitable. Id. at 101.
Constructing Democracy in the North American Free Trade Area
16:331 (1996)
historical forces, and its systems of control are pressing questions in a
world described by the Commission on Global Governance as a
"global neighborhood."'4 How such matters will affect the NAFTA's
future shape depend on the access and accountability established in
what we must recognize as a new regional polity with a regional
constituency.
The NAFTA and its supplemental agreements on environmental
and labor cooperation, for example, set up a complex series of sub-
stantive principles and rules through which the three NAFTA signato-
ries: Canada, Mexico, and the United States, have defined the
contours of the North American free trade area. The NAFTA's eco-
nomic goals of expansion of trade in goods and services, promotion of
fair competition, nurturance and protection of transnational invest-
ment, and adequate protection of intellectual property rights through-
out the FTA are coupled with the establishment of the FTA as a
framework for future expansion of the scope of the agreement on a
trilateral, regional, and multilateral basis.' To interpret and apply the
rules, administer the regional trade area, resolve disputes, and negoti-
ate expansion, the NAFTA contains provisions setting up institutional
arrangements and administrative mechanisms. The subsidiary agree-
ments that supplement the NAFTA with frameworks for cooperation
on labor and environmental issues set up additional arrangements and
mechanisms to accomplish their specific purposes.
These arrangements and procedures constitute structures of polit-
ical, not merely economic, governance. This paper focuses on the im-
plementing mechanisms, examining their character and implications
for regional government as the possibility of a hemisphere-wide free
trade area looms across the Americas. The essential problem is how
to define the political framework that Canada, Mexico, and the
United States are creating. It is not clear that it is an inherently demo-
cratic regime. The regime, created to oversee the complex system of
trading rules, is arguably (and paradoxically) necessary to ensure
"free" trade, but it may undermine the very emergent regional democ-
racy it seeks to empower. The link between the regional political
processes and the regional social and economic fabric that the
NAFTA is beginning to weave in this hemisphere requires an analysis
of the governmental structures created by the FTA agreements in or-
der to understand the nascent political dimension of regional govern-
4 See Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance
(1995).
5 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102, at 297.
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ment and to predict its impact on the development of the integrated
economic region. "Transparency" of the political dimension is essen-
tial, not merely as to the "visibility" of law to which the agreements
refer, but rather as to its shape and substance. The NAFTA has intro-
duced to the Americas the era of regional lawmaking with national
impact. Free trade has engendered a new, unmapped political sphere.
My analysis will begin with a brief description of the NAFTA fa-
miliar to economists and international lawyers but will proceed to
look at the NAFTA as a constitution, examining the structures of gov-
ernance it sets up. There arises an analytical dichotomy that asks "to
what or whom are these structures accountable?" The NAFTA and
its supplemental agreements on labor and environmental cooperation
characterize the regional polity as primarily responsive to the interests
and power of the three nations rather than a constituency of individu-
als. To test the soundness of this political order in light of the eco-
nomic benefits that are the very purpose of a FTA, I will consider a
range of models of government culled from the history of political
development theory. Such theories, coursing over the years from the
intersection of politics and economic development in the study of de-
veloping nations, provide various perspectives on a polity of states.
Most of the selected models favor the current responsiveness to na-
tions when projected onto a regional plane.
The question arises whether the full range of economic and polit-
ical interests of the region, bound up with a free trade agreement,
demand a reordering of the political priorities. A revision of current
and future agreements may provide a greater degree of access for in-
dividual and nongovernmental actors and a greater measure of ac-
countability of the regional government to such constituents.
Questions of governmental legitimacy and transnational justice give us
reason to shift the internal balance of power away from state control.
A realignment of power flows with current trends to open the process
of international lawmaking beyond states. Finally, I will argue that it
is possible to see a realignment of power within the FTA as a means
for nations to cooperate with non-state actors in the new regional
political space; as a means to ensure the survival and success of the
regional polity; and as a means to redefine the state in a period of
rapidly changing notions of sovereignty.
II. NAFTA AS A CONSTITUTION
The simple analogy to the constitutional origins of a nation gives
us a touchstone against which to assess the governing institutions and
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processes of the NAFTA. Like a national constitution, the NAFTA
embodies economic principles with the force of law,6 allocates power
among constituent political bodies, creates structures of governance to
wield that power, contains a supple future potential in provisions for
its own amendment and accession by other political bodies, and pro-
vides a text that will become the backbone of the polity as it grows
across national borders and territorial divides. The NAFrA's side ac-
cords are like constitutional codicils, amplifying and refocusing origi-
nal intent, imbuing economic mandates with wider, though non-
binding environmental and human rights dimensions, and adding ad-
ditional structures of governance.
A FTA is an association of nations that have agreed to eliminate
tariff and non-tariff barriers to substantially all trade among them.7 It
is an explicit exception to the GATT requirement that certain enu-
merated advantages of trade must be accorded to all signatories on an
equal basis known as most-favored-nation (MFN) status.8 Each FTA
"partner" maintains its own external tariff and customs administra-
tion, and each agrees to eliminate tariffs on FTA origin goods.9 The
GATT provides the foundation and defining purpose of a FTA, but it
does not dictate the precise details of the form of the arrangement. It
merely sets certain minimum requirements that qualify an arrange-
ment for the exception.' °
The NAFTA reaches far beyond mere relaxation or elimination
of tariff and other restrictions on trade in goods, although it has scores
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Article 26 states that, "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per-
formed by them in good faith." RESTATEMENT (THRD) oF Tr FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNrrED STATES Sec. 321 (1987). Although the U.S. is not a signatory to the Vienna Con-
vention of the law of Treaties that entered into force on January 27, 1980, the treaty's provisions
bind it as customary norms of international law.
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, reprinted
as amended in IV B.I.S.D. 1-76 (1969) [hereinafter GATE 1947]. I cite to GATT 1947 because
GATr 1994 did not exist during the negotiation of NAFTA or at the time NAFTA entered into
force. GAIT 1994 was a result of the creation of the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO]. The core provisions of GAIT 1994 are the same as GATr 1947. Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144. Among the many multi-
lateral agreements signed by WTO members was an Understanding on Interpretation of Article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125, 1161.
8 GATT 1947, art. I, supra note 7. The purpose of FTAs in the GATT scheme is to facilitate
trade on a regional basis.
9 A FTA differs from a customs union, the other regional trading arrangement sanctioned
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GAIF 1947, art. XXIV, supra note 7. In a
customs union such as the European Union there is only one common external tariff and set of
customs rules.
10 GAT 1947, art. XXIV, supra note 7.
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of provisions aimed at increasing market access in general and for cat-
egories of goods, such as agriculture, automotive products, and tex-
tiles and apparel, that are particularly sensitive for the three nations
concerned.'1 Well before the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations
succeeded in expanding global trading disciplines beyond the realm of
goods, the three NAFTA partners, working in the more manageable
regional negotiation environment, put into effect a host of provisions
to liberate trade in services (i.e., in areas of finance, telecommunica-
tions, insurance, and transportation), cross-border investment of capi-
tal, government procurement, and trade dependent on the protection
of intellectual property from national limitations that had either the
intent or effect of protecting national providers from transnational
competition and restricting the entry of non-national competitors and
investors into the market. The NAFTA tackled the problems for
trade posed by technical standards and health and safety measures
(sanitary and phytosanitary measures) when such standards and meas-
ures were incompatible with those applicable in other markets or tai-
lored to protect domestic business. In an attempt to navigate the
shoals of environmental protection and sustainable development that
had been sighted along the course of increased productivity, the
NAFTA's drafters embedded a few principles of deference to these
trade-related concerns. For example, they discouraged the lowering
of standards to attract transnational capital, and they gave precedence
to three multilateral and two bilateral environmental agreements. 2
Moreover, the NAFTA's substantive provisions range from prin-
ciples of non-discrimination that are truisms of free trade, such as
national treatment, MFN treatment, procedural transparency, and
rights of establishment,'13 to the definition of extremely technical rules
intended to effectuate those principles. In addition to establishing
necessary, complex requirements for free trade, such as rules of origin
by which goods are identifiable as subject to the advantages of the
agreement, the NAFTA addresses stages of trade liberalization. Com-
plete integration of the markets, i.e., full implementation of the princi-
11 NAFTA, supra note 1. While NAFTA builds on the model of its predecessor agreement,
the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Sept. 28, 1988, 102 Stat. 1851, a comparison of
the two is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
12 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 104, 1114(2), at 297-98.
13 These four concepts may be defined loosely as equality of treatment of imported products
and services as compared with domestic products and services (national treatment); equality of
treatment among eligible foreign goods and services when similarly situated (MFN); publication
and other means of access to law, regulations, and administrative decisions (transparency); and
elimination of prohibition of foreign participation in certain sectors (rights of establishment).
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pies, requirements and prohibitions of the NAFTA, will take place
over varying time periods (depending on the market sector).
During these periods, the NAFTA recognizes that the partners
will have to negotiate and settle upon many issues of interpretation,
implementation, and policy that the agreement leaves open. Practi-
cally every chapter of the NAFTA contains a provision for future "co-
operation" or "consultation" regarding matters ranging from technical
exceptions to general export rules. In other areas, the NAFTA does
no more than outline policy objectives, consigning matters to a com-
mittee to work out a framework of understanding and disciplines for
maintaining the proper relationship between competition policy and
free trade. In the intricate plan for economic integration of the three
markets, room for detail exists to which the NAFTA can only allude
as a goal.
There are two supplemental agreements that complement the
NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooper-
ation,' n and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.'
5
There is also a third so-called "side accord," the Understanding Be-
tween the Parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement Con-
cerning Chapter Eight - Emergency Action.16  The succeeding
discussion 17 will explain the genesis of these complementary agree-
ments and analyze the environmental and labor agreements in depth
regarding their democratic, political impacts. For now, it is sufficient
to point out their purposes and sketch in their instrumentalities.
The Environmental Agreement elaborates on the underdevel-
oped environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA. It lists de-
tailed environmental objectives including, inter alia, promoting
sustainable development, fostering "the protection and improvement
of the environment" for present and future generations, strengthening
cooperation on the development of "laws, regulations, procedures,
policies and practices," and enhancing "compliance with, and enforce-
ment of, environmental laws and regulations."'"8 To attain these
14 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1482 [hereinafter Environmental Agreement].
15 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1502 (1993)
[hereinafter Labor Agreement].
16 Canada-Mexico-United States: Understanding Between the Parties to the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement Concerning Chapter Eight - Emergency Action, Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1519. This understanding is primarily a framework for further negotiation of additional
procedures to effectuate NAFTA's provisions on temporary measures to protect domestic indus-
try. Id. at 1520; NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 8.
17 See infra §§ II-A-2, II-B-1, II-B-3.
18 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1, at 1483.
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objectives, it commits the three signatories to substantive and proce-
dural protections within their national legal systems.19 The Environ-
mental Agreement sets up a regional framework of bureaucratic
institutions, administrative mechanisms, and dispute resolution
procedures.
The Labor Agreement addresses concerns over working condi-
tions and living standards, and sets out, inter alia, to promote an
agreed-upon set of labor principles such as the rights to organize, bar-
gain collectively and strike, the right to be free of compulsory labor
and employment discrimination, and the right to a minimum wage.2"
Compliance with and enforcement of national labor laws are specific
goals.21 To achieve its purposes, the Labor Agreement obliges each
"Party" (as the three signatories are known) to enact compliance and
enforcement mechanisms with minimal procedural guarantees. 22 Like
the Environmental Agreement, the Labor Agreement establishes a
bureaucratic, regional framework with administrative mechanisms and
dispute resolution procedures.
The tripartite FTA as defined primarily by the NAFTA (with sup-
plemental elaborations on subsets of regional goals) is the core of
what was originally projected as a hemisphere-wide free trade area.
The United States planned this under a policy called the "Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative."'  The short-term goal of the initiative
was to offer incentives to Latin American nations in the form of debt
reduction and increased foreign aid for economic restructuring toward
market-driven systems comparable to the United States. The long-
term goal was to negotiate free trade agreements with each nation as
it reached what the United States considered to be sufficient progress
toward that goal to allow for economic integration. To achieve this
end, the United States negotiated framework agreements that formed
the basis for negotiation with Latin American nations (either singly or
in groups).2 4 Latin American nations forged ahead with their own re-
gional arrangements for free trade.2
5
19 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 2-7, at 1483-85.
20 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. l(b), annex 1, at 1502-03, 1515.
21 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. l(f), at 1503.
22 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 2-7, at 1503-04.
23 1991 Trade Policy Agenda and 1990 Annual Report of the President of the United States on
the Trade Agreements Program, at 83.
24 1994 Trade Policy Agenda and 1993 Annual Report of the President of the United States on
the Trade Agreements Program, at 89.
25 A prime example is Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, comprised of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Id. at 90-91. For a summary of the history of regional trading
arrangements in Latin America see Joseph Grunwald, The Rocky Road Toward Hemispheric
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Just as the U.S. and other constitutions allow for new member
states, the NAFTA and the environmental and labor side accords pro-
vide for accession by other nations.26 The NAFTA specifically leaves
the terms and conditions of accession open for negotiation and ap-
proval by the Parties working through their NAFTA institutions. The
side accords have similar provisions. When the United States imple-
mented the NAFTA in its domestic law, Congress addressed the issue
of accession in terms of U.S. objectives for greater market access and
other economic goals.27 In all likelihood, Chile will be the first South
American nation to accede to the FTA. The form and timing of acces-
sion is uncertain. It may consist of accession to the NAFTA itself or
it may instead take the form of negotiation of a separate agreement
between NAFTA signatories and Chile.2 9 In whichever form, the
terms and conditions defining free trade among the four nations are,
as yet, unspecified.
The possibilities for future expansion of the area were unsettled
at the beginning of the Clinton administration, which did not immedi-
ately embrace its predecessor's hemispheric plan.3 0 A historic re-
gional summit meeting in Miami in December 1994 confirmed,
however, that the Clinton administration as well as thirty-three na-
tions in this hemisphere are committed to a hemisphere-wide FTA
under treaty by 2005.3 1 If present and future U.S. presidents decide
not to check the momentum of regional economic integration, the op-
tions for expansion of the FTA are myriad. It is possible that With
geographic expansion will come either expansion or contraction of ex-
isting substantive rules and implementing mechanisms. Long-range
economic planning is itself subject to the unpredictable weather of
political change. Even with a steady course, the amount of negotia-
Economic Integration: A Regional Background with Attention to the Future, in NAFTA AS A
MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT:. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MERGING HIGH AND LOW WAGE
AREAS 51-67 (Richard S. Belous & Jonathan Lemco eds., 1993).
26 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2204, at 702; Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 49,
32 I.L.M. at 1495; Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 53, at 1514.
27 19 U.S.C. § 3317 (1994)
28 Rossella Brevetti, Staffers See Little Activity in Trade for 104th Congress, 13 INT'L TRADE
REP. 270-71 (BNA) (Feb. 21, 1996) (loss of momentum toward expanding FTA).
29 1994 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 24, at 91.
30 See The President's 1994 Trade Policy Agenda, at 10. In the President's July 1994 report to
Congress on issue of expansion of the FTA, he refused to identify any country other than Chile
as a target for free trade negotiations. Report to the Congress on Recommendations on Future
Free Trade Area Negotiations, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1399 (July 11, 1994).
31 James Brooke, U.S. and 33 Hemisphere Nations Agree to Create Free-Trade Zone, NY.
TiMEs, Dec. 11, 1994, at Al, A22; Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles and Plan of
Action, Dec. 11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995).
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tion for which the NAFTA serves as a framework is phenomenally
broad and complex. It reaches far beyond the scope of interpretation,
application, and policy delineation under the current agreement.
A. Creation of a Government
Whatever the NAFTA may aim to accomplish economically
throughout North America, it is important to characterize and com-
prehend its provisions politically. A FTA is not a "state" as that word
is ordinarily understood. It is, rather, a construct of the joint eco-
nomic aspirations of the national governments comprising it, ex-
pressed as a set of principles, goals, and rules. One may characterize
it as a regime. 2 The institutions, processes, functions, powers, inter-
nal relationships, and nodes of growth created by the NAFTA and its
supplemental agreements, nevertheless, also create a regional govern-
ment. As with any constitution, the NAFTA has established a model
of governmental functions and balance of power. For comparative
purposes, the U.S. Constitutional settlement is apt. Its accessibility is
matched by its relevance, as the United States is currently at the geo-
graphic center of the new polity. Moreover, the separation of powers
among governmental branches enunciated by John Locke and re-
flected in the United States model has become a familiar principle of
modern governments outside the realm of totalitarian states run by
sole dictators.33 Using the U.S. federal system as a model we can first
32 In using the word "regime" one must be clear as to its provenance. In political science,
the study of international regimes is the study of the process of international governance includ-
ing its principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. Some theorists focus on legal
regimes, or those institutions with explicit rules negotiated by states. The evolution of regime
theory and its relationship with international law are succinctly presented in Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.
J. INrT'L L. 205 (1993), from which these distillations of regime theory derive. Professor Burley
makes clear that "regime" in this sense refers to governance but not government. My own defi-
nition of regime is in conflict with her view to the extent that I more closely connect the word
"regime" to government and "governance" with political institutions, i.e., who rules and how.
Cf., id., at 219-220. Moreover, I do not posit world government as a goal, much less an ideal, but
rather inquire into the political aspects of a trade regime. As Professor Burley notes in her
critique of the shortcomings of institutionalism in political science, regime theory is inadequate
to the task of providing a "politico-economic theory to help conceptualize and analyze the law"
regulating international business transactions involving non-state actors. See Id. at 225. The
present work's focus on structures of governance is a way to explore ways to incorporate the
interests of the individual and the nongovernmental organization, political and, economic ideol-
ogy and goals, and the importance of identity and stability in an interdependent realm, as identi-
fied in Professor Burley's call for a liberal agenda of new scholarship moving beyond the
confines of "the reigning model" of the institutionalist approach. See Id. at 227.
33 See John Locke, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 364-366 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed.
1988) (3d ed. 1698) (separation of legislative from executive and federative (external) powers).
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break "government" down into its fundamental purposes and then
evaluate how each of the NAFTA's structural and procedural ele-
ments serves those purposes.
The federal government created by the U.S. Constitution com-
prises three separate institutions: an elected executive; a bicameral,
elected legislature; and a judiciary with constitutional power checked
by legislative action and electoral politics. On this skeleton is imposed
the fleshy body of federal administrative institutions created either by
the executive (departments) or by Congress (independent agencies)
and run by appointees and their employees. The Constitution assigns
and distributes power among governmental institutions. Their func-
tions execute those powers. A separation of power and, thus, function
is implicit in the system, although joint or sequential execution of sep-
arate federal powers is often necessary to accomplish a governmental
task. Thus, Congress may enact legislation, but the judiciary may in-
terpret its actual application; its enforcement is often left to the tenta-
cles of the executive departments under the Presidency.34
The federal system of government also involves a separation of
spheres of power among states and between each state and the central
government. Power and its attendant exercise may overlap between
spheres, but the system rests on a careful balance. State power is ex-
pressed in governmental action by elected representatives of execu-
tive and legislative character and by elected and appointed judges and
judicial functionaries.
At their most elemental the tasks of government are the articula-
tion of law, the interpretation of law, the resolution of disputes con-
cerning or requiring the application of law, and the enforcement of
law.31 The tasks of government occur in the real world at many levels
and in many forms. Articulation of law ranges from legislative state-
ments in the form of statutes and resolutions, through executive policy
in the form of orders, directives, and proclamations, to administrative
regulations. Regulations can also embody interpretation of law, as ad-
ministrative bodies exercise delegated authority to apply general stat-
utory authority and executive policy to specific situations in which
34 H. Jefferson Powell, How Does the Constitution Structure Government, in A WORKABLE
GOVERNMENT?: THE CONsTrrTUnON AFrER 200 YEARS 13-48, (Burke Marshall ed., 1987) (esp.
22-33). Separation of powers is complemented by Montesquieu's "checks and balances," some
explicitly enumerated in the Constitution and others interpreted by courts over time.
35 We leave completely unaddressed, of course, the question "what is law?"
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process they add much detail.36 In exercising their function as the ar-
biter of disputes, courts interpret the meaning of law as applied to a
specific case or series of cases. The resolution of disputes may involve
private citizens or governmental institutions as litigants, with federal
courts having the power to hear disputes between states and between
state governmental institutions and federal government institutions.
Yet courts are not the only venue for resolution of disputes, as admin-
istrative tribunals frequently exercise authority to resolve disputes in-
volving regulatory power and functions. Even Congress, on rare
occasion, has the power to resolve disputes. Under the federal gov-
ernment enforcement of law lies-with the executive but is actually car-
ried out by agencies to which the executive has delegated authority.
The structures and implementing processes of the NAFTA and its
supplemental agreements at either the general or particular level pro-
duce a government. It is quite different in the institutions of power,
the allocation of power, and the exercise of power, than the U.S. gov-
ernment, but it is also a federal system of overlapping spheres of
power.
1. Governmental Structures of NAFTA
Part Seven of the NAFTA contains the core of administrative and
institutional provisions created by the three signatories to govern the
FTA. These are amplified by a web of administrative bodies and func-
tions identified in separate sections throughout the NAFTA. The
FTA does not have traditional governmental institutions associated
with the business of states. 37 There is no legislature. There is no
standing judiciary. There is no single executive officer at the head of a
hierarchy of power. One can make analogies to traditional govern-
mental institutions, but they are perforce quite loose. There is not
even a parallel to the United Nations' bicameral legislative body. The
analogies must come from the purposes and functions of government
as exercised by the institutions that the NAFTA sets up.
What the NAFTA sets up is a regional bureaucracy. Its institu-
tions make up a government basically by committee. The form and
composition of the committees differ by their roles and functions as
36 Cf., Stephen Carter, The Beast that Might Not Exist: Some Speculations on the Constitution
and the Independent Regulatory Agencies, in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT?: THE CONSTITUTION
AFTER 200 YEARS 76-102 (Burke Marshall ed., 1987).
37 The FTA does not even have the institutions associated with regional trading arrange-
ments such as the EC which started out as a simple customs union. See Frederick M. Abbott,
Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the
GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917, 930-48 (1992).
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defined by the NAFTA, but they all reflect the trilateral nature of the
regional trade regime. There are both standing and authorized insti-
tutional bodies.
38
At the pinnacle of the NAFTA's bureaucracy is a Free Trade
Commission (The Commission), a body of cabinet-level ministers of
the Parties, which meets at least once a year.39 The Commission is a
self-governing body in the sense that its members, the national repre-
sentatives, establish rules and procedures applicable to its functions.4 °
Its stated purpose is to supervise implementation of NAFTA including
the numerous committees and working groups authorized by substan-
tive articles and annexes of the agreement, oversee the operation of
the FTA and its "further elaboration," and resolve disputes.4' The
Commission has authority to create other committees and working
groups and delegate functions as it sees fit. The Commission works by
consensus unless it decides otherwise. Consensusdecision-making re-
quires unanimity. The use of this critical method of decision-making
with its implicit power of national veto is within the discretionary
power of the regional structure itself.
The tripartite structure, simplified here, demonstrates at the very
least an implicit constitutional arrangement. Administration is the
function of a NAFTA Secretariat established by, and operating under,
the Commission.4 2 The eight standing committees created by the
NAFTA generally function as fora for consultations, negotiations, and
policy-formulation and to resolve the details of goals set by the
NAFrA. The Parties appoint representatives to sit on the commit-
tees, but the NAFTA itself specifies the jurisdiction and agenda of all
38 That is, some have fixed membership and meet regularly. Others may be called into being
to serve at the discretion of another standing body or to accomplish a specific task.
39 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001, at 693.
40 One may argue, of course, that as the Commission is subject to the direction of the na-
tional governments whose representatives comprise its membership, it is a creature of national
rather than regional power. In the remainder of this section I will argue that the power vested in
the regional structures as a whole undercuts the force of that argument.
41 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001, annex 2001.2, at 693, 698. Annex 2001.2 lists eight stand-
ing committees (with certain subcommittees) established in various parts of NAFTA dealing
with categories of trade or types of trade-related measures and six working groups.
42 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2002, at 693. The Secretariat consists of three national sections
working independently. Each Party appoints a secretary in charge of its section and is separately
responsible for the operation and costs of its section. These are akin to administrative agencies
with separate, though similar, functions in one executive department in the U.S. federal govern-
ment. As in the U.S. government, they are under the ultimate control of a higher authority in
this case the Free Trade Commission to which they report. The function of this regional Com-
mittee is shaped by the Commission which refers general issues of arbitration or alternative
dispute resolution to the Committee for a report and recommendation to the Commission.
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but one committee. The Commission is responsible for setting up that
committee and has unlimited discretion to select the experts to sit on
it. Judicial power resides in authorized bodies known as "panels" that
the Commission convenes to resolve disputes only as they arise. This
ephemeral institutional arrangement belies the radical nature of the
NAFTA's effect on national judicial power. It is, in fact, in the resolu-
tion of disputes and the enforcement of those resolutions that the
NAFTA manifests most clearly its creation of regional power consti-
tuted in an autonomous regional government.
a. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement
Resolution of formal disputes breaks down under the NAFTA
between intergovernmental disputes and disputes between private
parties and member states. The latter is limited to resolution of dis-
putes between private investors and national governments 43 and be-
tween private parties and national enforcement agencies
administering antidumping and countervailing duty laws. In all cases,
the NAFTA creates a sphere of regional power controlled by regional
structures to the exclusion of national power and national judicial
structures. Chapter Nineteen on antidumping and countervailing
measures and Chapter Twenty on intergovernmental disputes rely on
panels convened and operating according to the process set up by the
NAFTA. The process for resolution of disputes between investors of
one Party and governments of another involves a somewhat different
system of arbitration. For each type of regional dispute resolution,
different law may apply; the NAFTA identifies for each what law is
binding. Whether the NAFTA requires its dispute resolution bodies
to apply national law or the NAFTA's provisions, or to measure the
compliance of national law with the agreement, the NAFTA vests
power to interpret and apply such law with regional bodies to the ex-
clusion of national courts, and enforcement of the agreement rests on
the decisions of regional instrumentalities.
In the resolution of antidumping and countervailing duty dis-
putes, the NAFTA almost completely replaces national judicial juris-
diction with regional decision-making power. When a national
administrative agency imposes an antidumping or countervailing duty
order on the nationals or goods of another Party, appeal is available,
43 NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, § B, at 642-49, sets up a mechanism for arbitration of a
dispute between an investor of one Party and another Party as to which the investor claims a
breach of NAFTA. The disputants must agree to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of
NAFTA.
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in most cases, only to a binational panel constituted under the
NAFTA's detailed provisions. 44 The regional panel applies and thus
interprets the national law of the government making the original de-
cision. Appeal of the NAFrA panel's decision lies only with an "ex-
traordinary challenge committee" convened under the agreement in
circumscribed circumstances.45  Allegations of national interference
with the regional panel review process are assigned to "special com-
mittees" convened by the Parties under the NAFTA's provisions to
safeguard the regional process.46 Enforcement of the decisions made
by the binational review panels is ensured by this regional special re-
view process.47 Recourse for enforcement is exclusively within the re-
gional sphere.
Thus, the NAFIA creates and controls an exclusive sphere of re-
gional jurisdiction over disputes between private entities and national
governments involving two controversial and economically determina-
tive national regulatory functions aimed at combating foreign, unfair
competition.48 The jurisdiction of the regional dispute settlement in-
stitutions in antidumping and countervailing duty matters is even
broader than mere review of administrative rulings. Panels have the
power to issue declaratory opinions on whether amendments to na-
tional statutes comply with the NAFTA.49 A decision reflecting non-
44 Chapter Nineteen of NAFTA contains the provisions for review and dispute settlement in
antidumping and countervailing duty matters. NAFrA, supra note 1, at 682-93. Panel review is
actually an option under article 1904, NAFTA supra note 1, at 683, but, in reality, Parties avail
themselves of this option to avoid the potential bias in national courts to uphold decisions of the
national administration. There are other exceptions to the jurisdiction of panels convened under
regional authority. For a detailed summary of panel review in antidumping and countervailing
duty matters, see EUGENE T. RossrDas & ALEXANDRA MARAVEL, UNITED STATES IMPORT
TRADE LAW 41-43-41-45 (1994 rev. of 1992 ed.).
45 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(3), annex 1904.13, at 683, 688.
46 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1905, at 684-85.
47 If the Special Committee finds, inter alia, that a national government has failed to imple-
ment the decision of a binational panel, the sanction is the right granted to the other Party by the
agreement to suspend operation of regional review and revert to national judicial review.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1905, at 684-85. However, a Party may not suspend binational panel
review unless authorized by this special regional dispute resolution process.
48 The U.S. government imposes antidumping duties on imported goods to offset the com-
petitive advantage when such goods are sold at less than fair value (now termed "normal
value"), usually defined as less than the amount for which such goods are sold in the home
market. The U.S. government imposes countervailing duties on imports to offset the competitive
advantage of goods subject to home market subsidies. Prior to the U.S.-Canada FTA and then
NAFTA, disputes over antidumping and countervailing duties were heard by the United States
Court of International Trade with a right of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. See RossIDES & MARAvEL, supra note 44, at 18-24, 41-43-41-45 (1994 rev. of 1992 ed.)
(review of antidumping and countervailing duty orders under free trade agreements).
49 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1903, at 682-83.
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conformity is binding in the sense that a Party that does not amend its
statute(s) accordingly is subject to compensatory action or sanction by
the complaining Party in the form of either mirror legislation or termi-
nation of the entire agreement.
Another mechanism by which the NAFTA insulates itself from
national judicial power, though in a different sense, is that it contains
no provision for dispute settlement between private persons and the
FTA institutions about the application, scope or interpretation of the
NAFTA itself. It merely encourages alternative dispute resolution.
The NAFTA then expressly prohibits any Party from granting a pri-
vate right of action under national law against another Party for al-
leged violation of the agreement."0 Interpretation of law in the
judicial sense is a matter solely within the realm of regional power.
With respect to individuals, there is simply no right of action
available."1
Individuals who have an investment dispute with the government
of another Party involving an alleged violation of the NAFTA can
seek a remedy under Chapter Eleven, which aims to establish arbitra-
tion as the norm to assure due process before an impartial tribunal.52
The arbitral tribunal is to decide the issues in a dispute in accordance
with the provisions of the NAFTA and applicable rules of interna-
tional law. 3 Any interpretation of the NAFTA's provisions by the
Free Trade Commission are binding on the arbitral tribunal.5 4 Arbi-
tration is an option. It does not preempt national jurisdiction as the
investor may choose instead to litigate in the courts of the foreign
government. It does, however, create parallel regional jurisdiction
that affects national governments by forcing them to litigate in a re-
gionally constituted forum if the investor so chooses.55 To succeed on
the defense of an exception to arbitration created by the NAFTA, 6 a
national government must submit itself to the jurisdiction of regional
50 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2021, at 698.
51 NAFTA aims to establish arbitration as the norm for settlement of international disputes
between private commercial entities in the FTA. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2022, at 698. There
is a general responsibility lodged in the Commission to work to achieve this aim. NAFTA, supra
note 1, art. 2022 at 698.
52 NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, § B, at 642-49. Art. 1115 sets out the purpose of regional
arbitration.
53 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131, at 645.
54 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131, at 645.
55 There are very limited circumstances in which arbitration is not available. These are when
a government's investment measures come within the scope of allowable exceptions from the
obligations of NAFTA. Id., arts. 1410, 1415, at 659-61.
56 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1410, 1415, at 659-61.
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bodies who have the sole authority to decide if the exception to arbi-
tration applies.57 Thus, although regional arbitration is not exclusive,
the NAFTA's provisions and bodies control the process where it is
invoked.
Finally, intergovernmental disagreements about the interpreta-
tion or application of the NAFTA and allegations that a proposed or
existing measure of another Party is inconsistent with the NAFTA or
would cause nullification or impairment of benefits under the NAFTA
are also expressly reserved as matters of regional jurisdiction to be
decided by the dispute settlement panels and according to the provi-
sions of the agreement in Chapter Twenty. The same prohibition
against national judicial jurisdiction that prevents individuals from
challenging the NAFTA in national judicial fora prohibits govern-
ments from bypassing the NAFTA's dispute settlement provisions via
national courts.
With respect to enforcement of its provisions, the NAFTA autho-
rizes Parties to suspend benefits under the agreement as a sanction.58
The power to take such action, however, is limited to those instances
set out in the NAFTA. A Party must resort to regional dispute resolu-
tion under Chapter Twenty. If a Chapter Twenty arbitral panel has
ruled in its favor but the Party found to be in non-compliance has not
reached an agreement with the complainant as to mutually satisfac-
tory implementation of the panel's recommendations, the complain-
ant may suspend benefits. Thus, enforcement of the NAFTA's
substantive provisions is firmly anchored in the power of regional
processes and judicial bodies. Moreover, the only review mechanism
that is available exists in the regional space. If any disputant requests
it the Commission must establish a panel to determine if the level of
the sanction is beyond the compensatory level that NAFTA allows.
There is, however, no mechanism for enforcement of a panel ruling
that a sanction was manifestly excessive. Thus, enforcement of the
NAFTA is a matter solely within the control of its regional instrumen-
talities and beyond the scope of national power.
57 Article 1132 gives the Free Trade Commission the right to decide if a measure alleged to
be a breach of the agreement actually comes within an exception or reservation. NAFTA, supra
note 1, at 645.46. Article 1131 makes such an interpretation binding on the tribunal. NAFTA,
supra note 1, arts. 1410, 1415. With respect to investment disputes involving financial services,
article 1415 gives either the regional arbitral tribunal or, at the election of the government, the
NAFTA Committee on Financial Services the power to make a binding ruling on the issue of
whether an exception to arbitration exists under article 1410. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1410,
1415, at 659, 661.
58 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2019, at 697-98.
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The allocation of power among the regional bureaucratic institu-
tions reflects a varying degree of separation and balance of powers.
The most dramatic separation of power occurs in dispute resolution.
The dispute resolution panels exercise their judicial power independ-
ent of the ultimate control of other institutions. Thus, a Chapter
Twenty panel's decision is directly binding on the Parties in the sense
that the Parties' resolution of the dispute is supposed to conform to
the panel's determinations and recommendations 5 9 and the Commis-
sion has no authority to approve or disapprove of the decision. Re-
view of Chapter Nineteen panel decisions is limited to the
extraordinary challenge committees without interference from the
Commission, and the decision of the regionally constituted binational
panel is binding directly on the Parties.
60
Despite discretely defined powers, there is an intertwining of the
regional institutions in carrying out the judicial functions assigned by
the NAFTA. The overlapping of spheres of authority represents, to a
limited extent, a system of checks and balances in the U.S. constitu-
tional sense.61  Hence, not all dispute resolution in the NAFTA
reaches the formal stage of an arbitral panel or tribunal. Dispute res-
olution through consultation between and among the Parties is au-
thorized throughout almost all sections of the NAFTA. Some sections
specifically delegate this authority to negotiate resolution to the com-
mittees that are the regional analog of administrative agencies.62 In
addition to consultations at the committee level as the first stage of
informal dispute resolution, Chapter Twenty on formal intergovern-
mental dispute resolution charges the Commission to attempt to re-
solve the problem by various means including conciliation, mediation,
59 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2018, at 697.
60 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, at 683.
61 The intertwining of function and power as a system of checks and balances is manifest in
other ways. For example, in binational panel review of antidumping and countervailing duty
matters, the Secretariat is responsible for preparation of the record for review and takes all
administrative action as required by such a proceeding such as would be performed by a court
clerk. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1908, at 686.
62 For example, any Party or the Commission may call a meeting of the Committee on Trade
in Goods to consider any matter arising under Chapter Three (regarding national treatment and
market access for trade in goods). NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 316, at 303-04. Likewise, a Com-
mittee on Agriculture is a forum for regular consultations on the agricultural sections of NAFTA
with provision for special meetings to consult when a problem arises. NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
706, at 369. When a Party requests consultations regarding the application of NAFTA to a mea-
sure related to technical product standards, the Committee on Standards-Related Measures has
jurisdiction to facilitate the consultations by considering the matter itself. NAFTA, supra note 1,
arts. 913-914, at 390-91.
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and the use of good offices. 63 Only upon the failure of these methods
and at the request of a Party may the Commission convene an arbitral
panel.64 These mechanisms for regular and specific consultations
cross the boundaries of both policy formulation and problem resolu-
tion in an administrative and judicial sense. They are a manifestation
of the regional regime's allocation and balance of power that under-
scores its likeness to the U.S. federal system and its identification as a
regional government.
b. Articulation, Interpretation, and Administration of Law
The NAFTA is more than a legal code of regional rules. It cre-
ates and empowers regional bodies to exercise recognizably govern-
mental tasks. In a regime without an executive or legislature, there
are no statutes, executive orders, or proclamations. Nevertheless,
there are analogs for these traditional methods by which governmen-
tal structures pronounce and articulate law. In a government by com-
mittee, there is actually legislative, executive, and regulatory
articulation of law, all combined in the functions of the bureaucracy.
When seen as a constitution of principles of governance, in addi-
tion to one constituting governmental organs, the NAFTA lays down a
complex set of rules. In each case, however, the rules are merely the
bare bones framework for much development of the means by which
the principles are to be applied or even understood. The NAFTA an-
nounces many goals on which the Parties agree but is silent on how
the goals are to be reached.65
In the area of technical standards, the NAFTA creates its most
complex administrative structure. In addition to the Committee on
Standards-Related Measures, there are four subcommittees on land
transportation, telecommunications, automotive standards, and label-
ing of textile and apparel products.66 The agenda for each group in-
cludes the development of standards that are compatible or uniform
63 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2007, at 695. There are other provisions for the Commission to
act as an institution of mediation. For example, when problems arising in the Working Group on
Rules of Origin cannot be resolved in that body within thirty days of referral by a Party, any
Party may invoke Commission mediation under the procedures of Chapter Twenty. NAFTA,
supra note 1, art. 513(5), at 363.
64 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2008, at 695.
65 For example, with respect to both technical standards and salitary and phytosanitary stan-
dards, NAFTA commits the Parties to working toward making their national standards compati-
ble, equivalent, or identical. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 713(1), 906(2), at 378, 387. In both
cases, a regional committee is charged with achieving the policy goal. NAFTA, supra note 1,
arts. 722(2)(b), 913(2)(b), at 381, 390.
66 NAFTA, supra note 1, annexes 913.5.a-1-4, at 390-93.
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throughout the region.67 The recommendations of at least one of
these, the Automotive Standards Council, have the character of semi-
binding "regulations;" once the Parties agree on them, they must act
to implement them nationally in accordance with the legal and proce-
dural means at hand for that Party.6" This last example is analogous
to U.S. federalism. An organ of the regional government decides on
certain standards, and the member states are obliged to enforce them.
In this sense, the regional committees are acting as federal administra-
tive agencies, performing what is tantamount to regulatory application
and interpretation of legislative directives found in the NAFTA itself.
Sometimes the authority of the committees in this regard is au-
tonomous. At other times, regional bodies develop regulatory inter-
pretations that rise to the level of binding regional rules only when
accepted by the Free Trade Commission.69 The NAFTA leaves many
aspects of policy formation to administrative bodies that, in turn, must
report annually to the Commission. The Working Group on Agricul-
tural Subsidies is the regional forum in which the Parties will reach
"mutually acceptable criteria and procedures for reaching agreement"
on the limitation or elimination of export subsidies.7 ° The NAFTA
assigns the assessment of the risks and benefits of eliminating restric-
tions on trade in worn clothing to a committee charging it with making
recommendations to the Commission. 71
In these last examples, there is a separation of powers akin to the
U.S. government. In this case, the Working Group is like an agency
and the Commission is similar to a legislature with the power to adopt
a regulatory interpretation. The separation of powers includes the di-
rect delegations of authority to other regional bodies and other ad-
ministrative bodies, constrained somewhat by a degree of
subservience by particular bodies, in some respects to the Commission
and to other administrative bodies at higher levels in the regional bu-
reaucratic hierarchy.72 All committees report to the Commission.
The Commission acts like an executive department in the U.S. govern-
67 NAFTA, supra note 1, annexes 913.5.a-1-4, at 390-93.
68 NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 913.5.a-3(4), at 393.
69 For example, NAFTA authorizes the Working Group on Rules of Origin to propose to the
Commission for its adoption modifications of NAFTA's rules on drawback, duty-rates, and
country-of-origin marking rules. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 513, at 363.
70 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 705(6)(b), at 369.
71 NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 300-B, § 9(1), at 330.
72 For example, the Commission itself can, in certain cases, alter the jurisdiction of a standing
committee. One member of the Commission may veto the power of the Committee on Trade in
Worn Clothing to make recommendations to the Commission regarding the elimination of re-
strictions on such trade. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 316, annex 300-B, § 9(1), at 303-04, 330.
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ment with the committees, and other regional bodies reporting to it as
agencies would report to departmental authorities, taking on the pol-
icy-making aspects of the executive as well.73
Focusing solely on the Free Trade Commission at the pinnacle of
the regional bureaucracy, its mandatory functions are as follows:
(a) to supervise implementation of the NAFTA;
(b) to oversee its further elaboration;
(c) to resolve disputes;
(d) to supervise all committees and working groups; and
(e) to consider any other matter that may affect the operation of the
NAFTA.74
In addition to its mandates, the NAFTA empowers the Commis-
sion to "take any action in the exercise of its functions as the Parties
[comprising that body] may agree."'75 It is foreseeable that the Com-
mission, although constituted like an executive department headed by
cabinet ministers, might act like a legislature, particularly in executing
its function to oversee "elaboration" of the NAFTA. To the extent
that this means expansion of the benefits of the NAFTA on a trilat-
eral, regional and multilateral basis as set out in its objectives,76 the
Commission may articulate law that expands both the geographic
sphere that the FTA encompasses and the substantive definition of
the benefits and obligations of that realm.
If the statutory process is the embodiment of "deals" that results
in a compromise (whether balanced or skewed) of interests that may
vary among groups, then the Commission, in making any decision re-
quired or authorized by the NAFTA, articulates law by consensus.
Earlier in this inquiry,77 we identified issues of application, interpreta-
tion, modification, and expansion that the NAFTA left open for future
resolution, as well as areas in which other regional bodies are involved
in resolution of these issues. Some of these issues are, however, left
explicitly and directly to the Commission.78
The Commission is also empowered by the specific sections of the
NAFTA to make rules and regulations to carry out the agreement's
73 Standing subcommittees and working groups act at the direction of the higher committee
within limits set by NAFTA that differ for each body. See discussion, infra § II-B-3.
74 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(2), at 693.
75 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(3)(c), at 693.
76 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102(1)(f), at 297.
77 See discussion, supra § II.
78 For example, with respect to professional services, future mutual recognition of credentials
depends upon Commission approval of recommendations made by national accrediting bodies.
NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1210.5(2),(4), at 652.
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provisions.7 9 The NAFTA authorizes the Commission to draft model
rules of procedure for intergovernmental dispute settlement panels.
With regard to cross-border trade in services, the NAFTA requires
Parties to take certain steps such as listing in a schedule appended to
the NAFTA non-conforming measures as to which it has reserved ap-
plication of the obligations of the NAFTA and imposes a duty of noti-
fication of changes to the schedule."0 The procedures for notification
are left to the complete discretion of the Commission.
The Commission articulates law in an entirely different sense
when it is charged with interpretation of the NAFTA's provisions in
the context of dispute settlement as discussed in subsection (a)
above.8l In some cases, the NAFTA provides for the submission of
the views of the Commission in that forum.!' Effectively, then, the
Commission may at times take on the attributes of a legislature; at
other times act as an executive department; and at other junctures
take on a role left to the judiciary in the U.S. government. Its multi-
plicitous institutional sides are a function of the NAFTA. Its likeness
to a chameleon, partially a result of the analogy to the United States,
only confirms that the definition of government incorporates the
structures established in the NAFTA.
c. Regional Federalism
Throughout the agreement, the NAFTA imposes regional obliga-
tions on national subunits. There are, of course, core rules applicable
to substantive areas of law with which national governments must
comply. The significant regional obligations for the present inquiry,
however, are those regarding dispute resolution and enforcement, as
well as standards of governmental operation imposed on national
subunits by the NAFTA. For example, in Chapter Eighteen, the
NAFTA imposes a requirement of transparency of national govern-
ment in the sense that governmental action must be visible to those
outside that government and, indeed, to those outside that nation in-
cluding other governments participating in the FTA.83 The NAFTA
79 This rulemaking power might be inferred in any case from the Commission's authority to
supervise the implementation of NAFTA that is granted in article 2001(2). NAFTA, supra note
1, at 693 (1993).
80 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1206, 1209, at 650.
81 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2019, at 697-98. One example already cited is its binding ruling
on whether a matter is subject to investment dispute arbitration.
82 Another example is when a matter of interpretation or application of NAFTA arises in
any national or administrative forum. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2020, at 698.
83 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1802, at 681.
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also sets up minimum due process standards for national judicial,
quasi-judicial, and administrative tribunals.84 National governmental
units must now conform to regional constraints on their autonomous
operation.
In addition to such constraints on the power of national govern-
ments to order their mode of operation, the NAFTA carefully bal-
ances regional power among the three national Parties at all levels of
the regional bureaucratic hierarchy it creates, simulating the workings
of a federal system of government in a state belonging to the federa-
tion.85 The Commission and all committees, subcommittees, and
working groups, the regional bodies that carry out the functions of
government, are comprised of representatives of the Parties. How-
ever, there is no specificity as to proportional or equal representation
or the means to balance representation on regional institutions among
the Parties. The Secretariat has separate national sections working in
tandem. Although some standing and authorized institutions like the
Commission and committees have authority to compose their own
working procedures, the NAFTA carefully delimits decision-making
power of the Commission. Consensus decision-making requires una-
nimity as one member has the power to destroy consensus with the
veto implicit in the power not to agree. The Parties must take turns
chairing regular meetings of the Commission.
86
In dispute resolution, there is the most exact care taken concern-
ing allocation of power. The trilateral Free Trade Commission drafts
the rules of procedure for the Chapter Twenty panels and selects indi-
viduals for a roster of eligible panelists.87 The NAFTA explicitly dic-
tates exact representation of the Parties on the panels. The basic
mechanism is a five-member panel to which the complaining and dis-
puting Parties have rights to select members from the roster.88 Each
disputant selects two panelists who are citizens of the other disputing
Party. The disputants agree on a chair of the panel, but in the event of
disagreement, the disputant chosen by lot must select from the roster,
as the chair, a person who is not a citizen of that Party.
84 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1805, at 681-82.
85 There are, in fact, many layers to this regional federalism as each of the constituting Par-
ties is itself a federalist system. Article 105 recognizes this in obligating the national Parties to
"ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this
Agreement, including their observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state
and provincial governments. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 105, at 298.
86 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(5), at 693.
87 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2009, 2012, at 695-96. Chapter Twenty panels are those decid-
ing intergovernmental disputes.
88 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2011, at 696.
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Panel review of antidumping and countervailing duty matters is
similarly constrained. 9 The Parties maintain a roster of at least 75
eligible panelists with each Party selecting at least 25 candidates. The
Parties must consult with each other in composing the roster. In the
event of invocation of panel review, ordinarily, the disputing Parties
each appoint two panelists from the roster to the five-member panel.
They must consult with each other in the selection and must agree on
selection of a fifth panelist.9" As in Chapter Twenty there is provision
for peremptory challenge to panelists. The panel must decide cases
based on a majority vote of all panelists. The panel applies the na-
tional law of the Party imposing the antidumping or countervailing
duty order.9
In the creation of regional power with concomitant constraints on
the exercise of national power and in the careful balance of control of
such regional power among constitutive states, we see in the NAFTA
the preemptive constructions and articulations of a constitution set-
ting up a federal government.
2. Governmental Structures for Environmental and
Labor Cooperation
The supplemental agreements on environmental and labor coop-
eration mirror the most basic structures of the NAFTA but with
changes effected for purposes of public access and participation dis-
cussed in the next section. Each agreement sets up an additional layer
of regional bureaucracy to accomplish its supplemental purposes.
These layers comprise additional institutions, allocations, and bal-
ances of power that once again echo government in the U.S. federal
sense. As in the NAFTA itself, the supplemental agreements manifest
the clearest cessions of national power to a regional regime in dispute
resolution and enforcement. These cessions create regional power
and set up constituting agreements as a central means to deploy that
power with all the markings of a government.
The Environmental Agreement creates intergovernmental and
advisory bodies as part of a Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion (Environmental Commission). 92 At the top of the bureaucratic
hierarchy comprising this commission is an intergovernmental Council
89 NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2, at 687-88.
90 NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(3), at 687-88. There are fallback procedures for
disagreements.
91 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(3), annex 1911, at 683, 691-93.
92 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 8-9, 11, 16-18, at 1485, 1487, 1489.
Constructing Democracy in the North American Free Trade Area
16:331 (1996)
(Environmental Council).93 It is a self-governing 94 body that the En-
vironmental Agreement recognizes as "the governing body of the
Commission."95 It is composed of cabinet-level appointees from each
of the Parties.
Beneath the Environmental Council is the Commission Secreta-
fiat. The Commission Secretariat is headed by an executive director
appointed by the Environmental Council for a three-year term.96 The
executive director in turn appoints the staff of the Commission Secre-
tariat.97 The Secretariat provides technical, administrative, and opera-
tional support to the Council and any committees or groups the
Council may establish. It also prepares Environmental Commission
reports and has a very important, separate role in enforcement of re-
gional norms.98
The third arm of the Enviornmental Commission is the Joint Pub-
lic Advisory Committee (JPA Committee).99 The role of the JPA
Committee is spelled out in terms of the possible: it may provide ad-
vice to the Environmental Council and perform any functions as the
Council may direct. It also has a role in enforcement.
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (Labor
Agreement) creates an intergovernmental Commission for Labor Co-
operation (Labor Commission).100 The structure of the Labor Com-
mission reflects the Labor Agreement's lesser commitment to public
access and participation than the Environmental Agreement. The La-
bor Commission is composed of a Labor Council and a Labor Secreta-
riat; there is no intrinsic public advisory body. The Labor Council,
like the Environmental Council, is a self-governing body of the na-
tional labor ministers of the Parties with the power to establish its own
rules and procedures. 1 1 Beneath the governing Labor Council is an
administrative Labor Secretariat. 102 Like the Environmental Secreta-
93 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, pt. 3(A), at 1485-87.
94 1 consider the Environmental Council to be self-governing because the Environmental
Agreement allows the Council to establish its own rules and procedures. Environmental Agree-
ment, supra note 14, art. 9(2), at 1485. The Environmental Council is, of course, subject to the
direction of the national governments whose representatives comprise its membership. Environ-
mental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 9(1), at 1485.
95 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10(1), at 1485.
96 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11(1), at 1487.
97 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11(2), at 1487.
98 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts, 12-15, at 1487-89.
99 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 8, 16, at 1485, 1489.
100 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, pt. 3, at 1504-07.
101 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 9, at 1505.
102 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 12, at 1506.
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riat, it is headed by an executive director appointed by the Labor
Council who in turn appoints a staff.
In both the environmental and labor bureaucracies of the re-
gional regime, the secretariats are strictly creatures of the regional re-
gime itself. That is, the councils create and control them directly.
Unlike NAFTA's secretariat, the environmental and labor secretariats
do not operate in independent national sections subject to national
control. The councils appoint the directors, and the directors and staff
of the secretariats of the side accords are technically answerable only
to the councils rather than to the constitutive government Parties.10 3
This regional autonomy of governmental structures from national
control is reflected, to a lesser extent, in the JPA Committee of the
environmental regime. The Environmental Council controls that
committee through the power to establish its rules of procedure and to
enlarge its membership.104 The JPA Committee, although comprised
of national appointees, also acts autonomously of national govern-
ment in that it acts under the provisions of Environmental Agreement
itself, at the behest of the regional Environmental Council, or on its
own initiative (within its narrowly defined sphere of regional
power). 10 5
a. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement
One of the primary purposes of the supplemental agreements is
to provide a mechanism for settlement of intergovernmental disputes.
The agreements establish mechanisms for redress against Parties' per-
sistent patterns of failure to enforce national environmental laws ef-
fectively0 6 or to enforce labor standards.10 7 These are new regional
causes of action, capable of resolution only in a regional forum with a
monetary penalty imposed on national governments by the regional
regime and enforced by sanctions existing only in the regional space.
103 Compare Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11(4), 1487 with Labor Agree-
ment, supra note 15, art. 12(5), at 1506.
104 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 16. at 1489.
105 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 16, at 1489.
106 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, pt. 5, at 1490-94.
107 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 27-41, at 1509-13. Article 27 of the Labor Agree-
ment limits those standards as to which a Party has recourse under the agreement's provisions
for dispute settlement to "occupational safety and health, child labor, and minimum wage techni-
cal labor standards." Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 27-41 at 1509-13. Article 29 places
the further limitation on jurisdiction that the pattern of non-enforcement must be trade-related
and covered by mutually recognized labor laws as defined in Article 49. Labor Agreement, supra
note 15, art. 49, at 1509-10, 1513.
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The regional forum is a series of processes akin to those de-
scribed in the discussion of the NAFTA but with significant differ-
ences. The processes under the two side accords are similar, but there
are sufficient differences to warrant separate descriptions. Under the
Environmental Agreement, if consultations fail, the complaining Party
may submit the matter to the Environmental Council.10 8 The Coun-
cil's options are to work toward resolution within sixty days by good
offices, conciliation, mediation recommendations to the Parties, and
any other dispute resolution procedure analogous to mediation and
conciliation. If this does not result in resolution, the complaining
Party may request the establishment of an arbitral panel.10 9 The Envi-
ronmental Council has the final say, as it must vote by a two-thirds
majority to convene the panel. If it convenes a panel, the procedures
for Party agreement as to panelists depend on a roster of qualified
panelists appointed by consensus of the Environmental Council. 110
This is a significant departure from the NAFTA model in that the re-
gional body (albeit constituted of national representatives) rather
than the states is accorded power. The Environmental Council has
the right to establish panel procedures, but the Environmental Agree-
ment guarantees minimum due process requirements of a hearing,
written submissions, and, significantly, non-disclosure of the decision
of individual panelists."' The panel prepares initial and final reports
with the right of comment by a party to the former."' If the final
report includes a finding of a persistent pattern of failure to imple-
ment environmental laws, then the Environmental Agreement con-
tains provisions for implementation of an agreed upon resolution of
the dispute, mandated implementation of a corrective "action plan,"
or a monetary enforcement assessment against a Party.113 The re-
gional panel determines the amount of any monetary enforcement as-
108 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 23, at 1490.
109 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 24(1), at 1490.
110 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 25-27, at 1491. Panelists must meet stan-
dards of expertise, independence from national or NAFMA governmental or advisory bodies,
and must comply with a code of conduct to be drafted by the Environmental Council. Environ-
mental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 25-26, at 1491.
111 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 28(1), at 1491. Considering that Article 27
gives a Party the right to select panelists, Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27, at
1491, one wonders whether this secrecy is an attempt to depoliticize the arbitral process or is
otherwise motivated.
112 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 31-32, at 1492.
113 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 34, at 1492-93.
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sessment within limits set by the agreement. 14 Failure to pay allows
the other Party to suspend benefits under the NAFTA. 115
There is also a regional mechanism for identification of failure of
a national government to enforce its environmental laws effectively.
The most important substantive function of the Environmental Secre-
tariat is to participate in this process. The Environmental Secretariat
is the body to which persons or organizations may address complaints
that a Party to the Environmental Agreement is failing to enforce its
environmental laws effectively. 1 6 In this capacity it acts as a regional.
administrative escape valve and governmental filter. The Secretariat
may bring a complaint to the attention of the Parties, requesting a
response and preparing a factual record if requested to do so by the
Party concerned." 7 The regional Secretariat alone has the power to
decide if a complaint merits a response from a national govern-
ment.118 The JPA Committee may also have a role in this process as it
is empowered to provide information to the Environmental Secreta-
riat for the purpose of preparing a factual record of a public com-
plaint, if the Environmental Council so votes." 9
Therefore, a combination of regional, rather than national, gov-
ernmental structures has jurisdiction over enforcement of national en-
vironmental laws. This jurisdiction does not replace national
jurisdiction over causes of action that may exist under national law,
but it does embody regional power distinct from national power.
Moreover, it includes the power to impose and enforce remedies that
are completely beyond the pale of national jurisdiction.
The Labor Agreement sets out a more complex, two-stage pro-
cess for intergovernmental dispute resolution. The first stage is con-
sultation and evaluation. 120 The lowest level of consultation is among
the National Administrative Offices (NAOs) which each Party must
establish to serve as a liaison with the Labor Secretariat. 2 t These
consultations may cover the internal labor law, administration, or la-
bor market conditions of a Party.' 22  Ministerial level consultations
regarding any matter within the scope of Labor Agreement are also a
114 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, annex 34(2), at 1496.
115 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 36(1), at 1493.
116 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 14(1), at 1488.
117 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 14, at 1488.
118 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 14(2), at 1488.
119 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 16, at 1489. The Environmental Commit-
tee may provide information for other purposes as well.
120 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 20-26, at 1507-09.
121 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 15, 16, 21, at 1507.
122 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 21, at 1507.
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possibility. The failure of ministerial consultations gives a Party
standing to request the establishment of a formal Evaluation Commit-
tee of Experts (ECE). Resort to this regional mechanism is not within
the veto power of the national Parties inherent in their participation in
the Labor Council. A Party wishing to block establishment of an ECE
must either point to a prior ECE report on the same issue without
intervening, new evidence or obtain a ruling that the matter is not
trade-related or is not covered by mutually recognized labor laws.123
To obtain such a ruling, a Party must petition the Labor Council to
select one independent expert to rule on the matter.124 The Labor
Council has the power to establish rules of procedure for this process.
There are no guidelines or constraints in the Labor Agreement other
than an expressed preference for a report within fifteen days of the
expert's selection. Thus, a dispute enters the regional forum con-
trolled by the Labor Agreement's provisions and its bodies, and only
regional bodies have the power to decide questions of ECE
jurisdiction.
If an ECE is convened, its jurisdiction is analysis of patterns of
Party practice in the enforcement of standards relating to any matter
within the scope of the Labor Agreement that was the subject of un-
successful ministerial consultations.125 The Labor Council has the
power to set the rules of ECE procedure within the minimal frame-
work set up by the Labor Agreement. 126 The composition of the ECE
is ultimately within the control of the regional institution, a significant
departure from the NAFTA model in which the national governments
have more direct control over the process. The Labor Council selects
the experts; the chair must be chosen from a roster developed in con-
sultation with the International Labor Organization; but the other two
members normally comprising a committee need not be chosen from a
roster developed by the Parties that is merely the preferred method of
selection. The Labor Agreement does not spell out how an ECE is to
operate other than to demand that each Party have a reasonable op-
portunity to review and comment on information submitted to the
ECE; to make written submissions to the ECE; and to comment on
the draft report of the ECE - comments the ECE must consider in
preparing its final report. The ECE has discretion as to the informa-
tion it will otherwise consider in making its report for submission to
123 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 23, at 1508.
124 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, annex 23, at 1516.
125 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 23(2), at 1508.
126 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 24, at 1508.
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the Labor Council. The Labor Agreement requires a Party to respond
to the report, all of which the Labor Council must consider at its next
regular session.
As with the Environmental Agreement, the Labor Agreement
sets up a formal mechanism for redress against a Party's persistent
failure to enforce trade-related, mutually recognized labor standards
in three enumerated areas. 127 This mechanism becomes available only
after consultations and an ECE report, as discussed above. The first
step is formal consultations. If these fail, the complaining Party may
request a special session of the Labor Council.1
28
If the Labor Council's mediation, conciliation, dispute resolution
techniques, or recommendations do not facilitate a resolution of the
matter, an arbitral panel may be requested. 129 However, the Labor
Council must vote by a two-thirds majority to convene the panel. The
procedures for selection of panelists rest on a roster created by the
Labor Council.13 This is again a significant departure from the
NAFTA model since the regional body itself is accorded power to de-
termine the eligibility of panelists. As in the Environmental Agree-
ment, the Labor Council establishes the rules by which panels
function, but the Labor Agreement sets out basic procedural require-
ments: a hearing, two submissions by Parties, and the non-disclosure
of the decisions of individual panelists. 3' The panel issues an initial
report, disputants may comment, and then the panel issues a final re-
port to the Labor Council.' 32 The Labor Agreement contains exten-
sive provisions on implementation of panel recommendations that
span agreed-upon "action plans," implementation plans imposed by
reconvened panels, and monetary penalties imposed by panels recon-
vened to consider implementation. 33 Failure to pay a monetary as-
sessment may lead to compensatory suspension of NAFTA benefits.
Again, like the Environmental Agreement, the Labor Agreement
vests power in a regional dispute settlement process run by regional
127 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 27-41, at 1509-13. A Party's recourse is limited by
Article 27, Labor Agreement, supra note 15, at 1509, to occupational safety and heath, child
labor, and minimum wage technical labor standards.
128 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 28, at 1509.
129 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 29, at 1509-10.
130 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 30-32, at 1510. Panelists must meet standards set
out in the Labor Agreement as well as comply with a Code of conduct to be drafted by the Labor
Council. See Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 30(2)(d), at 1510.
131 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 33, at 1510.
132 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 36, 37, at 1511.
133 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 39, annex 39, 1511-12, 1516.
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bodies that may result in national monetary liability created and en-
forced solely by regional institutions.
b. Articulation, Interpretation, and Administration of Law
The commissions for environmental and labor cooperation, from
a constitutional perspective, serve as two executive departments of the
regional regime. They comprise subordinate agencies (the councils
and secretariats) that meet particular, interrelated functions. The role
of each commission is set by the international agreement, but the
functions of the agencies leave much autonomy to those regional insti-
tutions in performing their assigned functions.
The Environmental Agreement calls for the Environmental Com-
mission to facilitate cooperation on the conservation, protection, and
enhancement of the environment in the territories of the signato-
ries."3 The regional framework of governance is aimed at internal
environmental spheres as well as common and extraterritorial effects,
underscoring the fact that the NAFTA and its penumbral agreements,
as executed, interpreted, and administered by regional governmental
structures, are intended to have direct consequences within the partic-
ipating nations. 35
The councils meet at least annually in regular session to engage in
intergovernmental dialogue, negotiation, and policy-making. 136 This
regional policy-making is directly analogous to administrative inter-
pretation of statutes via regulation in the United States. Both the En-
vironmental and Labor Councils have the function of implementing
and elaborating on the respective agreements. 37 As in the NAFTA
itself, the autonomy to interpret the NAFTA and the charge to de-
velop recommendations as to future obligations138 invest the councils
with powers amplified by the expected expansion of the FTA. The
supplemental agreements refer to the councils as "governing" bodies
within the respective commissions. 39 The autonomy of the councils is
134 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, pmbl., at 1482.
135 See, e.g., Annette B. Fox, Environment and Trade: The NAFTA Case, 110 PoL. Sci. Q. 49,
49-50 (Spring 1995).
136 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10, at 1485-87; Labor Agreement, supra
note 15, art. 9(3), at 1505.
137 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10(1)b, at 1484; Labor Agreement, supra
note 15, art. 10(1), at 1505.
138 See, e.g., Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10(7), at 1486-87 (recommenda-
tions within three years on transboundary environmental issues).
139 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10(1), at 1485; Labor Agreement, supra
note 15, art. 10(1), at 1505.
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supported by their authority to promulgate rules for arbitral panels 40
and to change their mode of decision-making.141 Many aspects of the
publication of information are left to the discretion of the councils. 42
The Environmental Agreement sets out numerous functions for
the Environmental Council related to development of national imple-
mentation of specific environmental goals recognized by the Parties in
the agreement.143 The Environmental Council may consider and de-
velop recommendations regarding any matter it chooses in addition to
a laundry list of environmental goals.'" The Environmental Agree-
ment charges the Environmental Council with establishing a process
for developing recommendations on greater compatibility of environ-
mental technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment
procedures. 1
45
The Environmental Council is responsible for overseeing the
NAFTA's goals of harmonization in the environmental sphere."4 Ad-
ditionally, the Environmental Council must work with the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission to achieve the NAFTA goals.14 7 For example,
the Council is to act as a collector of public comments on the NAFTA
environmental goals. The Council also directs implementation and
develops recommendations on further elaboration of the agreement.
It can address questions and differences between the Parties on inter-
pretation and application of the Environmental Agreement and has
the power to establish and assign responsibilities to such groups as it
may choose to convene, seek advice, and, most significantly, take such
other action in the exercise of its functions as the Parties comprising it
may agree. 48
The Labor Council, like the Environmental Council, is a self-gov-
erning body of the national labor ministers of the Parties with the
power to establish its own rules and procedures. 4 9 Its functions are
140 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 28(1), at 1491; Labor Agreement, supra
note 15, art. 33(1), at 1510. Both agreements specify only minimal procedural requirements for
these rules.
141 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 9(6), at 1485; Labor Agreement, supra note
15, art. 9(6), at 1505.
142 See discussion, infra § II-B-3.
143 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10, at 1485-87.
144 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10(2), at 1485-86.
145 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10(3)b, at 1486.
146 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 906, at 387.
147 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10(6), at 1486.
148 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 9(5), 10(6), at 1484-85.
149 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 9-10, at 1505; Environmental Agreement, supra
note 14, art. 9, at 1485.
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primarily those of a consultative body with a public relations mis-
sion.150  Cooperative action and technical assistance projects are
aimed at a list of labor issues with a catch-all provision for other mat-
ters as the Parties may agree.' 51 The Parties may also empower the
Labor Council to take other action as they later see fit.152 The Labor
Council meets once a year in regular session.
The Environmental Secretariat is a regional administrative
agency. Although the Environmental Council meets only periodically,
the Environmental Secretariat exists as an independent regional body
that functions continuously. This regional bureaucratic institution will
keep the regional regime running. As noted in subsection (a) above,
the Environmental Secretariat also has an important, largely in-
dependent role in regional dispute resolution. Although the Labor
Secretariat similarly performs the role of an administrative agency on
a continuing basis, its functions are more limited. In addition to gen-
eral assistance to the Labor Council, the Labor Secretariat's major
role is in the preparation and publication of labor issue reports from
information supplied by the Parties. 53 In responding to Labor Coun-
cil requests for special reports, the Labor Secretariat is empowered to
hire independent experts. It is purely a regional administrative agency
with no role in dispute resolution.
Both supplemental agreements set regional goals as a statute
might set national goals. The task of the governing structures created
by those agreements is to meet the goals with specific action. As in an
executive department in the U.S. government, implementing policy
will flow largely from the top level of the bureaucracy, while the brunt
of the work of translating policy into action falls upon an agency cre-
ated by the regional bureaucracy itself and accountable only to the
regional government.
c. Regional Federalism
The NAFTA and its supplemental agreements reflect a careful
balance of the power allocated among regional structures. Consensus
decision-making by the councils reflects a power of veto retained by
150 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 10, at 1505; Environmental Agreement, supra note
14, art. 10, at 1485-87.
151 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 11(1), at 1505. Examples are collective bargaining
procedures, occupational health and safety, and employment standards.
152 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 10(2), at 1505.
153 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 14, at 1506-07.
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the national Parties. 54 Parts of agreements requiring only a two-
thirds vote reflect majority rule in a federation of three.'55 The direc-
torship of the secretariats must rotate consecutively among nationals
of the three Parties.156 The councils may remove the director solely
for cause; any rejection of a staff appointment by the secretariat direc-
tors requires a two-thirds council vote.157 In the environmental re-
gime, the members of the JPA Committee must be equally allocated
among the three nations unless the Environmental Council decides on
a different balance of membership. 58
As in dispute settlement under the NAFTA, the regional power
to control the process in the supplemental agreements is constrained
by powers left specifically to the national Parties. This includes, for
example, the Parties' selection of arbitral panelists from regionally-
created rosters for particular disputes. 59
One way in which layers of government in a federal system are
manifested in the labor cooperation regime is by the requirement that
each Party maintain NAOs to serve, inter alia, as a liaison with the
Labor Secretariat. 60 The NAOs represent a line of communication
between governmental structures across a clear line of demarcation
between national and regional government.
Another mark of federalism is the imposition by the constituting
document of standards of operation for the governmental structures
of the subordinate political units. Part two of each supplemental
agreement sets out the manner in which national governments must
carry out their national law. The obligations are more strongly
worded in the Environmental Agreement, but their existence in both
agreements reflects overarching regional restraint on how nations gov-
ern. This is significantly different than the imposition of substantive
154 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 9(6), at 1485; Labor Agreement, supra note
15, art. 9(6), at 1505.
155 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 24(1), at 1490; Labor Agreement, supra
note 15, art. 29(1), at 1509, with respect to convening an arbitral panel.
The transparency of the regional regime often hinges on two-thirds votes of the councils.
See, e.g., Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15(7), at 1489 (publication of factual
record of public grievance). This is an obvious bow to political balance necessary in a federal
system.
156 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11(1), at 1487; Labor Agreement, supra
note 15, art. 12(1), at 1506.
157 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11(1), 11(3), at 1487; Labor Agreement,
supra note 15, art. 12(1), (4), at 1506.
158 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 16(1), at 1489.
159 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 25, 27, at 1491; Labor Agreement, supra
note 15, arts. 30, 32, at 1510.
160 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 15, 16, at 1507.
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international rules in any treaty with which nations are expected to
conform.
In the Environmental Agreement, these federal governmental re-
quirements take the form of procedural obligations including public
notice and comment (to the extent possible) on pending measures,
publication of laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rules
of general application, modes of enforcement, availability of enforce-
ment proceedings and private access to remedies under those pro-
ceedings, and procedural due process requirements in such
proceedings.' 6' The Labor Agreement contains analogous, though
weaker, provisions. 62 The Labor Agreement obliges each Party to
enforce national labor law effectively, 163 to afford "persons with a le-
gally recognized interest under its law" with "appropriate access" to a
process for enforcement of national labor laws,164 to afford enumer-
ated procedural guarantees in internal enforcement proceedings, 16 5 to
publish laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings, 166
and to "promote public awareness" of national labor law.167 The pro-
cedural guarantees specify transparency of national enforcement pro-
ceedings as a goal and enumerate specific modes of accomplishing this
aim (i.e., public hearings with the right of participation by Parties to
the proceeding and published decisions).
168
Like the NAFTA, the supplemental agreements create regional
power, but they place it squarely within the control of institutions that
are even more removed from direct national control. The constraints
on the exercise of national power and modes of governmental opera-
tion remain within national control. The careful balance of control of
such regional power among constitutive states exhibit subsidiary con-
161 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 4-7, at 1483-85.
162 Advance notice and comment on proposed labor measures must be accorded only when
national law establishes such a right. Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 6, at 1504.
163 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 3, at 1503. This obligates labor authorities to give
"due consideration in accordance with its law" to requests by interested persons for an investiga-
tion of an alleged violation of a Party's labor law. The question once again arises (as with the
Environmental Agreement), who is an "interested person" entitled to make a request?
164 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 4, at 1503.
165 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 5, at 1504.
166 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 6, at 1504.
167 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 7, at 1504.
168 The weakness of the procedural "guarantees" in Article 5 is reflected in the language that
makes each more a principle than an obligation. For example, enforcement proceedings need
not be open to the public where the administration of justice otherwise requires. Labor Agree-
ment, supra note 15, art. 5(1)(b), at 1504. Similarly, enforcement decisions must be made avail-
able to the public "consistent with [national] law." Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 5(2)(b).
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structions and articulations of a constitution setting up a federal
government.
3. A Polity Emerges
A new regional polity is extant in the articulation and interpreta-
tion of economic rules that are binding upon states participating in the
regional order through a cession of national sovereignty; in the admin-
istration of those rules that have been given the fofc'e of lavI in the
resolution of disputes requiring the application of those rules; and in
the enforcement of those rules through the power of sanction. It is a
federation created by the governments of nations and vested with
some of their powers, sometimes to the extent of divesting national
governmental structures of jurisdiction. It separates delegated powers
among various institutions, allocates power among the constituting
governmental bodies, and permits the exercise of certain powers only
by the regional polity to the exclusion of subsidiary national polities
and enforceable against them. It is analogous to the U.S. government.
In the context of the NAFTA, however, it may be insufficient to
define the FTA as a political space as one in which "politics" is carried
on by a government serving traditional governmental functions or by
a political class, the regional bureaucrats, and technocrats of free
trade.169 At least one contemporary political theorist has posited that
the modern concept of the political is "the practical realization of the
universal value of freedom [of the individual] in the public domain,
the public area in which issues are discussed, contested, and de-
cided. ' 170 It is not the public character of an issue that makes it neces-
sarily political' 7' but its relationship to this core, substantive value.
Based on this definition, the political character of the regional space
depends on whether it serves the value of universal freedom. The de-
termination that the regional space is political identifies its structures
as governmental and distinguishes them, in the end, from other orga-
nizational frameworks such as corporate boards that "govern" other
spheres and bodies but which are not governments. One may argue
from this definition of "political" that the mechanisms for public ac-
cess and participation in the supplemental agreements are themselves
hallmarks of a "government." In the understanding of that word from
169 See Agnes Heller, The Concept of the Political Revisited, in POLITICAL THEORY TODAY
330 (David Held ed., 1991). Heller, a theorist in the republican or civic virtue school of thought,
describes how this is an outmoded definition of the concept of the political.
170 Id. at 340.
171 Id. at 342.
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a U.S. perspective of republican democracy, they are also key
markers.
Nevertheless, to answer the question whether the entire panoply
of FTA structures serves freedom and is thus political, one must pro-
ceed on the assumption that there is a regional government, in the
traditional sense of government, in the United States and assess its
relationship to individual freedom in the public domain. The issue of
individual freedom in the public arena further determines the regional
constituency of a presumed polity.
B. Public Access and Government Accountability
Before proceeding to any analysis of issues of public access and
accountability in the regional sphere, we must explain how and why
regional mechanisms to accomplish these purposes evolved. The side
accords build new layers of regional bureaucracy onto the NAFTA's
institutional frame. In so doing, they explicitly recognize the impor-
tance of public participation and provide avenues of public access to
the processes of regional government that simply do not exist in the
core agreement. A short history of the genesis of the NAFTA and the
side accords in the United States is, therefore, necessary.
1. The Politics of NAFTA in the United States
If FTAs are indeed new polities, the making of the constitutive
agreements that govern the new social, economic, and political order
should be a matter of intense, open political debate. In the United
States, however, the process by which free trade agreements are nego-
tiated and approved ignores this value. It reflects an outdated vision
of the possibilities and importance of FTAs that predated the need to
keep pace not only with the global movements of capital, goods, serv-
ices, and people, but also with the increasingly competitive pressures
of a politically unified European Union and a then dominant Japanese
trade "machine." The U.S. process reflected the idea that FTAs were
simply a new way in which to remove trade barriers that the post-
GAT system, then enmired in the seemingly endless "Uruguay
Round" of multilateral trade negotiations, was simply too unwieldy to
dismantle.' 72 Thus, the NAFTA resulted from a relatively closed
political process. Upon its emergence into the glare of the public
spotlight, it met with massive and intense political opposition.
172 See 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994) (1988 trade agreement negotiating objectives).
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At first glance, the road to the NAFTA seems a straightforward,
transparent process. The NAFTA is a type of treaty known as an "ex-
ecutive agreement," whereby Congress authorizes the President by
legislation to negotiate an agreement on a particular matter. After
delegating this power, Congress may reserve to itself the final right of
approval of the NAFTA. This has been the case with trade agree-
ments, including the NAFTA, over the past quarter century.
In 1988, Congress authorized the President to negotiate the
NAFTA.173 The U.S. system for negotiating trade agreements, as clar-
ified by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,174 en-
tailed diplomatic level negotiations by the executive branch
represented by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the
chief U.S. policy formulator for all trade matters in the United
States. 75 The delegation of negotiating authority to the USTR re-
quires consultation with congressional committees and with a large
system of advisory groups in an otherwise "secret" '176 negotiating pro-
cess. 177 These advisory groups primarily represent the private sector.
With the exception of one advisory committee whose composition is
outlined by statute, 178 the USTR constitutes these advisory groups as
to subject matter and membership.'79 The USTR set up a hierarchy of
advisory committees and functional and sectoral subcommittees. 8 °
The advisory committees gave their views but did not participate in
the actual negotiation process. They were required to give final re-
ports to the executive and legislative branches on the substance of the
final agreement.' 81 The negotiation process also included public hear-
ings.' 82 In addition, the U.S. International Trade Commission, an in-
dependent government agency, held public hearings on the impact of
173 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (1994).
174 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (1994).
175 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1994).
176 There were "leaks" of information about and drafts of the agreement as negotiations
progressed, but reports of these were limited to the trade media and did not generally cross over
into the general media.
177 19 U.S.C. §§ 2155, 2171, 2902-03 (1994).
178 The 1988 Act required that the President establish an Advisory Committee for Trade Pol-
icy and Negotiations to be composed of 45 individuals representing government, labor, industry,
small business, service industries, retailers, consumer interests, and the general public. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2155(b) (1994).
179 The USTR is subject, however, to the general authority and limitations of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15, 19 U.S.C. § 2155(c), (f) (1994).
180 For an overview of the advisory committee structure during the NAFTA negotiations see
1992 Trade Policy Agenda and 1991 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the
Trade Agreements Program, at 88-90.
181 19 U.S.C. § 2155(e) (1994).
182 19 U.S.C. § 2153 (1994); 1992 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 180, at 65.
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the NAFTA on the U.S. economy and issued technical, economic
reports.1
3
Once an agreement was ready, the President gave Congress the
notice required by law of its conclusion and of his intent to sign the
NAFTA.' 4 After signature, the next step in the approval process set
up by Congress in the 1988 Act was submission of the NAFTA to
Congress along with implementing legislation and an administrative
statement about the NAFTA. Upon its submission, the NAFTA
would be subject to what is known as "fast track" approval proce-
dures.18 5 The fast track process, in essence, gives Congress limited
time in which to consider the NAFTA, applies parliamentary re-
straints to enforce these time limits, and, most significantly, prevents
amendment of the NAFTA. Congress must either approve or disap-
prove the NAFTA in full. Without Congressional approval, the
NAFTA could not come into force with respect to the United States
President Bush signed the NAFTA for the United States on De-
cember 17, 1992.186 The President did not present the NAFTA to
Congress for approval until almost a year later.187 By the end of 1992,
mounting political opposition to the NAFTA had arisen. The opposi-
tion came from two sources: dissatisfaction with the substantive terms
of the NAFTA by labor unions and a broad array of environmental
groups (backed by various congressional factions), and procedural
protests to the exclusionary, closed nature of the negotiation and ap-
188proval process.
183 See, eg., United States International Trade Commission, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT
(1993).
184 The President had to give 90 days notice to Congress of his intent to sign NAFTA. 19
U.S.C. § 2903(a) (1994); 57 Fed. Reg. 43,603 (1992).
185 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1994). The expeditious, fast track process applied unless Congress took
specific steps to take a trade agreement out of its scope. "Fast track" has since expired. Efforts to
renew it have been tendentious and unsuccessful. Kantor's Legislative Priorities Still Include Fast
Track for Chile, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. 246 (Feb. 14, 1996).
186 NAFTA, supra note 1, at 703.
187 President Clinton submitted NAFTA and the required implementing legislation and ad-
ministrative statement on November 4, 1993. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, THE YEAR IN
TRADE: OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 45th Rep. 59 (1994).
188 See Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391, 398-402 (1993)
(describing congressional concerns about negotiation of non-trade issues and the administration
response expressed prior to allowing extension of fast-track procedures until June 1, 1993, to
accommodate NAFTA); Robert F. Housman & Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environ-
mental Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Backward and a Look
Forward, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 719, 726-34 (1993) (summarizing the various positions
and lobbying efforts of labor and environmental groups).
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What seemed on the surface to be an open process was really
open only to certain interest groups selected by the USTR. Other
groups and the public at large were unrepresented, underrepresented,
and left largely uninformed until the NAFTA had been concluded.
For example, the advisory committees did not have representatives of
groups concerned with environmental issues until political pressure
forced their inclusion quite late in the process for the NAFTA.189 The
public hearings held during the negotiations were inadequate at best
as a vehicle for public information, education, and solicitation of
views. 190 Congressional hearings held during the process of negotia-
tion and in the period between conclusion of the NAFTA and its sub-
mission for formal approval did not result in public awareness of the
significance or substance of the NAFTA. 1'9 In sum, there was no sub-
stantial public access to information about the NAFTA or debate
about its advisability until Congress was set to approve or disapprove
of the entire package. Thus, the diplomatic process of international
negotiation in combination with "fast track" approval procedures in-
sulated the NAFTA from public awareness and public impact.
Focusing on environmental groups will illustrate how opposition
to the substance of the NAFTA and the closed process of its negotia-
tion and approval reached critical mass. 92 While negotiations were in
progress, environmental groups, excluded from adequate representa-
tion in the advisory committee framework for the NAFTA, instituted
legal action against the USTR. They unsuccessfully sought to enjoin
the negotiations pending completion of an environmental impact
statement on which they could then comment under federal law.'93
Eventually, the courts decided that an environmental impact state-
For President Bush's request for extension of fast-track negotiating authority, see Presi-
dent's Message to the Congress on Trade Negotiations and Agreements, 27 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 242 (Mar. 1, 1991).
189 1992 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 180, at 88.
190 Frances L. Ansley, North American Free Trade Agreement: The Public Debate, 22 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 329, 330-33 (1992).
191 Keith Bradsher, Free Trade Pact Is Still a Mystery to Many in U.S., N.Y. lIMES, July 12,
1993, at Al, D3 (poll showing only 51% of Americans had heard or read of NAFTA).
192 Not all environmental groups opposed NAFTA in its final form. For example, the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation supported the agreement, while the Sierra Club opposed it. Stuart
Auerbach, Major Conservation Groups Divided on Trade Agreement, WASH. Posr, Oct. 1, 1994,
at D14.
193 Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992)
(dismissed for lack of standing), aff'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (no final agency action while
negotiations pending).
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ment was not required. 194 Denial of effective entry points into the
process by which they could have some impact on the substance of the
NAFTA or, at least, place their concerns on the political table was
coupled with international developments that intensified their concern
with issues of access to further substantive issues of environmental
protection as perceived by these groups.
At the end of 1991, a ruling by a GATr dispute settlement panel
that a court-ordered U.S. embargo of certain Mexican tuna and tuna
products under the mandates of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
violated the obligations of the United States under GAIT195 became a
political flashpoint. The panel recommended that free trade should
not be fettered even for valid environmental reasons absent a clear
message from the GAIT membership specifically addressing the ap-
propriate link between environmental and trade goals.196 Although
the non-binding report was never adopted by the GAIT Council of
Representatives, environmental groups and members of Congress
voiced outrage at the decision. The outcry against the substance of
the decision was joined with protests that trade specialists were in-
competent. to decide environmental issues requiring scientific exper-
tise. The inflammatory debate on the issue of the exclusion of voices
of environmental protection from global trade fora was fueled by the
U.N. Conference on the Environment and Development in June 1992
that called for a link between environmental concerns and sustainable
economic development. 197
Public opposition and the political momentum in Congress be-
hind the two major interest groups opposed to the NAFTA threatened
the NAFTA's political viability.198 As he had stated prior to his elec-
tion, President Clinton stayed the course of promising that he would
not support the NAFTA without supplemental agreements that ad-
dressed the concerns of three major opposition groups: labor, the en-
vironment, and farmers of perishable agricultural products.199 On
194 Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993),
rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), (submission of NAFTA to Congress not a final agency action),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1993).
195 GATT- Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991).
196 Id.
197 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Done at Rio de Janeiro, June 14,
1992, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/PC/WG.III/L.33/Rev. 1, principle 4, 31 I.L.M. 876, 877 (1992).
198 Bob Davis, NAFTA Clears Hurdle in Appellate Court, But Faces Tough Battle in Congress,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1993, at A3-A4.
199 See, e.g., Gwen Ifil, 1992 Campaign: The Democrats; With Reservation, Clinton Endorses
Free-Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992, at Al (focusing on labor issues); 10 INT'L TRADE REP.
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September 14, 1993, the three NAFTA signatories signed supplemen-
tal agreements on these issues.20 0 At that point, the President was
ready to press for approval of the NAFTA.
In the fall of 1993, the NAFTA's political future was a matter of
heated political contest.20 ' The likelihood of its approval was an un-
certain proposition. Although it almost failed,20 2 in the end, Congress
approved the NAFTA and implemented it in U.S. law.21 3 A condition
of its approval was approval by Mexico and Canada of two of the
supplemental agreements. 2°
Thus, the nature of the process gave rise to a host of complica-
tions at the birth of the new trade area. The process that had origi-
nally excluded environmental groups eventually led to their having a
disproportionate impact on the final outcome. The necessity of sup-
plemental agreements as political concessions added layers of bureau-
cracy to the operative framework of the area that would not have
been necessary had all interests been accommodated in an open pro-
cess from the start. The relationship between the NAFTA and the
supplemental agreements for countries later seeking to join the FTA
was a messy, open question. The repercussions even spread beyond
the NAFTA. By 1994, the process itself was a major political issue.
Mounting criticism of fast track approval procedures from both sides
of the political spectrum in Congress held up congressional approval
of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreements that the United
States and other GATT contracting parties had signed in April
1994.05
Between 1992 and 1994, the issues of public access and govern-
ment accountability became focal points of debate about the nature of
U.S. involvement in and commitment to trading regimes. From this
vantage, we now turn to an analysis of how the NAFTA and its sup-
(BNA) at 614 (Apr. 14, 1993) (President makes side accords precondition of sending NAFTA to
Congress).
200 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
201 See Robin Toner, The Free Trade Accord: Congressional Leaders; Just Waiting to Get this
Vote Over With, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1993, at B10.
202 Bob Davis & Jackie Calmes, The House Passes NAFTA - Trade Win: Providing President
with Crucial Victory, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1993, at Al (234-200 vote); Helen Dewar, NAFTA
Wins Final Congressional Test, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al (Senate vote of 61 to 38).
203 NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
204 19 U.S.C. § 3311(b) (1994) (labor and environmental agreements).
205 See All 44 Republican Senators Oppose Administration's Fast-Track Proposal, 11 Ir'L
TRADE REP. (BNA), at 1026 (June 29, 1994). Fast track approval expired in early 1994. 19
U.S.C. § 2902(e) (1994) (fast track applicable to Uruguay Round agreements signed before
April 16, 1994). The debate about its renewal was a major sticking point in the congressional
debate about approval of the Uruguay Round agreements.
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plemental agreements address these issues and how a regional govern-
ment should respond to such questions.
2. An Analytical Dichotomy
Against the descriptive background of the governmental struc-
tures and mechanisms of the FTA and the clamoring at the gate of
U.S. interest groups excluded from access to the processes of interna-
tional negotiation and domestic implementation of the NAFTA by the
United States, it is time to bring into analytical relief the means by
which the regional government allows for public participation in its
functions and affords that public an accounting. To accomplish this
sculptural process, a stark dichotomy is a useful chisel. The ordinal
question is: who is the public in this new regional political space? For
present purposes, we shall assume that the FTA is a polity of either
states or peoples. 0 6
Any assessment of access and accountability depends on whether
the regional government has a constituency of states or a constituency
of peoples. If the government is responsible to its constituting na-
tions, it is their access that is relevant. If it must account to a constitu-
ency, issues of public access and accountability must be evaluated
from the perspective of that constituency. A constituency of peoples
would consist of citizens of those states now seen as a regional citi-
zenry. By analyzing whether the regional government affords access
and participation to states or people, we can deduce to which constitu-
ency it is accountable, and then proceed to a discussion of how we
should define the constituency of this new polity.
207
206 This artificial dichotomy ignores, for the sake of analytical clarity, the possibility that a
free trade area that is, in essence, a new form of federalist system may have two levels of constit-
uency, the constitutive political bodies and the people represented by them. This notion of dual-
ity is supported by the idea of sovereignty free from the state/people dichotomy and defined by
the need to balance the power of both expressed by David Held in Democracy, the Nation-State
and the Global System, in POLTMCAL THEORY TODAY, supra note 169, at 197, 228.
207 We must acknowledge that some political philosophers of the current age would reject this
dichotomous question as irrelevant. "In modem times, the question 'who is the state?' makes
little sense; one should rather ask what it is." Heller, supra note 169, at 331. However, this focus
on the state as a set of political institutions that are really a network of human relations is not
completely unrelated to the inquiry as to who is the constituency of the FTA, as the answer to
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3. A Critical Assessment: Access and Accountability for
Which Constituency?
A comparison of the governmental structures and processes of
the NAFTA with those of its side accords shows parallel institutions
with a predictably greater degree of deference in the later agreements
to the growing public concerns about access and accountability.
Mechanisms for citizen access to and participation in the governmen-
tal structures and processes in the environmental and labor agree-
ments exceed those in the NAFTA both in number and effect. It
becomes apparent, however, that despite increased avenues for citizen
access and participation in the side accords, the entire operative
framework for the FTA falls short in its accountability to nongovern-
mental entities. The regional regime remains a creature of its national
creators, and it is responsive to states, not people.
If the ideas of public access and participation are broken into
component parts, there are useful focal points for assessing the degree
to which and for whom an agreement serves such goals. These com-
ponents are (1) the potential for service in and control of membership
in the government, (2) oversight of the operation of government with
some power over its direction, (3) the ability to contribute information
to governmental processes and to control consideration of informa-
tion in its decisions and actions, and (4) the ability to obtain informa-
tion held by the government and relied upon by it for particular
purposes. Accountability of government in the context of the regional
trade regime depends upon who retains the power and control over
the course and direction of the regional governmental structures and
actions.
a. NAFTA
(1) Government Membership and Selection of Members
The NAFTA contains very few provisions for direct citizen mem-
bership in governmental bodies. As noted above, the main govern-
mental structure, the Free Trade Commission, comprises cabinet level
national representatives. The Secretariat is actually three separate na-
tional sections overseen by the Commission. Where nongovernmental
individuals are to serve governmental functions, the regional govern-
ment itself retains control over both the nomination and selection pro-
cess. Individuals outside government can serve on committees and
working groups and can be nominated as panelists for dispute settle-
ment proceedings under Articles 19 or 20. With respect to rosters of
374
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panelists, the three nations consult as to the individuals listed.20 8 The
disputing Parties control the selection of panelists for any particular
dispute.20 9 With respect to committees and working groups, there are
not many instances in which the NAFTA requires citizen participa-
tion.210 In general, the Parties are given carte blanche to appoint
"representatives of the parties" to standing committees.21'
The provisions for the standing committees and working groups
reveal that the states control both membership and, often, the agenda
with few mechanisms requiring citizen inclusion either as committee
members or in some other capacity such as advisors.212 Where com-
mittees have the power to establish working groups, the NAFTA also
gives them discretion as to the scope and mandate of such groups.213
208 NAF'A, supra note 1, annex 1901.2, art. 2009, at 687-88, 695-96. In the United States, the
USTR invites public applications for U.S. nomination to the roster. The USTR's decisions on
nominations are not, however, a matter of public notice and comment.
209 NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2, art. 2011, at 687-88, 696.
210 Only groups dealing with textiles are subject to mandates of private sector representation.
NAFrA, supra note 1, annex 300-B, § 9(1), annex 913.5.a-4(2), at 330, 393.
211 "Representative of a party" may mean persons other than government employees. Sup-
port for this argument comes from the few instances where NAFTA delineates committee mem-
bership in requirements as to specific government functionaries that must sit on the committee.
See eg., NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1412, annex 1412.1, at 660, 662 (Financial Services Commit-
tee). However, only in the context of the textile and apparel sector is there any requirement of
nongovernmental membership in regional committees or subcommittees. NAFTA, supra note 1,
annex 1901.2, art. 2011 at 687-88, 695-96. From this, one may argue that each Party has discre-
tion to interpret who may serve as its representative unless NAFTA precludes such discretion.
This discretion in the language of NAFTA supports state control of membership in regional
governmental structures.
212 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 706, at 369 (Committee on Agriculture to be comprised of
representatives of the Parties without delineation as to composition); NAFrA, supra note 1, arts.
722, 723, at 381-82 (Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures to be comprised of
government employees or appointees with responsibility for such measures in the Parties);
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 913(6), at 391 (Committee on Standards-Related Measures may in-
clude representatives of state or provincial governments, but this arguably closer connection
between regional government and citizens is available only upon Party request and is subject to
restraints of reasonableness, appropriateness, and availability of measures); NAFrA, supra note
1, art. 1021, at 621 (Committee on Small Business to be comprised of non-specified representa-
tives of the Parties); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1415, at 661 (Financial Services Committee must
be composed of government officials with no direction as to who acts for the committee when a
Party requests a binding ruling on whether an exception in Article 1410 applies in a dispute
between a Party and a private investor). The six standing working groups are composed of
representatives of the Parties with no provisions for public membership. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra
note 1, art. 1605, at 665 (Temporary Entry Working Group to be composed of representatives of
the Parties including immigration officials).
213 See, eg., NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 722(3)(e), 723(3), at 381-82 (working groups under
the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).
In the four subcommittees that the Committee on Standards-related measures must estab-
lish, only two have membership constraints. NAFIA, supra note 1, annexes 913.5.a-1-.a-4, at
392-93. The subcommittee on labeling of textiles and apparel must include technical experts as
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This level of remove from external layers of national government to
which citizens have some degree of access may be indicative of greater
or lesser public access to the regional institution, depending on one's
point of view and the degree of accessibility of the national govern-
ment at issue. The relative freedom of the committee to constitute
working groups can result in more or less public participation, de-
pending on the priorities of the person exercising it. Of course, with
measures to ensure public access to regional working groups and
other bodies one could better predict the degree of public
participation.
(2) Oversight and Control of Government
Throughout the framework of committees there are no explicit
mechanisms for anyone other than the Parties to nominate and select
members. There are not explicit mechanisms for citizens or nongov-
ernmental groups to have a means of participating in the work of
these committees or overseeing their functions and actions.
To the extent that standing committees and subcommittees give
nongovernmental persons a limited means to participate in regional
government and, thus, some influence over its courses of action, the
degree of that influence varies by committee. Yet, generally, the im-
portance and scope of the function of a committee is in reverse pro-
portion to the degree of public access and transparency required of
the group by the NAFTA. The Committee on Trade in Goods is com-
prised of Party representatives (with no particular requirements) and
meets at the request of any Party or the Commission.214 It has no
specific function other than its existence as a vehicle for intergovern-
mental consultations on any matter covered by Chapter Three regard-
ing national treatment and market access for goods, a major focal
point of the NAFTA. In contrast to the broad jurisdiction and unspec-
ified composition and power of the Committee on Trade in Goods, the
Committee on Trade in Worn Clothing,215 with a narrow mandate to
assess the risks and benefits of eliminating restrictions on such rela-
well as a broadly representative group from the manufacturing and retailing sectors of each
Party. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 913.5.a-4, at 393. The Automotive Standards Council may
include private sector representatives in the subgroups it is empowered to establish but only if
the Parties agree to their inclusion. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 913.5.a-3, at 393. To the extent
that the standards committee may delegate consultations to subcommittees or working groups
for non-binding recommendations, the failure to provide for broad nongovernmental participa-
tion in all these groups represents a lost opportunity to provide citizen access to the regional
government.
214 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 316, at 303-04.
215 NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 300-B, § 9(1), at 330.
Constructing Democracy in the North American Free Trade Area
16:331 (1996)
tively unimportant trade, is subject to specific provisions regarding
public participation and transparency. If the Party representatives in
the committee do not include a spectrum of industry representatives,
the committee must consult with a broadly representative group. The
NAFTA charges the committee to make recommendations to the
commission unless a member of the commission formally objects to
the making of recommendations. Elimination of trade restrictions in
this area may only follow from agreement of the Parties upon recom-
mendations of the Committee. Thus, in its narrow sphere, the commit-
tee has relatively broad power subject to Party veto.
If advisory committees give citizens some oversight over the op-
eration of government and some power over its direction, the NAFTA
is deficient. It sets up only two: an Advisory Committee on Private
Commercial Disputes 16 and a public advisory committee on private
commercial disputes regarding agricultural goods. 17 To the regional
regime, only where a private dispute is involved does private sector
advice become relevant under the terms of the NAFTA. The advisory
committees are the two governmental structures that are most directly
creatures of the regional bureaucracy itself. That is, regional bodies
rather than the Parties are primarily responsible for setting up the
committees. In the case of the Advisory Committee on Private Com-
mercial Disputes, the Free Trade Commission has unlimited discretion
to select the experts to sit on the committee.2 18 The function of this
regional committee is shaped by the commission which refers general
issues of arbitration or alternative dispute resolution to the committee
for a report and recommendation to the commission. For other com-
mittees, the NAFTA specifies jurisdiction and agenda. The one com-
mittee directly responsive to the hierarchy of the regional regime is
not fettered by constraints as to its composition or function. The task
of the other advisory committee is to counsel the Committee on Agri-
cultural Trade on the development of national systems for resolution
of such disputes. However, the committee has discretion as to the
persons with expertise and experience in the field who will sit as mem-
bers of the advisory group.
Without explicit mechanisms for public involvement there is little
chance that citizens can participate in this regional political arena in
any capacity or exercise any power they might retain to oversee its
216 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2022(4), at 698.
217 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 707, at 369.
218 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2022(4), at 698. This selection must be by consensus unless the
commission agrees otherwise in constituting the committee.
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functioning and growth. This conclusion stems from the sheer impen-
etrability of the legal prose and byzantine rules of the NAFTA that
make the NAFTA a foreign realm to any but experts in the field of
international trade and business. Whether one sees citizens as in-
formed consumers, intended political and economic beneficiaries, or
necessary workers, one sees that they are not given the tools and
means to understand, much less control, the regional government that
the NAFTA has created.
(3) Participation in Decision-making through Control
of Information
The NAFTA does not require any public hearings to be held by
the regional government to solicit views from individuals and nongov-
ernmental organizations as to proposed actions or policies. There is
no provision for notice and comment on proposed actions or decisions
by regional governmental bodies.2 19 For example, the commission is
authorized to establish model rules of procedure for Chapter Twenty
dispute settlement, but the formulation and promulgation of those
rules was not open to those outside the commission.220 With respect
to review of antidumping and countervailing orders by binational
panels, matters as to which private persons are directly affected, the
three national Parties developed rules of procedure for such panels in
accordance with guidelines established by the NAFTA. The promul-
gation of the rules which contain a great more detail than is specified
in the NAFTA was not open to comment by nongovernmental per-
sons or groups.22'
219 To the extent that NAFTA is concerned with public access to decision-making it is with
access to national decision-making rather than regional governmental decisions. See, eg.,
NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 719 (national inquiry points for information sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures), 909 (notice and comment procedures regarding technical standards), 1411 (no-
tice and comment requirements on financial service measures), and 1802-1804 (requirements for
publication, notification to other Parties of certain measures and procedural due process rights
for interested persons in national administrative proceedings), at 381, 389, 659-60, 681. There is
only one point in the agreement where the transparency of the regional institutions is an issue.
NAFTA charges the Committee on Trade in Worn Clothing to act in a transparent manner.
NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 300-B, § 9(1)(b), at 330. It is not clear what transparency means in
this context, but it appears that the concern is with the Free Trade Commission's ability to under-
stand the work and methods of the committee rather than with the public visibility of the meet-
ings and reports of the committee.
220 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2012(1), at 696. The USTR provides interested persons with
notice and an opportunity to comment to USTR on Chapter 20 disputes, but this is access to the
process via the national Party. See, e.g., Notice, Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,605 (1995).
221 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(1), at 684; See, e.g., Notice, Department of Commerce, 59
Fed. Reg. 8,686 (1994).
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In the NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanisms, the state Parties
control the information considered by the panel making the decision.
The Parties to the NAFTA are the parties to the dispute and, thus,
have the benefits of the procedural fights accorded for a hearing and
for the submission of written views.222 The panels may seek informa-
tion and advice from experts and scientific review boards but only to
the extent that the Parties allow.2"
Most committees must meet at least once a year and at such other
times as the Parties may request.224 Provisions on standing commit-
tees and working groups are silent on public participation in meetings
or any other work of such groups. There is no mechanism for any
entity other than a Party to request a meeting. With no mechanism
for public participation, one may assume that the agendas and work-
ing schedules of these bodies are at the discretion of these bodies
themselves and at the disposal of the states that select their mem-
bers.225 It is unlikely that a group will seek to encumber its work with
unwieldy, time-consuming, and unpredictable measures for public par-
ticipation unless it is required to do so.
The NAFTA allows certain committees and subcommittees to
seek the advice of experts and nongovernmental organizations in ful-
filling their functions, but the mandate is either discretionary or quite
narrow. For example, the NAFTA charges the Committee on Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures to seek scientific and technical ad-
vice from standardizing organizations, but only to the extent possible.
The NAFTA merely authorizes it to draw on other experts and scien-
tific bodies as it deems appropriate in exercising its functions.226 This
discretion gives the Parties whose representatives serve on those bod-
ies ultimate control over the information which will form the basis for
their decisions and policies.
(4) Accountability through Control of Information
NAFTA's scant provisions on access to information held and used
by the regional institutions mean that only governments with access to
222 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2012(1), at 696.
223 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2014, 2015, at 696-97.
224 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1021, 1412, at 621, 660. Standing working groups
meet more often. See, e.g., NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 513(3), at 363.
225 NAFTA sets standing working group agendas, but a Party or regional institution may refer
a matter to a working group. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 513(6), at 363.
226 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 722(3), at 381. See also NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 913(4), at
390 (standards-related subcommittees and working groups may include or consult with NGOs,
scientists and technical experts). But see NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 913.5.a-2(4), at 393 (Tele-
communications Standards Subcommittee must consider standardizing work of NGOs).
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the information have the ability to assess the performance of its insti-
tutions. Thus, the regional government is accountable to its compo-
nent states rather than to a constituency of individuals. The NAFTA
does not explicitly address the issue of transparency of the institutions
and administrative functions created to effectuate the FTA. There is
no provision regarding public access to information available to or re-
lied upon by the commission, the secretariat, or committees or work-
ing groups in the carriage of their respective functions. The
governmental Parties comprising the institutions are under no obliga-
tion imposed by the NAFTA concerning disclosure of information. In
Chapter 21's general provisions, Article 2105 protects the ability of a
Party not to disclose information if disclosure would impede law en-
forcement or infringe the Party's laws protecting personal or financial
privacy.227 One may read an obligation into this article, but it is far
from explicit.
In dispute settlement, the commission retains discretion to keep
panel reports from being made public, even though the NAFTA pro-
vides for publication absent exercise of this discretion.228 The
NAFTA itself makes all panel proceedings prior to the final report
confidential. 29 Even the association of a particular panelist with a
particular majority or minority opinion is confidential.230 In dispute
settlement concerning antidumping and countervailing duty, there is
no requirement of publication of panel reports.23'
The NAFTA does not require public reports by the regional insti-
tutions. The committees report to the Free Trade Commission, but
there is neither any requirement of a written report or that any report
which is written be made public. 232 The standing working groups re-
port, if at all, to the commission or to the committees.2 3 3 The commis-
sion is not required to make any public report of its workings.234
Although the NAFTA is a stage for launching a wider FTA, it
contains not a single provision, even a hortatory one, regarding proce-
dures for interpretation and elaboration of the NAFTA or negotiation
of the terms of its expansion whether by accession of other nations to
227 NAFTA, supra note 1, at 701.
228 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2017(4), at 697.
229 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2012(1)(b), at 696.
230 NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 2017(2), at 697.
231 The parties negotiated Article 19 panel rules to include routine publication of panel re-
ports. Thus, access to this information remains under Party control. Notice, Department of
Commerce, supra note 221.
232 See, eg., NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 706, at 369.
233 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 513, 705(6), 1504, 1605, at 363, 369, 664-65 (1993).
234 Thus, one need not even reach the transparency problem of language of publication.
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the regime or by amendment of its terms for the original Parties. As
procedures for this crucial phase of development of the regional re-
gime do not exist, their transparency is a moot point.
In the NAFTA, it is the states to whom the structures are respon-
sive. For a constituency of states, the NAFTA offers a high degree of
access, participation, and accountability. There is very little autonomy
for the regional governmental structures and mechanisms. This is true
in the side accords as well, but these agreements ameliorate the he-
gemony of the state Parties with more autonomy for the regional re-
gimes created by the NAFTA and more access to regional structures
and processes for citizens and nongovernmental groups.
b. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(Enviornmental Agreement) goes the furthest to include nongovern-
mental concerns with governmental functions in its regional structures
and processes.235 In recognizing its progress in achieving this goal, we
must also recognize the steps it fails to take in moving toward ac-
countability to a constituency of citizens rather than states. The Envi-
ronmental Agreement has the objective, inter alia, of promoting
public participation in the development of laws, regulations, and poli-
cies. 36 It does not address the obvious question as to whether this
applies to the regional framework itself or is a reflection of U.S. public
concern with access to national regulatory processes in the NAFTA
partners, particularly Mexico. Article 45 sets out definitions but does
not define the meaning of "public." So we must look at the provisions
for public access and participation to analyze the Environmental
Agreement on this question - a central question going to the heart of
the present inquiry.
(1) Government Membership and Selection of Members
The first focal point is the possibility to serve as a member of the
government or control who does serve. As noted above, the central
governmental structure is the Commission for Environmental Cooper-
ation, an umbrella term for component structures. The Parties ap-
point the members of the Environmental Council, the governing body
of the Environmental Commission. In the United States, this is not a
matter of public participation. The Environmental Council then ap-
points the executive director of the Environmental Secretariat who
235 Fox, supra note 135, at 55-60.
236 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1(h), at 1483.
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then appoints his or her staff. With a council of appointees and a sec-
retariat of appointees, one may logically inquire as to procedures of
public penetration through these bureaucratic layers of insulation
from citizens and nongovernmental groups. The existence of a JPA
Committee that is part of the regional governmental hierarchy is a
significant departure from the NAFTA model. Control over member-
ship in this arm of regional government is, however, held by the na-
tional governments or a national advisory committee that any Party to
the NAFTA may convene. As national advisory committees are op-
tional, this is not a guaranteed avenue of nongovernmental access into
the government selection process.237 The joint committee provides a
weak link between the public and the composition of the secretariat
bureaucracy, as the executive director must at least consider lists of
candidates for secretariat staff positions submitted by the Parties and
the joint committee.2 38 Nevertheless, to the extent that the Environ-
mental Agreement allows state Parties to retain ultimate power over
the selection process through control of citizen advisory groups, it in-
dicates a responsiveness to a constituency of such states.
The primary adjudicative process created by the Environmental
Agreement is redress to government Parties from government Parties
for persistent patterns of failure to enforce national environmental
laws. In the panel phase of this adjudicative process, the council has
control. The council appoints the roster of panelists;23 9 there are no
regional procedures for public access to this newly regional nomina-
tion process.24 ° The Parties then select panelists to decide the dispute.
This too indicates responsiveness to a constituency of states rather
than citizens.
(2) Oversight and Control of Government
The Environmental Council and its Environmental Secretariat
have no lawmaking functions, per se, but to the extent that they are
237 In implementing the Environmental Agreement, the President directed the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. representative on the Council, to utilize a
national advisory committee. Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,775 (1994). This exercise
of discretion does not mask the agreement's failure to recognize a right of public access.
238 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11(2)b, at 1487.
239 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 25-27, at 1491. There are minimum re-
quirements set out in the agreement as to eligibility. For example, panelists may not be affiliated
with national or regional governmental or advisory bodies. Environmental Agreement, supra
note 14, art. 25(2), at 1491. The United States, in implementing the Environmental Agreement,
announced that it would provide public notice of the opportunity to apply for inclusion on the
roster. Exec. Order. No. 12,915, 25,775 (1994).
240 In NAFTA, the Parties independently confer on the roster rather than through regional
instrumentalities. See NAFTA, supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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charged with functions such as developing regional environmental
policy through discussion and negotiation, this may be considered to
be an analog of administrative policy-making. Any regional body pol-
itic may have quite limited access to the process. The JPA Committee
has only 15 appointed members (unless the council decides on a larger
or smaller number.) The council controls the composition, function,
rules, and access to information of the committee.24' Although the
committee may provide information for the factual record (at the dis-
cretion of the secretariat), the control of the council and its secretariat
over the committee's role remains preemptive and indicative of a con-
stituency of the NAFrA Parties rather than of individuals or nongov-
ernmental groups.242 This conclusion is further supported by the
Parties' discretion to convene advisory bodies authorized by the Envi-
ronmental Agreement. Parties may appoint national advisory com-
mittees as noted above. Similarly, Parties may appoint governmental
advisory committees consisting of representatives of federal and state
or provincial governments.243 Thus, the potential for citizen oversight
and control of the processes of the regional environmental regime ex-
ists, but it is attenuated by the optional nature of the framework of
advisory committees and the limited jurisdiction and autonomy of the
mandatory JPA Committee.
The mechanism for public grievances to the regional bureaucracy
is limited to complaints regarding national failure to enforce internal
environmental laws effectively. An individual or NGO may not ad-
dress intergovernmental matters such as the functioning of the re-
gional bodies themselves, the rules established for the conduct of
regional government, the composition of staff, the validity of conclu-
sions in reports, the need for inclusion of particular information in
particular reports, or any other matter concerning the operation of the
bureaucracy. The mechanism for complaint as to government en-
forcement is toothless. It leads only to reference of the matter to the
Party with possible reference of a factual record to the Environmental
Council. There is no provision for redress. There is an interesting
incorporation of a provision requiring Environmental Secretariat con-
sideration of exhaustion of national remedies even though no regional
remedy is directly available to a private complainant. The grievance
mechanism does, of course, serve the very important function of es-
241 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 16, at 1489.
242 The Committee may have access to a factual report prepared by the Secretariat upon
public complaint of Party non-enforcement only if the council by two-thirds vote so agrees. En-
vironmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 16, at 1489.
243 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 18, at 1489.
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tablishing a record on which a Party may build a case for a persistent
pattern of non-enforcement, and it may even force the hand of a Party
reluctant to resort to the enforcement provisions of the Environmen-
tal Agreement. Standing to make a written complaint to the secreta-
riat is limited, though, to persons or organizations residing or
established in the territory of a Party. This indicates a rudimentary
definition of the "public" whose political access to the mechanisms of
the regional trade regime are under scrutiny. To the extent that this
may indicate some responsiveness to a nongovernmental constituency,
it is a constituency of citizens of state Parties rather than any regional
citizenry.
Although the Environmental Agreement allows for private per-
sons to bring complaints for non-enforcement, there is no provision
for adjudication or redress for such public complaints. 24" The secreta-
riat retains the power to determine whether the matter should be pur-
sued with the state Party in question. The Environmental Agreement
specifically prevents any Party from creating a private right of action
against another Party on the ground that a Party has acted in a man-
ner inconsistent with the agreement."n The sole relief is that avail-
able under the dispute settlement procedure, which may lead to the
monetary penalties discussed above. 46 Only states have access to that
process. The Environmental Agreement provides no basis for com-
plaining that the regional regime is not fulfilling its mandate under its
provisions. The agreement grants the executive director and the staff
of the secretariat such privileges and immunities in the territory of
each Party as are necessary to the exercise of their functions. 47 Pre-
sumably, this could be construed to mean that they are immune from
public action on the basis of malfeasance or misfeasance.248 While the
agreement pays its respects to public pressure for oversight and con-
trol, it is the states and not any citizen constituency that direct and
enforce the functions of the agreement.
244 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 14, 15, at 1488-89.
245 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 38, at 1494.
246 See discussion infra § II-A-2-a.
247 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 44, at 1494.
248 An early example of the potential for abuse was reflected in the guilty plea of Robert
Bostick, former Associate Deputy Under Secretary for International Labor Affairs at the U.S.
Department of Labor, for conspiracy to violate federal conflict of interest statutes by an agree-
ment to accept a percentage of a U.S.-Mexico border worker housing project while he had offi-
cial responsibilities involving negotiation of NAFTA. J. Ramsey Johnson, U.S. Attorney for the
District of Columbia, Press release (Aug. 20, 1993).
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(3) Participation in Decision-making through Control
of Information
In the two grievance procedures of the Environmental Agree-
ment, intergovernmental dispute settlement for persistent patterns of
failure to enforce environmental laws and the secretariat's compila-
tion of public complaints, there are limited rights and opportunities
for regional bodies, nongovernmental organizations and individuals to
contribute information to be considered by the decision-makers. In
the conciliation phase of dispute settlement, the Environmental Coun-
cil may call on such technical advisors or create such working groups
or expert groups as it deems necessary without any constraint on
either the use of such advisory groups or their composition or sta-
tus.24 9 As noted above, the panelists chosen by the Parties from a
roster composed by the council decide the matter. They may seek
information and technical advice from expert individuals or bodies
only if the disputing Parties agree and under the conditions the Parties
impose.250 There is no other provision for nongovernmental partici-
pation in the process.
To the extent that the secretariat acts as a fact-finding body for
the council the Environmental Agreement does not impose any right
of public access. When the council votes for the secretariat to prepare
a factual record in the course of a private complaint on government
enforcement,251 the secretariat is required to consider information
submitted by a Party but may, at its option, consider information sub-
mitted by NGOs, individuals, private experts, or the JPA Commit-
tee.252 This selective preparation of a record indicates the alliance of
the regional governmental structures to the national governmental
structures that created them.
The annual Environmental Commission reports of the secretariat
must include "relevant views and information" submitted by NGOs
and persons, although it is apparent that the qualifying language af-
fords leeway as to public access to the preparation of the substance of
the report.2 53 In preparing other reports, the secretariat is given spe-
249 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 23(4), at 1490.
250 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 30, at 1492. The United States intends for
panels to "consult with appropriate experts. . ." Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,775
(1994).
251 The United States intends to support the preparation of a factual record whenever the
Environmental Secretariat deems it warranted. Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,775
(1994). This does not change the basic fact that the regional council still controls the process.
252 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15(4), at 1489.
253 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 12, at 1487.
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cific authority to draw, at its sole discretion, on relevant information
submitted by NGOs, persons, Parties, experts, the JPA Committee, or
any other public source.254 Thus, there is the ability to contribute in-
formation, but the regional body that is constituted by the state or its
delegates retains power to decide whether to consider it.
The Environmental Agreement does fill a void left by the
NAFTA itself, i.e., the opportunity for public comment on regional
rather than national policies and procedures. The council is to act as
the collection point for public comment (whether by individuals or
NGOs) on the NAFTA's environmental goals. However, there is no
responsibility to take these comments into account in the exercise of
its policy-making functions. The weak nature of this right of regional
public participation does not suggest recognition of a citizen constitu-
ency. Some of the Environmental Agreement's other provisions show
that this limited right of public comment is a nod to individual partici-
pation in regional government rather than a swing away from a state
constituency. Article 6 assures private access to remedies available
under national law if that law gives the person a legally recognized
interest in a particular matter. Along with the injunction that national
governments enforce their environmental laws, Article 6 underscores
the interpretation that the agreement is aimed more at public access
to and participation in national fora than in the fledgling regional gov-
ernmental processes. The procedural guarantees in Article 7 that in-
clude that proceedings be open to the public as a general rule are
specifically limited to national proceedings only as specified in Arti-
cles 5 and 6. Thus, the focus of the agreement remains on access to
participation in national processes.
(4) Accountability through Control of Information
The transparency of the regional environmental regime is a signif-
icant improvement over the NAFTA model.25 5 When it comes to the
regional governance structures created by the Environmental Agree-
ment, there are several requirements affecting the flow and availabil-
ity of information. The secretariat must prepare an annual
commission report that is to be released to the public after council
review. Reports of arbitral panels convened by the council to settle
254 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 13, at 1487-88.
255 It is interesting to note that the Environmental Agreement does not specifically address
the international character and impact of national lawmaking after NAFTA. The Parties must
provide for public notice and comment for regulations, procedures and administrative rulings.
Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 4, at 1483. The Environmental Agreement is
silent on access of non-nationals to any pre-enactment comment process.
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disputes must be published.5 6 However, the rules of procedure for
arbitral panels established by the council will dictate the treatment of
confidential or proprietary information submitted in panel
proceedings.5 7
The Environmental Agreement notably directs the council to
promote and, "as appropriate," develop recommendations regarding
public access to information held by national public authorities and to
participation in decision-making processes related to obtaining access
to such information.2 58 There is no correlative obligation concerning
information held by the regional authorities themselves, although one
may argue that they are merely organs of the national Parties creating
them.
Part Four of the Environmental Agreement commits a Party to
making information available to the council or secretariat as needed
or requested by those bodies.259 Of course, there is no enforcement
mechanism for this requirement which is a direct reflection of the link
between national and regional government. There is no correlative'
provision requiring the commission to make information available to'
individuals or NGOs upon request.
2 60
The Environmental Agreement is distinguished by the "outs"
against the principle of transparent regional government. The agree-
ment exhorts the council to make all its decisions and recommenda-
tions public, but it actually gives it discretion to act otherwise. 6' Any
person or NGO submitting information to the secretariat may desig-
nate that information as confidential or proprietary, and the secreta-
riat must safeguard it from public disclosure.262 The secretariat may
likewise protect the identity of a submitter from disclosure. When the
secretariat prepares a factual record at the request of the Environ-
mental council in a matter of public grievance as to governmental
non-enforcement, the council must vote by a two-thirds majority to
256 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 32(3), at 1492.
257 The United States has announced its intention to seek to include in the rules provisions for
public versions of written submissions and arbitral reports not made public in their entirety and
for public access to arbitral hearings. Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,775 (1994).
258 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 10(5), at 1486.
259 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 21, at 1490.
260 The United States, in implementing the Environmental Agreement, announced its inten-
tion to support public disclosure of all nonconfidential and nonproprietary information gathered
and prepared by the Environmental Commission, or in the alternative, for a public statement of
reasons for nondisclosure. Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,775 (1994).
261 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 9(7), at 1485.
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make that record publicly available or even available to the JPA Com-
mittee.263 When one considers the function of public pressure that
this procedure serves, then the significance of this council discretion
becomes apparent. During formal dispute settlement, the recommen-
dations of the council to the disputing Parties prior to referral to arbi-
tration can only be made public by a two-thirds vote. If disclosure
would impede national environmental law enforcement, is limited by
national law, or would be contrary to essential security interests, the
Parties retain the right to prevent access to information by the com-
mission, the public, or other Parties.26  A Party may make informa-
tion available on a confidential basis, and, in such cases, the
commission bodies must treat it as such.265 The two-thirds vote on
which hinges so much of the transparency of the workings of the re-
gional regime is an obvious bow to political balance in a tripartite
FTA.266 It is also a clear marker of a state constituency of the regional
environmental regime.
c. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
Unlike the Environmental Agreement, the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation is not explicitly committed to the
goals of public access and participation. The objectives in Article 1
are entirely substantive except for the goal of fostering transparency
in the administration of labor law.267 As stated in the recitation of
purposes and objectives, in the tripartite resolve to control political
damage to the NAFTA's chances for implementation in the United
States by assuaging fear of job flight and worker exploitation, the only
nod to access by organized labor to the building of the regional trade
regime is an oblique reference to encouraging "dialogue" between la-
bor, business, and government in each Party and in the North Ameri-
can region.
268
263 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 15(7), 16(7), at 1489.
264 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 39, 42, at 1494.
265 Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 39, at 1494.
266 Other countries may accede to the agreement on such terms and conditions as may be
agreed upon by the acceding party(ies) and the council. Environmental Agreement, supra note
14, art. 49, at 1495. One wonders how this agreement will be modified to accommodate the new
political balance.
267 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1, at 1503. It is not explicitly stated whether this is
aimed at national labor law. From the focus on respect for national law, promotion of mutual
labor goals in accordance with the respective national laws of the Parties, and enforcement of
national labor law, one may assume that the concern is for transparency of national legal regimes
rather than the regional labor cooperation structures. Labor Agreement, supra note 15, pmbl.,
arts. 2-3, at 1502-03.
268 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, pmbl., at 1502.
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(1) Government Membership and Selection of Members
The Commission for Labor Cooperation consists only of a council
of national labor ministers (or their designees) and a secretariat.269
The council designates the executive director of the secretariat who
then appoints his or her staff members, taking into account lists of
candidates prepared by the Parties and the need for a balance of na-
tional representation on the staff.27  The council retains a veto right
over any appointment.271 Each Party must maintain a National Ad-
ministrative Office (NAO) to serve as a contact point with other na-
tional. governmental agencies, other NAOs, and the secretariat.272
These are administrative bodies of national government created and
run by them.
In the process for cooperative consultation on the interpretation
and application of the Labor Agreement, the council may convene an
Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) at the request of a state
Party.273 The council then selects committee members.274 The council
also selects the chair of each committee.275 Here, however, an allow-
ance is made for some representation from the nongovernmental
sphere. The council is to select the chair from a roster developed in
consultation with the International Labor Organization (ILO).276 To
the extent that the ILO represents interests beyond those of the three
state Parties, this provision represents some external power over se-
lection of regional governmental representatives. However, this
power is overshadowed by the greater control of the Parties over the
process through the council of its ministers.
In dispute settlement between the Parties that reaches the stage
of referral to an arbitral panel, it is the Labor Council that creates the
roster from which panelists are chosen.2 77 There is no provision for
269 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 8-9, at 1504-05.
270 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 12(1-2), at 1506.
271 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 12(4), at 1506.
272 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 15, 16(1), at 1507.
273 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 23, at 1508. To ensure that an ECE is authorized by
the Labor Agreement, a Party may request the Labor Council select an independent expert to
rule on whether the matter is subject to the ECE provisions. Labor Agreement, supra note 15,
annex 23, at 1516. The agreement empowers the council to establish the procedures for selection
of this expert. Labor Agreement, supra note 15, annex 23(2), at 1516. Thus, this is an opportu-
nity for an individual not employed by a state Party to serve the regional regime, but the na-
tional ministerial Council retains control of the process of selection with no requirement of
public access. Labor Agreement, supra note 15, annex 23(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1516.
274 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 24(1)(a-b), at 1516.
275 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 24(1)(b), at 1508.
276 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 24(1), at 1508.
277 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 30, at 1510.
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public access to the process for creation of the roster. In any particu-
lar dispute, it is the Parties that choose the panelists from the roster.278
In short, there are a few instances in which individuals not affili-
ated with the state Parties may serve governmental functions. In addi-
tion, there is at least one instance in which the Parties must consider
outside recommendations about appointees. However, the selection
of individuals to serve is firmly controlled by the state Parties through
the Labor Council.
(2) Oversight and Control of Government
With so much power in the hands of the Labor Council, one looks
for avenues by which the public (whether it is defined regionally or
nationally, individually, or organizationally) may influence the use of
that power. There is no guaranteed public entry into the workings of
the Labor Commission, nor any provision mandating even a nominal
public advisory role in the form of an advisory committee as there is in
the Environmental Agreement. The public can affect the composition
and functioning of the regional bureaucracy only by indirect recourse
to national bodies. Each Party has the option of convening advisory
committees of public members including representatives of labor and
business2 79 and of representatives of federal and state or provincial
governments.28 0 However, the failure of the Labor Agreement to
make this mandatory is particularly significant in light of the antici-
pated need for elaboration of the agreement alluded to in the text and
obvious from the intended expansion of the FTA.
Even if a state chooses to exercise its option to convene advisory
bodies, such bodies do not provide direct access to or oversight of
policy-making by the regional government. The NAOs may offer an
avenue of access to the regional regime, but the Labor Agreement
only minimally addresses public access to these administrative institu-
tions which function under domestic processes.28 ' The Labor Council
may seek advice in carrying out its responsibilities from committees,
working groups, expert groups, or independent experts, but this is en-
tirely at its discretion.
278 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 32, at 1510.
279 Labor Agreement, supra note 17, at 1507.
280 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 18, at 1507.
281 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 16(3), at 1507. The Labor Agreement requires that
each NAO provide, according to appropriate domestic procedures, an opportunity for submis-
sion and receipt of public communications on labor law matters arising in the territory of an-
other Party.
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There is no private right of action under domestic law available
for violations of the Labor Agreement.21 A citizen of one Party does
not have the option of persuading its government to take enforcement
measures in another Party state because extraterritorial enforcement
is prohibited.28 3 With even less structural provision for public over-
sight than is afforded in the Environmental Agreement, the regional
Labor Agreement arguably does not envision a popular constituency.
(3) Participation in Decision-making through Control
of Information
The Labor Agreement is more akin to the NAFTA than the Envi-
ronmental Agreement in its total lack of provision for public partici-
pation in regional processes. Like the NAFTA, the Labor Agreement
has no provisions allowing individuals or NGOs to contribute infor-
mation to regional bodies for consideration.28 4 Unlike the Environ-
mental Agreement, the Labor Agreement does not explicitly set out
to improve public participation in the development of law, policy, or
its administration and regulation. Therefore, there are even fewer av-
enues for individuals or NGOs to have even the limited recourse to
the regional regime in the labor area that provisions for public notice
and comment or public hearings would allow. There is no provision
for private persons or entities, labor organizations, or NGOs to bring
grievances concerning labor issues covered by the Labor Agreement
to the attention of the Labor Commission. In the dispute resolution
process, the agreement sets out no mechanism to ensure the participa-
tion of the public at any stage of the proceeding. Every layer of dis-
pute resolution is beyond direct public comment, much less control.
As noted above, the Labor Council controls the ECE process. Once
convened by the council, an ECE may invite public participation in
the form of written submissions and may consider information submit-
ted by the public or by organizations, institutions, or persons with rel-
evant expertise,285 but it is in no way a public right of access to the
process. Of course, a person, union, or NGO may use its power to
282 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 43, at 1513.
283 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 42, at 1513.
284 The only reference to public participation in the form of contribution of views and infor-
mation relates to national agencies, the NAOs. Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 16(3), at
1507. See discussion, supra note 280. As NAOs are a contact point with the Labor Commission
one must recognize this provision as an indirect means for the public to contribute information
to the regional regime.
285 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 24, at 1508. It is interesting to speculate whether
language on "relevant expertise" could be used to further limit the information an ECE
considers.
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persuade a Party to bring an action targeting another Party's failure to
enforce its labor laws. However, even if public pressure or persuasion
invokes the process, the process is then beyond the public pale. The
council creates the roster of arbitral panelists and the rules of proce-
dure; the Labor Agreement does not provide for public participation
in the hearing, public submission of views to the panel, or public com-
ment on the initial or final report. The panel itself decides to what
extent the views of persons or organizations will be considered, and
then only at the sufferance and under the terms and conditions set by
the parties to the dispute. If a panel is reconvened to address non-
implementation, there is no provision for public comment on the ap-
propriate action, even though the public will ultimately foot the bill if
a monetary penalty is assessed against a Party.
28 6
The Labor Secretariat's functions are more limited than in the
Environmental Commission. In addition to general assistance to the
Labor Council, the secretariat's major role is in the preparation and
publication of labor issue reports from information supplied by the
Parties.28 7 In responding to council requests for special reports, the
secretariat is empowered to hire independent experts. This discretion
to obtain outside information indicates a responsiveness to a constitu-
ency of states as the secretariat is answerable only to the council com-
prised of national labor ministers.
The Labor Agreement does attempt to address issues of public
participation in national labor law processes.28 8 Article 3 obliges na-
tional labor authorities to give "due consideration in accordance with
its law" to requests by any interested person for an investigation of an
alleged violation of a Party's labor law. Aside from questions regard-
ing the actual content and enforceability of such a tenuously worded
obligation, the obvious question once again arises as to just who is an
"interested person" within the meaning of this obligation. If an inter-
ested person does not include citizens of other NAFTA Parties, then
the absence of provisions of access to regional government to address
such enforcement issues becomes that much more pressing and that
much more indicative of the regional institutions' responsiveness to a
state, rather than a popular constituency.
286 One may assume that the cost would ultimately be passed through to the public by taxa-
tion or a decrease in governmental services from which funds would be diverted for payment.
287 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 14, at 1506-07.
288 See, e.g., Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 3(2), 4, 5, 6, at 1503-04. It does not, how-
ever, address public access to regional lawmaking, interpretation, or enforcement.
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To the extent that the regional agreement affects public access to
lawmaking and legal processes at a national level, it is significant that
it contains no mechanism for the citizens of the Parties to the Labor
Agreement to effect or inhibit change. To the extent that the agree-
ment will change as the FTA expands and new parties accede to the
agreement under terms negotiated with the council, it is significant
that the regional public, as it now stands, is not assured of any means
of influencing the extent of such change.
(4) Accountability through Control of Information
Transparency of the regional institutions created by the Labor
Agreement is not a high priority of the accord.s 9 There are, never-
theless, several provisions offering access to information. It is a plus
that the official languages of the regional regime are English, French,
and Spanish.290 But the progressive nature of that inclusive rule is not
carried through in further measures of accessibility. Even if carried
out in the languages of the regional public, regular Labor Council ses-
sions need not be public and council decisions to hold public sessions
are entirely discretionary and for purposes of public reporting only.
2 91
A primary function of the council is to publish data on enforcement,
labor standards, and labor market indicators. 2  The Labor Secreta-
riat is to prepare reports on labor issues, whether periodic and as spec-
ified in the Labor Agreement or at the special request of the
council.293 Its reports are to be made public, although the council re-
tains the right to prevent publication in any case. The NAOs act more
as a conduit of national information to the regional regime, rather
than the other way around.294 In the case of dispute settlement, ECE
reports are to be published, but the council retains the right to decide
against publication.295 Arbitral panel reports must be published in all
cases.296 The secretariat must also periodically publish a list of mat-
289 The Labor Agreement does address issues of transparency of national law within the Obli-
gations section. Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 2-7, at 1503-04.
290 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 19, at 1507. The Labor Agreement requires the
Labor Council to establish rules and procedures for interpretation and translation. This is en-
tirely lacking in NAFTA, and the Environmental Agreement merely authenticates trilingual
texts of the agreement. Environmental Agreement, supra note 14, art. 51, at 1495.
291 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 9, at 1505.
292 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 10, at 1505.
293 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 14, at 1506-07.
294 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 16, 21, 22, at 1507-08. The NAOs must periodically
publish enumerated labor law public communications arising in other Parties, but this does not
afford transparency to the regional regime itself.
295 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 26, at 1509.
296 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 37, at 1511.
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ters subject to dispute settlement.297 In opposition to the mandatory
publication requirements that are a significant departure from the
NAFTA model, the Labor Agreement retains the protective device of
nondisclosure of panelist decisions in order to prevent revealing pan-
elist identities.
Access to regional governmental information not occurring in re-
ports that the Labor Commission chooses to or is required to publish
is not freely available under the Labor Agreement. A Party may sim-
ply designate information submitted to NAO, the council, or secreta-
riat as confidential or proprietary and the recipient must respect that
designation.298 Similarly, the secretariat must keep information re-
ceived from any organization or person safe from public disclosure if
the submitter designates the information as confidential or proprie-
tary.299 An organization or person may prevent disclosure of informa-
tion that would identify it simply by requesting non-disclosure; non-
disclosure of identifying information is also an option of the secreta-
riat without a specific request.300 The agreement contains no underly-
ing right of access to information by the public. Thus, there are no
limits on designations by public or private parties that would prevent
disclosure of information or procedures on access to information held
by the regional institutions. Information submitted to ECEs or arbi-
tral panels are subject to rules on confidential or proprietary proce-
dure to be established by the council.301 When the agreement talks of
publicly available information, as where it refers to the NAOs obliga-
tion to provide it in the course of consultations, the agreement means
information to which the public has a right under the national statu-
tory law of a Party.3 2 This lack of free access to information is an-
other marker of a constituency of states, as state representatives
comprise the council. The people who do not serve or control the
regional institutions are denied information with which to judge ac-
tions or the opportunity to submit other information that might influ-
ence the eventual decisions and policies of those institutions.
d. Levels of Regional Bureaucracy
The addition of new layers of bureaucracy to implement the envi-
ronmental and labor goals of the regional regime makes the entire
297 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 13(4), at 1506.
298 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 44, at 1513.
299 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 12(6), at 1506.
300 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 12(6), at 1506.
301 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, art. 44(2), at 1513.
302 Labor Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 21, 49, at 1507-08, 1513-14.
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regional regime per se less penetrable. This makes the question of
visibility and access more pressing, even though those layers are them-
selves more responsive to concerns of citizen access and participation.
While the side accords signal a shift toward the goals of citizen access
and participation, the extent of the shift does not amount to govern-
mental structures accountable to a constituency of peoples. There are
no elections. All layers of the regional regime remain open and di-
rectly accountable to the states constituting that regime. One may
naturally argue that citizen recourse to the processes of the regional
government must be channeled through national government
processes set up for this purpose. But one must ask whether this is the
appropriate course of action when a regional governmental structure
is in the gestation stage. The next section of this paper sets up a mech-
anism to identify possible reasons for charting this course of allegiance
to a constituency of states and to analyze its wisdom.
III. CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND EXPECrATIONS OF POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT THEORY
The NAFTA and its supplemental agreements allocate power and
control among constituent nations. To the extent that the governmen-
tal structures and mechanisms of the FTA seem to respond to a con-
stituency of states rather than to a constituency of peoples, one may
presume that these states are the body politic. This presumptive fact
of a choice as to constituency shifts our inquiry to its meaning for the
evolution of the FTA as a political space. If the FTA implies political
as well as economic integration and development, we must explore
those implications in the context of both. We must discern the extent
to which democracy is relevant to the nascent regional government
and define it in this new context. When we look at issues of access
and participation in regional government in the context of political
and economic development, we must ask whether a polity of states is
desirable. We must evaluate the alternative of a polity of individuals
in which there would be direct citizen involvement in the formation,
governance, and staged development of this new regional economic
integration of states.
The intellectual history of political development theory presents
us with a wealth of diverse and pertinent perspectives from which to
view the NAFTA's commitment to a polity of states. Political devel-
opment theory, a subset of modern political science, addresses the ap-
propriate relationship between political structures and economic
development goals. Such theories provide a good foundation for anal-
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ysis of the new polity because the NAFTA's political structures are
geared specifically and exclusively toward economic goals. Various
theoretical frameworks addressing the relationship between politics
and development have emerged in waves since World War II. Each
generation of theories both builds on and supplants the predecessor
generation. °3 Theories from the 1950s to the present provide a wide
range of possible analytical bases from which to judge the current con-
tours of the regional polity.
FTAs are relatively new entities with political, legal, economic,
social, and cultural dimensions that transcend national boundaries.
They answer old questions of economic development in new ways.3 4
The questions, however, have arisen with frequency in the post war
era with respect to states. If we recognize or assume for the sake of
analysis that FTAs present mutations of an older set of problems
about the relationship between politics and economic development,
then querying how existing theoretical frameworks addressed devel-
opment may inforn our analysis of political forms, processes and out-
comes in this new regional political frontier. In answer to the charge
that the very concept of political development theory is intellectually
dated, the first salvo in reply is that old ideas long thought unfashion-
able may look surprisingly fresh when a new occasion arises to air
them of the dust of the closet of irrelevance.
By looking at the regional polity through the lenses of various
theoretical approaches to development, different answers emerge to
our central question about what the regional constituency is or should
be. This prismatic focus on the emerging regional regime gives us
more than one window into the implications of its governmental struc-
tures.3 5 We will examine a selection of political development theories
from those which suggest that states should be the regional constitu-
ency to those which suggest a popular constituency. Political develop-
ment theories originally focused on states. It is important to question
how both state-centered and popular-centered theories translate when
applied in this new regional space. Although the goal of the princi-
303 For example, the "triumph of democracy" with the fall of communism in the past decade
has sparked political scientists to address the question of development in new ways. See, e.g.,
Enrique A. Baloyra, Democracy Despite Development, 150 WORLD AFF. 73 (1987).
304 See, e.g., NAFTA AS A MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MERG-
ING HIGH AND Low WAGE AREAS (Richard S. Belous & Jonathan Lemco eds., 1993).
305 For a succinct, eminently readable intellectual history of political development theory, the
author recommends RICHARD A. HIGGOTr, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY (1983), which
provides expert insights into the major works that are the basis for any understanding of the
evolution of political development theory through multiple generations of thought.
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pies, laws, governmental structures and political processes of the FTA
is the economic development of a region that is currently sufficiently
small to be somewhat analogous to a state, the fit of that analogy may
shift as the region expands. State-centered answers may need even
more regional tailoring with time.
A. Late "Modernization Theory"
Early modernization theory, described in subsection G below, fo-
cused on democracy as implicit in its models for economic develop-
ment. In a first reaction of political development theory away from
early modernization theory, theorists whose work formed the basis for
new schools shifted their emphasis to other concerns. During an era
of pessimism about democracy even in the developed world," 6 the
paramount concern was social and political order.30 7 Theorists of this
era saw political development as the growth of stable institutions
suited to achieve this goal.308 "Order" implied a lowering of economic
expectations and suppression of political activity, reflecting the view
that political participation and public order are irreconcilable in the
developing world.30 9 This confirmed the projection of classical theo-
rists that mass political participation led inevitably to political instabil-
ity.310 One illustrative work of this era set development up as an
equation of order versus five crises facing a political system in a devel-
oping state: governmental legitimacy, national identity, political par-
ticipation, government penetration into society, and resource
distribution.311 The vehicle for the maintenance of the order necessary
to accomplish development strategies was a ruling elite with the ca-
pacity to manage the crises (or problems) facing it.312 "Capacity" re-
ferred to the ability to overcome divisions and manage the tensions
306 See, e.g., MICHEL CROZIER ET AL., THE CmsIs OF DEMOCRACY 3-9 (1975) [hereinafter
CROZIER]
307 HiGGoI-r, supra note 305, at 18.
308 Leonard Binder, The Crises of Political Development, in LEONARD BINDER, JAMES S.
COLEMAN, JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA, LUCIEN W. PYE, SIDNEY VERBA & MYRON WEINER, CRISES
AND SEOUENCES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 3. 65 [hereinafter BINDER & COLEMAN]; Lucien
W. Pye, The Legitimization Crisis in BINDER & COLEMAN, at 135, 141, 158.
309 Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Public and the Polity, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE:
TOWARDS EMPIRICAL THEORY 22, 26 (Ithiel de Sola Pool ed., 1967).
310 Id. at 26, 32-33.
311 BINDER & COLEMAN, supra note 308 at 65; Sidney Verba, The Crises of Political Sequences
and Development, in BINDER & COLEMAN, supra note 308, at 283, 298-99.
312 Joseph LaPalombara, Penetration: A Crisis of Governmental Capacity, in BINDER & COLE-
MAN, supra note 308 at 205, 231-32; Joseph LaPalombara, Distribution A Crisis of Resource
Management, in BINDER & COLEMAN, supra note 308, at 233, 272-73, 279-82; Sidney Verba,
Sequences and Development; in BINDER & COLEMAN, supra note 308, at 283, 292.
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created by the social and institutional differentiation inherent in the
modernization process, to contain participatory and distribution de-
mands, and to avoid the threats to modernization goals posed by
"compulsive egalitarianism. '313
If expectations of economic justice, political pressure, and polit-
ical demands from outside the ruling elite are threats to economic de-
velopment in a state, then this theory favors a constituency of states.
Under this model in the FTA, the ruling elites are, arguably, the three
national governments that must retain tight control of the processes of
regional integration and the mechanisms of government.314 If direct
political participation of either individuals or nongovernmental groups
representing them in the regional sphere may conflict with the policy
initiatives and implementations of the triumvirate elite, or simply di-
vert resources and attention from them, a popular regional constitu-
ency would be undesirable. The difficulties of providing for political
participation at a supranational level over a huge geographical terrain
would be a problem posing all risks and no benefits. Accountability to
a popular constituency might undermine regional economic integra-
tion because it might present problems such as those faced by the
NAFTA in the United States prior to its approval, only multiplied by
three. This is particularly true when the elite plans an on-going pro-
cess of economic development. The legitimacy of the nascent regional
government depends on its insulation from political erosions of its
goals, popular acceptance, and momentum.
The Chiapas rebellion, timed so exactly to the inauguration of the
NAFTA at the start of 1994, supports the notion that economic devel-
opment itself arouses political activity and that such activity may pose
an extreme threat to the existence and definition of the regional re-
gime.315  There are inescapable pressures of social insecurity
presented by regional economic integration such as those arising from
relocations of production and its attendant job migration, cultural and
economic nationalism and defensiveness, and redistribution of wealth.
The elite must contain those pressures to ensure its continued exist-
313 James S. Coleman, The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-Capacity, in
BINDER & COLEMAN, supra note 308, at 73, 75, 78-79, 95.
314 Of course one may argue that the true ruling elites in the FTA are the economic entities of
global capitalism. Alternatively, one may define the regional elite as the national bureaucrats
who run the regional institutions and processes of government.
315 On January 1, 1994, the Mexican state of Chiapas was the site of an armed uprising against
the federal government. Tim Golden, Rebel Attacks Hit 4 Towns in Mexico, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2,
1994, at A9. The attacks were timed to coincide with the initiation of NAFTA. Tim Golden,
Mexican Troops Battling Rebels; Toll at Least 57, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1994, at Al.
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ence, stability, and control of the regime. Expanding popular access
to, participation in, and demands for an accounting from the regional
government would itself detract from the maintenance of control by
an elite secure in its power. The effect could actually undermine re-
gional order.316 Only a. definition of a constituency of states avoids
this potential.
B. The Public Policy Approach
Public policy theory arose out of the "new political economy" tra-
dition of the early 1970s that blended political and economic disci-
plines and dealt directly with the interaction of economics with
political choice.317 In public policy analysis, the system of politics and
its institutions are less consequential than strategies for political activ-
ity within that system and predictions of policy outcomes from those
strategies.318 The focal points are the policy results of bargaining and
choice with an emphasis on rational decision-making and problem-
solving. 319 At the core of public policy analyses, of which there are
many, is the belief that the form of government is less important than
policy-making.
As with earlier political development theory, public policy theory
is not limited to developing states, but the difference lies in the fact
that the earlier theory applied approaches derived from developed
states to developing states while the approach of public policy analysis
is applicable to both developed and developing nations. While public
policy analysis has had a much greater impact on the study of policy
outside the realm of the problems of developing nations,320 it has been
316 For an extensive discussion of the interests of the people and their representation under
different democratic forms of government, see AXEL HADENruS, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOP-
MENT, 32-33 and passim (1992). Hadenius asserts that a government that seeks to benefit the
people can exist without direct participation in the process. Id. at 32-35.
317 See, e.g. THE POLTICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT (Norman T. Uphoff & Warren F.
Ilchman eds., 1972).
318 See HIGGoTr, supra note 305, at 26-27.
319 Social choice theorists criticize rational decision-making as impossible in democratic, col-
lective decision-making given Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, a proof of irrationality
under certain reasonable conditions of fairness. For a lucid explanation of Arrow's Theorem,
see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2124-35 (1990).
320 Various schools of thought have focused on access to information and to the processes of
government in the United States and the consequences of organizing government institutions in
a certain way. See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a
Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MicH. L. REv. 917, 921-38 (1990) (summarizing law
and economics and civic virtue (or civic republicanism) perspectives favoring broader access to
information). Mr. Fitts favors limiting public dissemination of information and access to admin-
istrative agencies to strengthen "comparative information advantage" and the accountability of
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applied to specific situations in the developing world and has the po-
tential for wider application.32'
The NAFTA has already created the core of economic develop-
ment policies and stages, as well as plans for their implementation.
The public policy model is relevant because the NAFTA defines many
principles of economic integration but leaves a range of matters of
interpretation, implementation, and, particularly, plans for expansion
to negotiation within the framework of the regional regime. In addi-
tion, the NAFTA's supplemental agreements call into question
whether the further articulation of mechanisms of direct popular ac-
cess and participation are appropriate to implementation of economic
integration. Application of public policy analysis can suggest an an-
swer to this open question of the direction in which the FTA should
head on this issue.
Theorists of the early public policy analysis of development con-
tinued to propound the importance of elites. The presence of elites
corresponded with the ability of the regime to make and implement
decisions on economic planning goals. Government intervention, reg-
ulation, and planning required institutions, the form of which was less
critical than their degree of centralization.322 Thus, the need to con-
centrate power in bureaucratic and technocratic institutions was a first
step in regime maintenance that was necessary to give the ruling elite
the capacity to make policy and modify it incrementally to implement
the goals. Centrally controlled organizations of government are the
means to make rational political bargains among competing alterna-
tives. They are also the means to prevent competition among elites
central government institutions. He argues that replacing wide dispersion with political party
channeling of information will promote popular accountability, stimulate group dialogue, and
forge political agreement. Positive political theory focuses on the implications of the choice of
particular political institutions, their forms, arrangements of power, and operations. Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Positive Political Theory for the Nineties, 80 GEo. L.J. 457, 461-62
(1992). Public choice literature focuses on political behavior and decision-making as the out-
come of rational and strategic actions within a set of institutional boundaries. Id. at 459 citing
Jerry Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive and Critical Stories of
Legal Development, 6 J. LAW, ECON. & OROANMZAzIONS, Special Issue, 267, 280 (1990).
321 See, e.g., DONALD ROTHCHILD & ROBERT L. CURRY, SCARCITY, CHOICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN MIDDLE AFRICA (1978). Rothchild and Curry note the applicability of policy analysis
to non-Western countries as a starting point. Id. at 3. Critics of "policy theory decry its ethno-
centrism and failure to incorporate unique factors such as a history of colonization and depen-
dence on foreign aid and control. See HIGGOTr, supra note 305, at 32-33, 35. 1 suggest that
policy analysis, a theory designed for the problems of one type of state, may not apply to a new
regional space which, in one sense, has the economic attributes of both developed and develop-
ing nations and, in another sense, neither.
322 HIGGo0I-r, supra note 305, at 32-33.
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and resistance from a citizenry not committed by tradition to the polit-
ical institutions both of which threaten decision-making capacity.
323
The bureaucrats and technocrats who run those institutions must
place a predominant value on order, predictability, and rational
calculation.324
In the context of development, policy theorists recognized that
the leadership elites must make decisions reflecting "system goals"
often in conflict with collective values that reflect popular demands
for participation and distribution.3' Some of the goals for elite deci-
sion-makers are directed toward states, such as the need to build a
modem nation-state, ensure the survival of the state, and secure free-
dom from external control.326 Others might be translatable beyond
the state, such as the need to create an acceptable authority system
within which resources are redistributed.32 7 Even in state-centered
strategies, there are analogies possible to a regional polity. These are
survival of the region as a polity, maintenance of control of its regime
by its elite, consolidation of power to improve political and economic
leverage in a world increasingly comprised of regional trade regimes,
and creation of a regional identity around which a regional authority
system has credibility to effect economic restructurings of a radical
nature.
Early policy analysts of development would opt for a system in
which the ruling national elites are accountable only to themselves
and retain tight reins on access of others to the mechanisms of policy
formulation and implementation. The need to concentrate power in
centrally controlled bureaucratic institutions is heightened in a re-
gional realm where there are three (and eventually many) separate
ruling elites among which a balance of power is essential to promote
effective, rational decision-making. If policy is the result of political
bargains expressed as compromises, then the differing interests, de-
mands and pressures of the national constituents alone present a for-
midable challenge to success. A regional government open and
accountable to a popular constituency would only add interests to an
323 Joel Migdal, Policy and Power: a Framework for the Study of Comparative Policy Contexts
in Third World countries, PUBLIC POLICY, 25 (2): 241-60, as cited in HIGGOTT, supra note 305, at
33.
324 B.J. Berman, Clientalism and Neo-colonialisrm Centre Periphery Relations and Political
Development in African States, STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE ITRNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 9
(1): 3-25 (1974) as cited in HiOOT-T, supra note 305, at 36.
325 See RomciLD & CURRY, supra note 321, at 92-93, 98-101.
326 ROTHCHILD & CURRY, supra note 321, at 38, 93-97.
327 RoTHcnLD & CURRY, supra note 321, at 93-94.
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already crowded arena with the predictable result of delay in the pro-
cess of bargaining and would undermine the efforts of the national
elites to control what is already a central, bureaucratic government.
Governmental mechanisms that promote the participation of a popu-
lar constituency might reshape the regional government away from
the centralized bureaucracy that is at the heart of policy analysis. The
very value of participatory democracy at a regional level cannot rise to
the importance of the value of rational decision-making with a dis-
crete and manageable set of variables.
Policy analysis applied to developing nations focused on govern-
mental elites as the then prevailing instruments of power and ignored
the relevance of cultural and historical difference and conflict. As the
FTA seems to be presently constructed of national elites controlling a
central, regional bureaucracy, the applicability of this school of analy-
sis is, at least, arguable. It may, however, be strengthened by its cul-
tural and historical blinders because the extremes of pluralism found
in such a potentially large region may well become formidable obsta-
cles to regional economic development. The assumptions of the
school make a prediction of its answer to the question in the present
inquiry almost a priori. When one considers, however, the arguments
that the competition of local elites with ruling elites and political
resistance from lower political strata at a local level are threats to the
successful implementation of policy, 328 two possible prescriptions
from policy analysis appear. First, one could argue that in a regional
polity all local participation must be valued less than elite control.
Second, passive resistance from a populace without a history of partic-
ipation in or commitment to the new institutions would not pose such
a threat to the policy potential of regional institutions if the new re-
gime fostered participation in and commitment to the new institutions
with specific mechanisms of access and accountability. The endurance
of the regional regime may depend on building a regional identity.
That, in turn, might be facilitated by alleviating individual political
alienation from regional power.
C. Consociational Democracy and Development
Arend Lijphart, a Dutch political theorist, used the term "conso-
ciational democracy" to describe a type of social and political organi-
zation found in several developed countries, including the
328 See Migdal, supra note 323.
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Netherlands and Canada during the 1950s and early 1960s.329 Com-
parative study showed its manifestation in developing countries as
well.330 Consociational democracy is a system of democratic govern-
ment that achieves stability and approximates democratic ideals to a
reasonable degree despite a lack of homogeneity and political consen-
sus in a plural society. A plural society is subject to extreme "segmen-
tal cleavages" of religion, ideology, linguistics, region, culture, race,
and/or ethnicity, which then dictate further corresponding divisions of
groups within the society, such as political parties, interest groups, and
the media. 33' In Lijphart's analysis, there are four dimensions of
political stability: system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and ef-
fectiveness.3 32 There are three basic characteristics of consociational
democracy: impermeability of blocs organized along the lines of social
cleavage; the internal cohesion of each bloc under the leadership of a
unified elite; and the aggregation of the varied interests of these blocs
by an institutionalized system of accommodation among the ruling
elites.333 There are four basic characteristics of consociational govern-
ment: government by a coalition of elites, protection of minority inter-
ests by veto or concurrent majority rule, proportionality rather than
majority rule as the principle standard of political representation, and
a high degree of autonomy for each segment of the plural society to
run its own internal affairs.3 1 In his focus on systems and order
within a democratic framework, Lijphart bridges a gap between classic
and late modernization theorists.
Lijphart originally posed consociational democracy as a promis-
ing normative model with specific applicability to developing coun-
tries.335 Instead of the replacement of segmental loyalties in the
329 This entire discussion of consociational democracy derives from AREND LLPHART. DE-
MOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (1977), except as specifically noted. Lijphart's early work on
consociational democracy occurred in the 1960s. There were others working in this school, and
they used other terms such as "segmented pluralism" and "concordant democracy." Id. at 1, 3.
330 Lijphart's 1977 work focused on consociational democracy in Lebanon, Malaysia, Cyprus,
Nigeria, and Uruguay and showed how it failed in several former Dutch and Belgian colonies.
Id. Others have noted that consociational democracy actually came to exist as a historical phase
in scores of developing nations by the end of the 1980s. MAxri DOGAN & DOMINIoUE PE-
LAssY, How To COMPARE NATIONS: STRATEGIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 102-03 (1990).
331 In this view, the United States is not a plural society, as it is a homogeneous, secular,
political society whose organizations are autonomous from societal cleavages of the sorts
identified.
332 LIJPHART, supra note 329, at 3.
333 DooAN & PELAssY, supra note 330, at 97.
334 LTJPHART, supra note 329, at 25.
335 LLtPHART, supra note 329, at 24. Lijphart later "preferred" to dissolve consociational de-
mocracy into a broader concept of consensual, as opposed to majoritarian, democracy. DOGAN
& PELASSY, supra note 330, at 102.
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traditional state with a new national identity and allegiance as a pre-
requisite to democracy (which Lijphart saw as a project fraught with
the perils of intensified segmental adhesion and intersegmental vio-
lence), Lijphart offered his model as a means to achieve unity and
democracy simultaneously. He encouraged "consociational engineer-
ing," particularly with respect to the economic policy formation chal-
lenges of development, although maintaining democracy itself as the
primary goal.336 He specifically challenged the idea that economic de-
velopment and the imposition of centralized national order must pre-
cede democracy and that nondemocratic regimes achieve economic
development at an accelerated pace.337 He argued against develop-
ment as a zero-sum game, maintaining that the creation of wealth in
consociational democracy would be subject to proportional allocation
and less subject to the conflicts in redistribution inherent in other
forms of democracy.338 As an example of a consociational institution
specifically designed for a new developing nation, he cited the sugges-
tion of a parliamentary "upper house" dedicated to development is-
sues and staffed by professionals responsible for long-term economic
planning.3
39
In consociation theory the severe vertical segmentation of society
is ameliorated by a governmental system of negotiation among group
elites. Thus, elite cooperation transcends strict cleavages. Unlike
other theorists' focus on ruling elites building order and a value sys-
tem reflecting the priorities of those in authority, consociational de-
mocracy envisions a pragmatic coalition of elites in the context of
emerging, developing nations.340
It is not difficult to similarly envision regional government in the
emergent, developing FTA as a form of consociational democracy.
Each nation participating in the regional organization represents a
bloc characterized by a different history, culture, racial and ethnic
composition, language, and degree of economic leverage. At any
336 LIIPHART, supra note 329, at 223.
337 Studies demonstrated a low correlation between democracy and level of economic devel-
opment. LiUPHART, supra note 329, at 230. Lijphart questioned, however, the record of non-
democratic regimes and development as well. LuPHART, supra note 329, at 226. One must note,
however, that his empirical evidence is dated. An analysis of autocratic regimes such as those
characterizing the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of Southeast Asia today might lead to
very different conclusions.
338 LUPHART, supra note 329, at 230, 232.
339 LIJPHART, supra note 329, at 231 citing the suggestion in David E. Apter & Martin R.
Doorbos, Development and the Political Process: A Plan for a Constitution, in DAVID E. APTER,
POLMCAL CHANGE: COLLECtED EssAYs 118-146 (1973).
340 LL'PHART, supra note 329, at 19.
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given time, there is at least some measure of internal cohesion under
the elite in each bloc. The central governmental structures of
NAFTA, such as the Free Trade Commission, are the governing coali-
tion of those elites. Consensus decision-making in the commission is
analogous to the protection of minority interests by the implicit veto
power inherent in the ability to refuse to reach consensus. The re-
quirement of the NAFTA that all structures such as committees and
working groups comprise representatives of the Parties is an example
of proportionality in government.3 41 In this regional governmental
structure, the national elites retain their autonomy in their internal
affairs.
Although it may not be perfectly consonant with the model, the
FTA may be a democratic government upon which non-conforming
attributes of the Anglo-American model should not encroach at this
stage of its development.342 The effectiveness of the coalition of the
elites should not be impaired by other groups such as political parties
and nongovernmental organizations aggregating interests and articu-
lating them directly at the regional level. To the extent that accounta-
bility to a regional, horizontally segmented individual constituency
undermines the ability of the national, governmental elites to mediate
confficts inherent in a region of such diversity and to negotiate com-
promises,34 3 then application of consociational democracy theory to a
nascent FTA would opt for a constituency of states, which are the nec-
essary elites.
D. Embedded Liberalism or Benign Mercantilism
The status of the state, at the heart of the present inquiry into
NAFTA's political space, is also central in a theory of politics and
economics alternatively styled "embedded liberalism"" or "benign
341 See LurHART, supra note 329, at 51.
342 Consociational democracy is now seen as a phase in the political development of pluralist,
segmented societies, leading inevitably and eventually to more competitive democratic systems.
DOGAN & PELASSY, supra note 330, at 101-02.
343 Strategies of compromise in consociational democracy often involve decision-making at
sites remote from any electorate, since negotiations in small committees protected by secrecy are
more likely to lead to necessary concessions. DOGAN & PELASSY, supra note 330, at 98.
344 Thomas R. Callaghy, Vision and Politics in the Transformation of the Global Political
Economy: Lessons from the Second and Third Worlds, in GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE
THIRD WORLD 161, 162,248 (Robert 0. Slater et al. eds., 1993) (citing John G. Ruggie, Interna-
tional Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Or-
der, IN'L ORG. 36, no. 2 379, 398-99, 405, 413 (Spring 1982), where Ruggie defines the term as
the compromise between liberal international economics and the necessities of the political con-
texts of states in which economics is defined).
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mercantilism."345 The relationship between politics and economics
that is required by political economy analysis is an extensive use of
state power to achieve, inter alia, international economic readjust-
ment.346 There is, however, a necessary balance that has prevailed
between state interests and market forces operating in the interna-
tional arena to prevent either from dominating the direction of eco-
nomic, adjustment. 347 State intervention and manipulation at the
international economic level were linked with devices to buffer the
state from the disruptive political and social consequences of interna-
tional economic development.348  The balance between statism and
free trade depended on the pressures of democratic political forces.3 49
Applying this theory to the problems of economic development
in the so-called "second world" with the collapse of global commu-
nism and to the so-called "third world" in the wake of the debt crisis
of the 1980s, at least one analyst has called for political liberalization
that does not sacrifice the strength and capability of the state as an
economic actor on the altar of a burgeoning democracy.3 50 Thus, eco-
nomic reform within states depends on state reform leading to "mar-
ket-friendly" behavior.35' It also requires the creation of new
centralized political structures in which technocrats have autonomous
decision-making power delegated by the state and which facilitate dis-
cussion among national and international economic private actors as a
predicate to decisions.352 The need for state bureaucratic capabilities
to carry out reform is more important than "full-blown democratiza-
345 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 248 (citing ROBERT GiLprN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at 404-05 (1987), where Gilpin defines "malign mercantilism" as
that economic policy resulting from the unbridled prevalence of unproductive, political interests
of the state operating without the rein of international market forces).
346 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 162-63.
347 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 163. The constraint on state action posed by the "embedded"
position of the state in domestic and transnational society is a central tenet of Liberal Interna-
tional Relations Theory. Burley, supra note 32, at 227. Liberal Theory applies in a much wider
context than transnational business transactions, but transnational economic relations are a
prime example of how one may see private interests influencing state behavior.
348 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 163-64. Examples of such devices are protectionist national
policies that appease domestic constituencies economically threatened by free international
trade.
349 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 163.
350 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 164-65.
351 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 165.
352 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 165. This premise seems to reflect a twist on classic Liberal
theory. Private economic actors are the determinant of state behavior, but institutions facilitat-
ing that linkage seem to have a high priority that one might more readily associate with institu-
tionalism and its emphasis on organizational design. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, supra
note 32, at 222-23.
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tion. '35 3 The necessary political stability in the state to provide the
proper climate for economic liberalization also depends on the capac-
ity of the state to "buffer" the populace from the domestic costs of
reform and insulate itself from "antimarket, statist" forces within the
country.3 54
NAFTA's government by remote international committee com-
posed of representatives of states is not the ideal delegation to eco-
nomic technocrats envisioned by political economy theories, but it
does serve, at least partially, the aims of insulation from direct contact
with national political interests that may be counter-productive. It
serves less well the function of facilitating an exchange of information
between business and bureaucracy that makes autonomous decisions
rationally informed. To the extent that responsiveness to constitutive
states that are in turn responsive to popular constituencies may also
interfere with insulation, delegation, and buffering of the regional
government, NAFTA does not correspond neatly to this rather au-
thoritarian model.3
However, given our stark analytical dichotomy that presents only
two choices for the FTA's constituency, this choice of direct respon-
siveness only to states seems more consonant with the theory. Viewed
in the light of the "vision" of embedded liberalism or benign mercan-
tilism, NAFTA approaches the requisite insulation, delegation, and
buffering only if it is responsive to a state rather than popular constit-
uency. A popular constituency with access to the regional govern-
353 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 165.
354 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 166.
355 See Callaghy, supra note 344, at 240 (reviewing findings by Atul Kohli, Democracy and
Development, in DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED 156, 159 (John P. Lewis & Valeri-
ana Kallab eds., 1986). The theorist (Kohli) cites empirical evidence of a link between authorita-
rian regimes and economic development, particularly in East Asian and Latin American NICs.
Id. Kohli recognizes, however, that new forms of embedded liberalism may exist in developing
states under democratic conditions, but he asserts that it is difficult to achieve and sustain. Id. at
241. These democratic conditions are the "democratic functional equivalent" for insulation and
delegation. Callaghy, supra note 344, at 241. Even these functional equivalents in a non-author-
itarian government must be autonomous centers of power, protected from political pressures.
Callaghy, supra note 344, at 243. An example cited is a central bank. At least one theorist,
propounding the viability of these functional equivalents in development, argues that they pres-
ent the potential for "powerful agencies of restraint" that can produce "informed domestic con-
stituencies of restraint" at the level of social organization and the popular electorate. Callaghy,
supra note 344, at 243 (quoting Paul Collier, Africa's External Economic Relations: 1960-1990, 90
AFRICAN AFFAms 339, 340 (1991)). Accordingly, mechanisms designed to aid these autono-
mous groups to induce restraint from competing social groups should include a means to ex-
change information and persuade such groups to form coalitions of support for economic policy.
In that case, we might have a state-centered constituency that does not necessarily predict a
government entirely closed to popular access and participation.
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ment and direct influence on its decisions destroys the autonomy of
regional technocrats who will then be subject to political considera-
tions that may corrupt the purity of their economic judgment. It also
interferes with the idea that exposure of the workings and undisguised
effects of economic reform will create a political backlash from which
reform must be protected. Finally, it injects into the decision-making
process interests which may be diametrically opposed to the goals of
the regional regime. National governments, as long as they remain
committed to economic regional integration, are the lesser threat to
the regional political economy. They can also perform the necessary
function for the new regime of buffering the political consequences
and economic costs of regional integration for their constituencies by
steering the regional regime in carefully controlled directions that bal-
ance the interests of economic restructuring with domestic political
stasis.
The "optimal sequence" in this model is "substantial economic
transformation followed by staged but increasingly open political lib-
eralization." '356 One may project that mechanisms for participation of
and accountability to individuals and groups in the FTA may be ap-
propriate in the future course of democratization of the regional pol-
ity, but that definition of a popular constituency at this point would be
unwise. It would impair the ability of the regional government to de-
velop its fledgling administrative capabilities and its autonomy, leav-
ing it unable to manage the next phase of political economy in which
the institutions of democracy are linked regionally to the already se-
cure institutions of economic reform.
E. The Minimalist State in Global Development
The "new world order" of the 1990s links economic and political
liberalism in a global transformative process that will yield the simul-
taneous freedom of capital in a market-driven global economic envi-
ronment and of populations in democratically structured political
units.357 Markets and citizens are the primary actors at the center of
development; the state is reduced to a minimal set of institutional
structures.35 8 This "recent" vision is actually derived from the histori-
cal extension of democracy into politically collective regulation of pro-
356 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 167.
357 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 161.
358 Callaghy, supra note 344, at 162.
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duction and distribution.359 Critiques of the liberal democratic model
from both sides of the political spectrum outside the sphere of devel-
opment theory have given life over the past two decades to the idea
that it is necessary to redefine the power boundaries of the state.
360
"New Right" perspectives on pressure groups and bloated bureau-
cracy yielded prescriptions that free markets and free citizens should
be allowed to operate within a minimal state in which the governmen-
tal framework protects these freedoms from excessive political inter-
ference.361  While the vocabulary of left-leaning critiques of
democracy did not include the "minimalist state," their arguments
presupposed a redefinition of the state away from the notion of a cita-
del of independent, unchecked power toward a model of regulation
and accountability in which citizens, rather than the state itself, run
the key institutions of society.362 The theory of global political econ-
omy posited at the start of this section seems to be rooted in political
positions that have been merged to accomplish seemingly contrary
goals in the realm of a global economy. Another source for the mini-
malist state position of the "transformationalist view" is the inability
of states alone to manage the complex transactions and transnational
forces of a now global society, including the sphere of economic man-
agement that was traditionally state-dominated.363 Two consequences
are the growth of cooperative rather than state institutions of deci-
359 See Claus Offe & Ulrich K. Preuss, Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources, in POUT-
ICAL THEORY TODAY, supra note 169, at 143, 160-61 (tracing roots of expansion to the French
Constitution of 1791).
360 Held, supra note 206, at 199.
361 Held, supra note 206, at 200. One critic of lawmaking by administrative agencies in the
United States, while never using the term "minimalist state" or analyzing the global situation,
gives us a cogent set of reasons for paring government back to its essentials. From a U.S. per-
spective, David Schoenbrod concludes that congressional delegation of lawmaking to a sub-
government of agency personnel, private interest groups, and congressional subcommittees
endangers individual liberty and democracy. POWER WrHouTr RESPONsIBILITY, 82-83, 99, 107
(1993). He argues that the Constitution makes Congress the primary, accountable institution to
the people for the making of laws, with the presidency a secondary mechanism. Id. at 99-106.
Delegation to the vast federal bureaucracy violates the Constitution and diminishes the value of
the accountability afforded the people by its provisions. Id. at 118, 155. The governmental deci-
sions that infringe liberty and erode democracy are less dependent on public opinion than on the
structure of the delegation process through which Congress may give an edge to a particular
interest, or an agency regulation of business may protect the politically powerful at the expense
of individuals, smaller, less powerful groups, and the public interest it purports to regulate. Id. at
116, 134.
362 Held, supra note 206, at 200-01.
363 Held, supra note 206, at 207-12 (citing, inter alia, EDWARD MORSE, MODERNIZATION AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1976)). Held's own view is that the
state system with its policy-shaping apparatuses is, nevertheless, enduring.
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sion-making and a decline of state autonomy as the need and potential
for state control lessens.364
In the context of a regional trading arrangement, itself a mecha-
nism of international cooperation predicted by the transformationalist
view, it seems a bit tricky to translate notions of the minimalist state
to our inquiry about the nature of the cooperative mechanism itself.
It does not necessarily follow that a minimalist state, with limits on
power and autonomy flowing from the requirements of international
economic management, predicts a minimalist regional political en-
tity.365 Even if such a conclusion is possible, it is still difficult to pre-
dict how minimalism would define the regional entity.
From the perspective of the political right, it is less difficult to see
that a regional government confined to a minimal sphere of power by
a strictly limited set of institutions may be the preference. Market
forces and individual decision-making would be constrained only by
that amount of regional regulation and intervention required to en-
sure that "free trade" remain unhindered by nationalist protectionist
barriers. Regulatory power and decision-making within the regional
institutions would be limited. Therefore, questions of its accountabil-
ity to a constituency may be similarly limited in relevance. It may also
be impossible to answer, given the somewhat conflicting aims of the
model: freedom of individual decision-making outside the realm of
government and freedom of government from capture by interest
groups whose participation in collective decision-making is thus con-
strained. To the extent that minimal government depends on limited
institutions, direct citizen access and participation flowing from no-
tions of direct accountability to a popular constituency would be con-
trary to this theory of political development. Accountability to states
364 See Held, supra note 206, at 207-12.
365 See BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERN-
ANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1992). From strategic organization theory we might predict
just the opposite. It explains and predicts forms of trade liberalization (unilateral, bilateral,
minilateral, or multilateral). Id. This approach posits that third party enforcement of trade com-
mitments is a critical factor. Id. at 19. The availability of supranational institutions to serve this
function facilitates trade liberalization on a "minilateral" scale as exemplified by free trade areas
and customs unions. Id. at 19, 89, 102, 106. When these institutions serve this function most
effectively, such as in weighted majority voting in the European arrangement, then progress in
trade liberalization results. Id. at 96-97 (unanimous votes give veto power that derogates from
the supranational character of the enforcement mechanism). Thus, in strategic organization the-
ory, a strong, specifically structured supranational institution is a necessary check on the oppor-
tunism by any state (or private actor) that may undermine trade liberalization. Id. at 35-36, 106.
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already circumscribed in their decision-making processes and powers
may better accomplish containment of regional institutions.
3 66
From the perspective of the left, the FTA constituency is one
composed of citizens. It does not, however, follow that such an an-
swer gives us a clear prescription for the regional government. There
appears to be a contradiction between expanded citizen involvement
and the concept of a shrinking government.367 When the ideas, of in-
creased citizen participation, power, and control over government at
the state level cross over into the regional space, they seem to require
expansion of regional governmental mechanisms as well as processes
of citizen inclusion and accountability. The contradiction dissolves,
though, if citizen participation acts as a check on institutional gigan-
tism in all types of governments. The key is to redefine the central
regional institutions with limiting, oversight mechanisms rather than
additive layers and processes as exemplified by the side accords.
F. The Women in Development Movement
One theory of development, the Women in Development Move-
ment (WID), crossed national boundaries with hypotheses about
political relationships that transcend the nation-state.368 The move-
ment worked within the institutions of the United Nations, but many
of its core elements could apply to the question of popular participa-
tion in the regional political spaces carved out by FTAs. WID
emerged as an answer to failed development strategies of the 1960s
and 1970s, focusing on the need for public policy decisions to address
popular concerns, and using those aspects of development models that
served the purpose of increased participation by excluded population
groups and greater governmental receptivity to popular concerns.369
366 See Id. at 105. (Analysis of relationship between minilateralism and multilateral trade
liberalization). With minimalist states, however, one may ask where exactly are the curbs on
regional institutions? Strategic organization theory suggests the possibility of supra-bloc institu-
tions enforcing trade agreements between blocs as a solution, albeit unlikely. Id.
367 Tracing the domestic U.S. roots of this global theory may pose part of this quandary that
might not exist if the theory stood only in a global light. If one takes the notion of a minimalist
state in a new international order and transposes it to the regional realm, one quickly comes up
with a simple prescription for a regional government of constricted institutions. The constitu-
ency that would best confine them is still, however, open to question. Tracing the domestic roots
was an attempt to answer that question.
368 Kathleen Newland, From Transnational Relationships to International relations: Women in
Development and the International Decade for Women, in GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 122 (Rebecca Grant & Kathleen Newland eds., 1991).
369 SUSAN P. JOEKES, WOMEN IN THE WO=LD ECONOMY 138-46 (1987).
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Moreover, WID has confronted the problem of identifying and work-
ing within the political institutions of economic entities.370
WID emphasizes the need for governmental and quasi-govern-
mental institutions to be attuned to the needs of their constituencies.
It has, at various stages in its history, used different approaches to
realizing greater governmental accountability to the people and for
increased fairness of the system,371 but the particular approaches all
converged in overarching principles of equality, increased participa-
tion by marginalized groups in politics and the economy, and the end
of divisiveness.
Using the WID model, the constituency of the FTA would be the
people, not the states. The people would be citizens of the FTA and,
thus, eligible for direct representation in the FTA political structure.
People could vote directly for governmental representatives in the
FTA, as opposed to voting only for national representatives who par-
ticipate in the regional regime on their behalf.372 National boundaries
would become permeable to transnational and transcultural interests
and would not hinder representation of those interests regionally. 373
WID has recognized that the problems a polity must address may
have different solutions based on culture, but that there may be a con-
sensus based upon some other condition. For example, female pov-
erty relative to male poverty remained a problem even in the most
economically developed countries.374
370 Newland, supra note 368, at 123.
371 See Caroline 0. Moser, Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strate-
gic Needs, in Grant & Newland, supra note 368, at 94-110 (discussing five approaches: welfare,
equity, anti-poverty, efficiency and empowerment).
372 This is only one possible model for representation of the people within the FTA as seen
from the perspective of the purposes and approaches of WID. This is the model most akin to
U.S.-type federalism where individuals choose directly those who will represent them in their
respective states and in the federal government. Another option is for representation as under
the U.S. Articles of Confederation: individuals chose representatives to the state governments
and those representatives then chose who would represent the state in the national government.
See Articles of Confederation, reprinted in THE ENDURING VISION x-xiv (P. Boyer et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1993). The federalist model is more compatible with WID theory, since more direct repre-
sentation is more likely to be more responsive to the people's interests.
373 Newland, supra note 368, at 123-24. Within the United Nations, women have formed
transnational coalitions designed to address the problems of women. The cultural differences
among women have not proved easy to address in the WID movement, but it is, nevertheless, a
development model that pays close attention to culture and its relationship to economic develop-
ment. See, e.g., DIFFERENT PLACEs, DIFFERENT VoicEs: GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN AF-
RICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 3-8 (Janet H. Momsen and Vivian Kinnaird eds., 1993)
(arguing for the need to recognize regional specificity in women's experience).
374 JOEKES, supra note 369, at 18, 20-21.
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Coalition-building is the primary developmental tool used by
WID for problem-solving.375 As seen in subsection C above, coalition
was also central to theories of consociational democracy. The crucial
difference between coalition under WID and under consociational de-
mocracy theory is that the latter depends on a coalition of elites, while
the former works for a coalition representing the interests of those
traditionally excluded from elites. The goal in WID is the broadest
possible representation of subcultures as well as a guarantee of their
respective rights.376 Coalitions have been particularly effective in ar-
eas such as environmental policy,377 a concern that became critical
with respect to the NAFTA and an area of trade policy that will be-
come even more important in the decades to come. Under the WID
model, accountability in the FrA to a constituency of people, rather
than states, will best serve the goal of building broad, cross-cultural
coalitions that are responsive to popular concerns rather than those of
the entrenched bureaucracy, entrenched political parties, or powerful
economic groups with disproportionate influence in national govern-
ments and their institutions.378
Another principal, though controversial, idea in the WID model
is the need for relational autonomy, i.e., a system in which people are
able to maintain social, economic and cultural integrity while chal-
lenging global divisions and inequalities. Relational autonomy recog-
nizes reciprocity and interconnectedness in human relations, similar to
375 Even prior to WID, women in the western countries often crossed national boundaries to
assist in reform, such as the women's suffrage movement. For example, women in eight Euro-
pean countries simultaneously obtained the right to vote. DOGAN & PEtLssy, supra note 330, at
7; Anna Marie Goetz, Feminism and the Claim to Know: Contradictions in Feminist Approaches
to Women in Development, in Grant & Newland, supra note 368, at 150-153.
376 JOEKES, supra note 369, at 146 (inclusive organizations necessary to prevent conflicts of
interest between developed and underdeveloped countries).
377 See, e.g., discussion of women's coalitions regarding environmental policy in V. SPIKE PE-
TERSON & ANNE S. RUNYAN, GLOBAL GENDER ISSUES 142 (1993).
378 But see Cathryn L. Thorup, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations and the NAFTA,
in NAFTA AS A MODEL OF DEvELoPmENT, supra note 304, at 174, 174-175, arguing that trans-
national coalitions of NGOs influenced the course and outcome of the NAFTA negotiations and
have already yielded a form of economic integration that is, in practice, quite susceptible to
citizen influence. The author describes the FTA as a dispersion of power beyond national gov-
ernments to domestic interest groups and cross-border coalitions. The author saw NAFTA as a
catalyst for continuing cross-border dialogue and coalition that would only survive if they solidi-
fied into mature, transsectoral NGO institutions transcending the FTA as their sole focus.
Thorup, supra note 304, at 177-179. 1 question whether the actual structures of NAFTA suffi-
ciently serve the author's vision of powerful regional coalitions that build social interdependence
in the region and change the balance of power of between state and society in the FTA. Thorup,
supra note 304, at 179.
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the Habermasian idea of communicative ethics.379 The principle, on
its face, seems to align with the general objectives of the NAFTA to
break down trade barriers and reduce inequalities among member
states that have economic effects. However, cooperation in FTAs is
offset by the competitiveness that underlies liberal economic theory.
The WID model takes the principle of interconnectedness further and
argues that governments have an obligation to reduce systemic ine-
qualities. Extrapolating from this point, one may posit that direct
election by a regional citizenry of representatives to the governmental
structures of the FTA implicit in the WID model demands concerted
efforts to ensure that representatives in the FTA structures are truly
representative of their constituency and that the choice of representa-
tives will be accomplished in a fair and reasonable manner designed to
achieve this goal.3 s It can be done partially through the broadest pos-
sible dissemination of information to the people. WID has empha-
sized the need for governments to make information truly accessible
to their constituents. Related to this is the demand that information
be collected so that potential problems can be monitored. 8'
Applying these principles to the NAFTA, responsiveness to a
constituency of peoples lies not only in the form of regional, electoral
control but also in the elaboration of mechanisms such as those in the
United States regarding access to information held by the government
and the establishment of rights for members of the popular constitu-
ency to contribute information that must be considered by the re-
gional government in making policy and taking action. It would
further require particular mechanisms designed to give regional polit-
ical voice to those traditionally silenced. One example might be
mandatory advisory committees, the membership of which is required
to be representative of specifically identified segments of the popular
constituency. Another might be the requirement that members of the
regional government, regardless of whether they are serving in a com-
mission, secretariat, standing committees, ad hoc working groups, or
379 PETERSON & RUNYAN, supra note 377, at 152. The relational autonomy model is an explic-
itly feminist one that seeks to ensure equality "between men and women... [as well as] among
women and among men" (emphasis in original), at 153. See also STEPHEN K. WHrrE, POLITICAL
THEORY AND POSTMODERNmSM 95-113, (1991) (on "difference feminism" and the ethic of care in
political theory).
380 The history of the idea of "equitable integration [of women]" is fraught with problems of
implementation, because the idea was originally one of establishing greater equality and justice
in tandem with greater economic productivity. See Goetz, supra note 375, at 138-140. Experi-
ence and further thought have added complexity to the WID model with regard to class, race,
nationality, and other problems of conflict and difference.
381 PETERSON & RUNYAN, supra note 377, at 153-156.
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dispute settlement panels, must be representative of the constituency
so that positions that are matters of appointment, rather than election,
must reflect the face of the regional citizenry rather than the current
requirement that they reflect the balance of power among constituent
states.
G. Classic Modernization Theory Revisited
The term "modernization theory" describes a school of political
development theory that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in response
to the post-war problems of post-colonial states. It is, at this point, a
relic of intellectual history fixed to its era by assumptions and biases
long-since subject to critical analysis and rejection.3 2 Even its intel-
lectual founders later outgrew its limitations and embraced a political
economy approach.383 Its possible relevance to the present inquiry is
its usefulness as a point of reference, a historical grounding against
which later theories may be understood in contrast. There is, more-
over, an analogy between the post-war emergence of new political en-
tities with particular economic development needs and the current
emergence in the western hemisphere of a new entity, the very raison
d'tre of which is the urgent need to address economic development.
The hemispheric embrace of the FTA as a new vehicle for develop-
ment gives reason to reassess the validity of classic modernization the-
ory. One may even ask if the emergence of the regional regime is
possibly a product of the diffusion of political culture in the name of
economic development that the theory predicted, although in a differ-
ent form. At least one recent work purported to offer new empirical
justification for its tenet that the process of economic and social devel-
opment in non-western nations would lead to the transference of
western democratic political models. 4
The methodology of modernization theory was the use of models
of traditional and modern forms of society based on sociological, an-
thropological and psychological modes of analysis in addition to eco-
nomic information.38 5 One of its most basic normative assumptions
382 At least one author argues that the roots of subsequent political development theory may
be found in the writings of this early school of thought. HIGGO-r, supra note 305, at 30-32.
383 GABRIEL A. ALMOND & G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., COMPARATIVE POLITICS (6th ed.
1978).
384 HADENIUS, supra note 316, at 90, 147. This empirical study concluded, however, that the
link between economic and social modernization and democracy was much weaker than shown
by the empirical studies of the classic modernization school. HADENIUS, supra note 316, at 90.
385 See, e.g., GABRIEL A. ALMOND & G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., COMPARATIVE POLITIcs: A
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH (1966).
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was the desirability of transferring the first world "modern" model,
with its economic systems and liberal democratic political institutions,
to the "traditional" developing world.386 However, it is not easy to
predict how this theory would answer the question of how to define
the constituency of the new regional political space to best achieve its
economic aims. Modernization theory focused on the transformation
of popular attitudes through economic and social development and
mass education leading to a political transformation of a now in-
formed, involved populace.387 The theory rejected a formalistic ap-
proach, focusing on legal and institutional questions. There are
aspects of the theory, however, that give reason to assume that it
might swing toward a constituency of people rather than states.
The rejection of modernization theory depended on many things,
such as: the intransigent problems of development in the real world
and the rejection of its normative assumption that economic develop-
ment depended on the facilitation of liberal democracy in new states.
The varying states of failure of development in the wake of this theory
belied the post-war optimism on which it rested. Without rejecting all
of the later critiques such as the radical Latin American dependency
theory of the late 1960s and early 1970s, one may still find reason to
salvage the relevance of modernization theory and apply its rehabili-
tated model to the situation of the 1990s. One cannot reject, outright,
the validity of its normative assumption of transference when an eco-
nomic merger is occurring which shares the core assumption that the
economic and political model of Canada and the United States is the
only basis upon which the merger may occur.3ss The post-war opti-
mism of this approach is, further, matched by the post-1989 optimism
for liberal democracy in the wake of the fall of global communism, the
1990s Latin American eagerness to pursue national economic and
386 See HiGoorr, supra note 305, at 9.
387 See HADENIUS, supra note 316, at 78-79. In this recent statistical analysis of the correla-
tion between democracy in developing countries and various attributes of socio-economic devel-
opment such as GNP, employment, energy consumption, and literacy, the author discovered that
literacy, rather than any economic factor, had the strongest correlation with the existence of
democratic institutions and identified it as the central factor in the modernization process.
HADENIUS, supra note 316, at 90-91. Its importance decreased, however, when compared with
other variables. HADENIUS, supra note 316, at 147. Overall, trade with the United States proved
to be the most significant predictor of democracy. HADENIUS, supra note 316 at 152.
388 Although dependency theory reached its heyday in political science in the early 1970s,
current "critical" legal scholarship questions the imperialistic and counter-productive process of
attempting to "americanize" Mexican law and society through NAFTA. See, eg., Gloria L. San-
drino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World
Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1994), and Zamora, supra note 188..
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political restructuring38 9 in the hopes of joining the FTA, and the opti-
mism over regional economic integration as the solution to past
problems of development and capital expansion.
Thus, assuming the goal is now facilitating liberal democracy in
the emerging region, as opposed to the post-colonial, developing
states, the question becomes whether a state-centered regional de-
mocracy or a popular regional democracy will best accomplish this. In
the U.S. Constitution, the federal government is responsive to the
people rather than the states.39° Transference of this form of federal-
ism to the FTA not only meets modernization theory's goals of facili-
tating liberal democracy, it also comports with its assumption that
liberal democracy depends on achieving a consensus of values. In a
merger of states with different languages, peoples, cultures, languages,
histories, and levels of economic expectation, one might argue that
regional institutions responsive to those peoples, rather than their
governments, might better achieve value consensus across such a wide
spectrum of values. 391
IV. BEYOND DEVELOPMENT: A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
REGIONAL POLITY
In the regional polity created by the NAFTA, the functional bod-
ies of the FTA serve traditional governmental purposes such as dis-
pute resolution, policy formulation, regulation, implementation, and
enforcement. In the constitutional paradigm, there resides a similarity
to a federalist state regime with the potential for expansion of the
geographic boundaries and internal dimensions of the polity. A criti-
cal assessment of the governmental structures led to the conclusion
that the regional government adequately addressed issues of access
and participation if one saw it as accountable to a constituency of its
three member states. On the other hand, if one saw its constituency as
the individual citizens of the member states, the regional government
did not respond adequately to the concerns of individual access and
participation and did not provide sufficient mechanisms for accounta-
bility to that constituency.
389 Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr. & Gerhard Wegen, Privatization of Public Enterprises in
Latin America, ANNm. PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 124-31 (1993).
390 Compare U.S. Const. with Articles of Confederation, reprinted in Ti ENDURING VISION
app. iv-xx (P. Boyer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993). The Articles of Confederation created a confedera-
tion of constitutive states (the former colonies). They were rejected in favor of the Constitution
expressing a government representing individuals.
391 One might also argue that national governmental processes would filter and clarify a
broad array of values and better achieve the necessary consensus.
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Political development theory can be revived to determine how
each analytical approach would judge the state-oriented structure of
the regional government in the context of economic development.
The conflicting positions on the relationship between democratic insti-
tutions and development and the role of the state in development in
the new international realm nevertheless presented an almost unani-
mous recognition of the need to give economic development policies
and outcomes priority over other social and political demands. As the
primary purpose of the FTA is economic development, this consensus
on its priority demonstrated the relevance of political development
theory to our inquiry. From a projection of each theory's normative
assessment of the FTA's government through the lens of our central
question as to the appropriate regional constituency, there emerged a
consensus. A regional government accountable to a constituency of a
few states better served the goals of development. In the majority of
theories discussed, mechanisms for citizen access related to accounta-
bility to a constituency of peoples were deemed unnecessary and, in-
deed, counter-productive. From only two theories could one derive
an opposite conclusion.
The fact that most theories seem to support the state-centered
governmental structure of NAFTA is not the end of the inquiry, how-
ever. Political development theory focused on states. There was suffi-
cient similarity between a state and a regional polity to apply the
theories in the new context. At this point, it is, however, imperative to
note how the unique contours of the new polity affect our ultimate
conclusions as to the shape, structures, and accountability of the new
regional government. These differences will alter the seeming solidity
of the conclusions drawn from theory.
The regional polity is an evolutionary recombination of political
systems in a new political space made and run by states; the new or-
ganization transcends, but does not obliterate, the state. Any assess-
ment of the new polity in the last years of the twentieth century must
incorporate a wider range of goals than those served by national gov-
ernments, whether of the developed or developing world. Today, one
can no longer speak merely of traditional governmental functions such
as dispute resolution, executive power, and international balance and
ignore: evolving notions of sovereignty; the emergent right of people
to a democratic form of government under international law;392 the
evolution of ideas on international law-making and growing accept-
392 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992). See discussion infra § IV-A-1.
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ance of greater access to its processes by non-state actors; changing
theories of democracy in a global dimension and new forms of repre-
sentative government within states that may be applicable to suprana-
tional polities; values inherent in an evolving democracy; the need for
a specifically local political vocabulary for a global market;393 the le-
gitimacy of new forms of political power; means to mediate crises of
internal ethnic, racial or political schisms and to keep the surge of
rising nationalism from infecting the new space and weakening the
precarious being and balance of the regional regime; and finally, but
very significantly, transnational justice. Moreover, it is necessary to
use the raw political materials of the nascent regional government to
construct new, political mechanisms adequate to the task of building a
new, post-sovereignty model of participatory, regional democracy.
394
A. Democracy and the FTA
The FTA is an ideal laboratory for the evolution of democracy. It
provides a manageable set of players395 yet presents extremes of the
thornier problems besetting democratic government at a state level
that has long since outgrown the homogeneity requisite to its classic
form. Examples of these start with the tyranny of the majority and
proceed to the difficulties of negotiating consensus in a vastly plural
society. In an FTA, pluralism is now characterized by differences of
language, culture, history, religion, political attitudes, economic ad-
vantages and expectations that are all multiplied with the addition of
each nation to the FTA. Modern democracy is saddled with intracta-
bly complex government subject to the inordinately influential lever-
age of very powerful or organized or vocal groups able to penetrate its
393 Saskia Sassen, Address at Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law
Conference (Feb. 24, 1994). See SASKIA SASSEN, THm GLOBAL Crry (1991) for the foundation
for this political challenge. Sassen's work posits that internationalization of service industries
has caused social and economic polarizations and tensions in key urban centers. See id. at 19,
324-25, 331-37. The author raised questions of the political implications of these developments
that were specific to her study. Political expression of local impacts from vast, international
economic developments are inevitable. If one transposes her questions to NAFTA, one must
ask what shape should local political response to the globalization of trade take in the regional
regime?
394 Our inquiry assumes the continuing relevance of democracy, itself a much debated propo-
sition. For a superb theoretical defense of democracy in the face of social choice theory's charac-
terizations and critiques of the democratic, collective decision-making process as inherently
fraught with irrationality and meaninglessness, see Pildes & Anderson, supra note 319, at 2197-
205.
395 Whether one is dealing with three state players or the entire citizenry of three nations, the
set is more manageable than, say, the U.N. or WTO or some dated, hopelessly utopian prescrip-
tion for democratic world government.
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processes. The failure of plural democracies to include whole sections
of the population at the peripheries of power or the margins of society
has led to calls that the world-view, needs, demands and history of
discriminatory exclusion from power of these groups must be rewoven
back into the political fabric. 396 Without a new theory of democracy
fitted to the expanding polity, groups excluded to some degree from
participation in national politics will be relegated to a border so far
from the regional center of power and decision-making that they can-
not hope to live in anything but political exile.
Democratic government has come under severe criticism both for
its opacity and impermeability to citizen participation in the United
States and for its "capture" by powerful interest groups.397 Given the
history of western political liberalism and the fragility of democracy as
a current political trend in Latin America, one cannot be sure that the
regional regime will serve the various interests of the people of the
region, however those interests are analyzed or characterized.398 In
this sense, responsiveness to a state constituency and continuation of
the democratic status quo of the regional governmental model will fail
to provide a fair process of representative government.399
396 See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609, 1620 (1988) (focusing on necessity for participation of historically oppressed
groups such as African-Americans).
397 The critiques from all sides of the question are legion and far too numerous to cite. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 1539 (1988) (civic republican perspective
advocating, inter alia, for political equality in the sense of equal access to the political process);
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, 12-37, 132-143 (1991) (summa-
rizing literature on interest groups and the political process and suggesting reforms of the pro-
cess to reduce the power of special interest groups). Analyses of U.S. government operation
through delegation to administrative agencies yield useful illustrations of how democratic institu-
tions are open to criticism. For example, David Schoenbrod, supra note 361, at 166, 134, 196,
argues that delegation to agencies reduces participation in lawmaking and fails to protect against
laws that serve private interests and favor powerful interest groups. He suggests that the institu-
tions of Congress and only secondarily the presidency are the appropriate sites of lawmaking.
Id. at 99-106. On the other hand, Yvette M. Barksdale prefers the open process of administra-
tive value selection to the insular process of presidential value selection, as the former better
serves the democratic values of deliberation, public participation, consensus, and diffusion of
power that governmental value selection should respect. Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency
and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 276, 310, 334-35 (1993).
398 Nathaniel C. Nash, A Boom for the Few - A Special Report; Latin Economic Speedup
Leaves Poor in the Dust, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1994, at Al, A14 (describing current political
instability in Latin America even within "the relatively stable process of democracy" and ascrib-
ing asymmetrical benefits of economic progress as a potential source of political unrest).
399 As David Held asks in Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System, supra note
206, at 225, "is there any reason for thinking that the system of overlapping authority structures
[of international interconnectedness] ... would be more accountable than traditional models of
democracy and existing mechanisms of accountability, i.e., the institutions and practices of repre-
sentative democracy?"
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Economic integration will affect citizens of the region in every
aspect of their daily lives from job prospects, availability of goods,
services and capital, ability to consume the increased production on
which regional prosperity partly rests, to the ability to cross borders,
to retain cultural identity, and to depend upon a national government
whose stability may be linked to its relationship with its regional trad-
ing partners. Without giving voice to those affected by the rather re-
mote, even hidden regional government, the regional regime will
alienate those whose identification with the economic goals of the re-
gime is absolutely critical to it stability. The need for survival of the
regime to serve its core economic purposes is not, then, so very far
removed, as some development theorists would have us think, from
popular political activity and some degree of decentralization of
power and control of governmental processes.
Although the purposes of NAFTA and the personal goals of re-
gional citizens may differ, the process must provide a means to effect
compromises between those interests. The processes of government
ought to effect a balance of the sometimes competing interests of in-
clusion and fairness and of maintenance of the regime. In this way,
regional stability is ensured. Establishing and maintaining the legiti-
macy of a political regime was one of the goals of political develop-
ment theory.
1. Democracy as an Emerging Norm of Governance
and Legitimacy
One of the preeminent international scholars of the current era
argued in 1992 that democracy would become the touchstone of "le-
gitimate" governance.40 0 Professor Thomas M. Franck predicts that
the legitimacy of national government will, in the future, be measured
by international rules and processes that guarantee the entitlement of
citizens to a democratic form of government.401 He bases his identifi-
cation of an emergent right to democratic governance as a coherent
norm on the combinant power of three strands of existing interna-
tional, democratic norms: the right of self-determination, the human
right of freedom of expression, and the latest right to free and open
elections that is approaching the status of customary law.402 Professor
Franck's analysis focuses on national governments, but the democratic
norm is based on his analysis of the three existing norms of demo-
400 Franck, supra note 392, at 49.
401 Franck, supra note 392, at 50-51.
402 Franck, supra note 392, at 52, 64, 77.
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cratic values that accrues to peoples as recognized in the U.N. Charter
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (self-de-
termination), to individuals as recognized in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (freedom of expression including the right to
receive and impart information), and to citizens as recognized in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (right to take
part in the conduct of public affairs either directly or through freely
chosen representatives and to vote and be elected in a system of uni-
versal, equal suffrage and secret ballots).4 °3 He also places these
rights in a larger context of entitlement of persons under various inter-
national legal instruments to participation in government as a restraint
on governmental action.n n
Thus, the argument of democratic entitlement is translatable into
a regional governmental arena. As Professor Franck notes, the three
existing components of democratic entitlement share a common pur-
pose to create the "opportunity for all persons to assume responsibil-
ity for shaping the kind of civil society in which they live and work. 40 5
When society and government become supranational, this purpose
and the norm of democratic entitlement on which it is based must
transcend old national boundaries if they are to retain meaning.
In his analysis, Professor Franck identifies legitimacy as a system
of rules that pulls both the rule-makers and citizens toward voluntary
compliance, and equates a high degree of voluntary compliance by the
governed as the raison d'etre of legitimacy.406 He sees the triumph of
democracy over totalitarianism and anti-democratic political regimes
and theories embodied in post-colonial Third World economic mod-
ernization strategies as the profound event of the twentieth century
now recognized as both desired and desirable "outside a small enclave
of western industrialized states."40 7 He defines "democracy" as free,
open, multi-party electoral, parliamentary government.40 8
Under the touchstone of legitimacy, the FTA's structures of gov-
ernance do not meet the core definition of democracy. Without the
legitimacy conferred by democratic institutions, one may predict a low
403 Franck, supra note 392, at 58-60.
404 Gregory H. Fox explored the roots of an emerging right to political participation, eg., to
the selection of one's own national government, to the major international human rights conven-
tions of the post-war era. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992).
405 Franck, supra note 392, at 79.
406 Franck, supra note 392, at 49-50.
407 Franck, supra note 392, at 49.
408 Franck, supra note 392, at 50.
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degree of public acquiescence in the governing processes. From this,
one may predict the very lack of stable government that anti-demo-
cratic economic development strategies once aimed to ensure. Empir-
ical evidence for this proposition comes from the fall of non-
democratic regimes in much of the developing world. While one may
argue that the regional regime derives its legitimacy from the demo-
cratic character of its constituting nations, the strength of this argu-
ment breaks down in the face of the single-party system in Mexico.
More importantly, the legitimacy of a government based on something
other than its own internal character attenuates the very purpose of
legitimacy: to facilitate governing. If the emergent international norm
of a right to a democratic form of government is to have meaning, it
must apply directly to all spheres of government. If "the problems of
underdevelopment can only be addressed successfully in a world of
stable, peaceable nations, which, in turn, also presupposes a world of
open democracies, ' 40 9 then a regional government that is not itself
democratic is doomed to fail in its mission of regional economic
development.
2. Legitimacy as the Democratic Construction of the Collective Will
Two critics of social choice theory argue that democratic institu-
tions and procedures are legitimate to the extent that they (1) man-
age, distribute, and contain power in ways that further democratic
values and (2) they create conditions for a political community to con-
ceive and construct its collective will (as opposed to giving mere ex-
pression to that will, silently waiting in perfect formation).410 Thus,
any practice or institution that "systematically deprives groups of the
power to participate meaningfully in deliberative politics is chal-
lenged" by this conception of legitimacy.411
For the present inquiry, we must focus on what is the relevant
political community, whether states or individual make up the groups
that should be included in the political process. We choose under this
definition of legitimacy by selecting the group whose participation
best serves the purpose of fostering a coherent collective will and best
promotes equality, individual dignity and pluralism, the core demo-
cratic values defined by its authors.412 A regional government of
409 Franck, supra note 392, at 50.
410 Pildes & Anderson, supra note 319, at 2197-98. See also CROZmR, supra note 306, at 160-
61 (viable democracy stated as a process for the building of common purpose and its collective
perception to avoid deterioration into an arena for the assertion of conflicting interests).
411 Pildes & Anderson, supra note 319, at 2204.
412 Pildes & Anderson, supra note 319, at 2214.
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states could further an agenda set by an elite group of bureaucrats and
private, transnational actors. From this perspective, the legitimacy of
the regional government would be better accomplished through ac-
countability of those who set the agenda of the regime to a broader
constituency of individuals, without whom the plural heart of democ-
racy would be rendered meaningless.413
3. The Principle of Autonomy as the Canon of Legitimacy
The legitimacy of any regime, according to one contemporary
political theorist, depends on whether it serves the core principle of
autonomy.414 The principle of autonomy calls for both individual
rights and obligations that allow for free and equal determinations of
the conditions of individual lives but do not negate the rights of others
through the tyranny of the majority or other means.415 Participation
in the deliberations of government on a free and equal basis makes
the principle consonant with majority rule.416 There must, however,
be constitutional safeguards of both individual and minority rights and
civil restraints on the abilities of powerful groups to distort democratic
processes and outcomes.417
'The author of the "principle of autonomy" addressed himself to
the question: "[h]ow can democracy be understood in a world of
independent and interdependent political authorities?" 418 He re-
sponded to the fragmentations of multiple authority structures in the
global system with a "federal model of democratic autonomy.
419
Each level of power, from the multinational to the regional to the na-
tional, must be articulated in institutions and processes that safeguard
the principle of autonomy. In this way, one assures that the hybrid
413 See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 319, at 2196 (legitimacy of agenda setting power de-
pends on institutional arrangements governing appointment, limitations, and accountability of
those with the power).
414 Held, supra note 206, at 231, 234.
415 Held, supra note 206, at 228-30.
416 Held, supra note 206, at 229.
417 Held, supra note 206, at 230, 234. An example of a constitutional safeguard against the
ability of powerful interest groups to distort both process and outcome in the United States is
the proscription against congressional delegation of lawmaking power that David Schoenbrod
finds in the U.S. Constitution, supra note 361, at 155-164. He argues that delegation disables the
Constitution's safeguards against laws that serve private purposes, reduces the participation of
the people in lawmaking, their ability to understand how government works, and their power to
hold legislators to account. Schoenbrod, supra note 361, at 196. Translating this author's domes-
tic views into the regional realm, one could argue that national delegation to a hidden regional
government is similarly at odds with the interests of the people.
418 Held, supra note 206, at 223.
419 Held, supra note 206, at 226-35.
424
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system of sovereign states and overlapping, plural authority structures
is orderly, secure, accountable and legitimate,420 and a secure fate for
democracy itself.42'
The federal model of democratic autonomy also requires each
state to undergo a reformation of power to achieve maximum ac-
countability to elected representatives and, ultimately, to the citizen
body.4' The principle of autonomy replaces any need to choose be-
tween the sovereignty of states and the sovereignty of peoples, as it is
a check on the tyrannical potential of either.423 While a choice of con-
stituencies appears to reflect a choice of one concept of sovereignty,
one sphere of power over another, in fact, the federal model of demo-
cratic autonomy requires a redefinition and expansion of relevant con-
stituency, mirroring the domains and groups of people significantly
affected by the structure of decision-making at issue; it even foresees
shifting constituencies depending upon the nature of the issue to be
decided. 4' The model also clearly projects equal and free access of all
citizens to the processes of deliberation from which decisions affecting
their lives will ensue. It views regional networks as a pragmatic hope
for more effective accountability than existing state systems.4' In the
whole sphere of interlocking national and international governance, it
envisions regional parliaments, referenda cutting across nations and
nation-states, an opening of international governmental organizations
to public scrutiny, citizen supervision of international institutions, and
enforcement mechanisms available to individuals.426 The goals, the
precepts and the mechanisms of this model all support a definition of
constituency at an individual level that transcends state boundaries
when necessary. A constituency of states, while democratic, would
not fulfill the model's vision of a new democracy.
Whatever the constituencies, the federal model of democratic au-
tonomy requires greater citizen access to regional government, direct
participation in its decision-making deliberations, and explicit mecha-
nisms of regional accountability to individuals than NAFTA and its
side accords provide. Without mixing up the theorists' suggestions
that cut across all sorts of regional and international organizations and
limiting our discussion to the FTA, we foresee several possibilities
420 Held, supra note 206, at 226.
421 Held, supra note 206, at 234.
422 Held, supra note 206, at 231.
423 Held, supra note 206, at 228.
424 Held, supra note 206, at 232-33.
425 Held, supra note 206, at 233 n.92.
426 Held, supra note 206, at 233.
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ranging from the mildly reformist to the utterly radical. There is no
normative priority to the suggestions, as they are ideas to inflame de-
bate rather than prescriptions for progress.
At the stage of negotiation of constituting documents or, in this
case, negotiating revisions as NAFTA becomes the base for an ex-
panded regional trade area, citizen negotiating groups directly elected
by the citizens of any state participating in the negotiations should be
at the table. Short of this radical suggestion, nongovernmental organi-
zations could be included in the process with a small number of seats
reserved by area of interest. NGOs would be forced into transna-
tional coalition to nominate from their midst representatives for each
area such as labor, consumers, the environment or forego representa-
tion in the process if unable to reach consensus on a representative.
The process would have to be subject to safeguards such that no group
or interest could hold the negotiation for ransom. Advisory groups to
negotiations would have to reflect a broader array of interests and
NGOs than was the case in the United States with the negotiation of
NAFTA.42 7 In the United States, this could be accomplished with leg-
islative revision of the requirements for trade negotiation advisory
bodies to curb the discretion of the USTR as to the composition and
allocation of seats among interests in the powerful Advisory Commit-
tee for Trade Policy and Negotiation as well as the subsidiary, general
policy advisory groups.
428
After agreement is reached, there could be a regional referendum
on whether it is acceptable. This would occur after a prolonged pe-
riod of open, public deliberation at local levels with mechanisms for
equal access and participation by all citizens.42 9 Short of this, there
should be national referenda organized in the same manner.430 Na-
427 The fallout from the lack of representation of environmental interests in advisory groups
prior to NAFTA included the creation of a Trade and Environmental Policy Advisory Commit-
tee in the office of the USTR in 1994. Exec. Order No. 12,905, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,733 (1994). The
USTR appoints the members within broad guidelines. The USTR solicited public nominations.
59 Fed. Reg. 24,213 (1994).
428 See 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b),(c) (1994).
429 The political economy of trade analysis of referenda could predict a vote against any free
trade initiative, because the wide dispersal of benefits, the concentration of costs, and the possi-
bility of "rent-seeking" in the form of lobbying for protection against foreign competition would
pull the outcome toward a protectionist vote against such an initiative. YARBROUGH & YAR-
BROurGH, supra note 365, at 8-9.
430 In the United States at least, it might be advisable to delegate this responsibility to Oprah
Winfrey and Phil Donahue. They are experts at the solicitation of public opinion. They have
wide popular credibility. They are not known for their affiliation with particular political parties
or views. As silly as this suggestion may seem to some readers, I propound that it would be a far
more effective instrument for public education, debate, and contribution to the political process
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tional legal mechanisms for approval of agreements should reflect the
new mechanism. The referenda need not be binding. In such a case,
however, they would lead to a much greater involvement of the citi-
zenry in the political process or potential for access that would leave
fewer citizens with the feeling that they were victims of a political pro-
cess from which they were excluded.
The least radical suggestion for reform of the U.S. process of ap-
proval of free trade agreements entails revision of the "fast-track"
process for Congressional approval. This is touted as the only mecha-
nism that insulates an agreement from interest group capture of the
well-known process of pork barrel politics because Congress cannot
amend the agreement but must approve or disapprove it in its en-
tirety. For instance, approval of the NAFTA required rents to be paid
to several key political groups such as the citrus and truck farm lob-
bies that succeeded in obtaining special concessions in the legislation
under which Congress approved the NAFTA.4 31 A compromise
would be that fast-track approval be disassociated from such conces-
sions or any promise of such concessions. By June 1994, renewal of
fast-track procedures for future trade agreements was a subject of
heated, political contention in the U.S. Congress.432
If an agreement is implemented, there should be direct citizen
access to all governmental bodies, whether policy-making or dispute-
settling. The NAFTA and its side accords leave much to be worked
out even without considering the major issues of accession and expan-
sion. Direct citizen access could mean any of several things. The dras-
tic shift to a regional parliament is not necessary, though it is the
logical expression of regional democracy. Even without an elected
legislature, citizens could have the right to elect representatives to all
the regional governing commissions to sit alongside representatives of
than the system of public, administrative hearings currently in use in the U.S. Such hearings are
like show trials. Participation usually depends on reading and responding to a notice in the
Federal Register. This is the equivalent of constructive service of process by publication in a local
newspaper that a defendant in a trial is unlikely ever to see. The defendant's failure to show up
and defend is just as predictable as the public's failure to show up and participate in public
rulemaking hearings. There is surely no need to duplicate the practical inadequacy and unfair-
ness of this system in creating a new scheme of public participation fitted to a new form of
government.
431 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3391(d) (1994) (peanuts). These deals are described in Kevin Merida
& Tom Kenworthy, For Some, a Bitter NAFTA Taste: House Awaits Fallout from Bipartisan Vote
Dealmaking, WASH. Post, Nov. 18,1993, at Al (deals for sugar, citrus, vegetables, beef, peanuts,
appliances).
432 See, e.g., All 44 Republican Senators Oppose Administration's Fast-Track Proposal, 11
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1,026 (June 29, 1994).
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national governments.433 This would be at least analogous to a re-
gional, electoral parliamentary system. Citizens already have the po-
tential to sit as judges on panels, but that potential is limited by the
nature of the nomination process.434 A reform would be citizen con-
trol over a segment of the panel rosters either through election or a
special citizen roster selection committee. Short of such reforms,
there could be the requirement that each body consult with a citizen
advisory board elected directly or composed of NGO representatives
as described above with respect to referenda.
There must be access for the citizenry to all of the processes of
the NAFTA's governing bodies. The first would be open meetings,
except as necessary for the protection of state or regional security in-
terests. Citizens or NGOs should have the ability to offer testimony
or information as appropriate to the meeting. Information should also
flow in the other direction with all information freely available in mul-
tiple official languages with safeguards of confidential, private or pro-
prietary information that do not leave absolute discretion with the
information holder to make the decision with respect to its public re-
lease. All panel decisions should be public with the panelists names
attached. All governmental reports should be made freely available
to encourage public knowledge of both the substantive workings of
the regional government and the openness of the processes.
As for enforcement, there should be a central mechanism for citi-
zen complaints to the regional bureaucracy that lead to a decision
rather than act merely as an escape valve for citizen frustration with-
out hope of real resolution (as in the Environmental Agreement).
The prohibition on private rights of action for enforcement could be
433 The right to direct representation in the regional government raises questions about the
advisability of reforms of the electoral process in the regional polity. One analyst of trade and
democratic institutions argues that a parliamentary system of proportional representation with
strong political parties and large electoral districts will best serve the goals of an advanced state
with a trade-dependent economy, because such a system will insulate rulers from protectionist
pressures, liberate them from the influence of powerful private interests, and enable them to
pursue stable economic policies. Ronald Rogowski, Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institu-
tions, in THEm INTERNATONAL PoLrriCAL EcoNoMY OF TRADE 1 455,458-64 (David A. Lake ed.,
1993).
434 In the side accords, the councils of national ministers create the roster of eligible panelists.
It is likely that they will merely approve lists compiled by national representatives or by the
environmental or labor Secretariats. See Environmental Agreement, supra note 239, art. 16, at
1489, and body of the article as to nomination of panelists in the United States under the Envi-
ronmental Agreement. Under NAFTA itself, member states have more direct control of the
creation of the rosters. In the United States, the USTR selects individuals for NAFTA panel
rosters from nominations that are open to the public. Taking at least some selections out of the
hands of the government could increase its openness.
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eliminated, giving regional citizens and groups a right, a remedy and
standing to sue for enforcement of the agreement or violation of the
democratic requirements of the process. 43
5
This is nothing like a comprehensive reform package, but it is a
starting point to discuss how new institutions can respond in different
ways to calls for direct citizen participation in government and direct
accountability of that government to a regional citizenry. There is no
doubt that the regional regime, the product or national democratic
regimes, is remarkably closed to public oversight and public involve-
ment. Dramatic or moderate restructurings could only help build re-
gional legitimacy for the regime if the regional public had more of an
image of the entity and more of a direct stake in its survival and direc-
tion. Such inclusive restructurings would have to be carefully thought
out in detail to avoid intractable logjams of decision-making when too
varied interests are directly involved. Safeguards against "capture" of
the process by powerful organizations or individuals would also be
necessary. This is not an impossibility but a constitutional challenge:
to create a more inclusive, less elite-oriented government that is less
like a remote fortress and more like a local agora. The net effect
could be a regional consolidation of power in the new regime that
could ensure its availability to finish the job of economic integration
into the next century.
B. The FTA as Vehicle for Transnational Justice
Any serious contemporary discussion of economic development
must reach into the legal, ethical and political dimension of transna-
tional justice. "Transnational justice," "international distributive jus-
tice," and "global distributive justice" all refer to the idea that justice
requires economic redistributions of wealth across national bounda-
ries. Various substantive definitions of this concept have intrigued
political and legal theorists for some time.4 3 6 This was particularly
true after John Rawls' 1971 A Theory of Justice applied his state-cen-
435 See, e.g., Philippe J. Sands, The Environmen; Community and International Law, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 (1989) (esp. at 417). The idea of individual rights in a regional polity has
already arisen in the discussion of democracy, supra § IV-A. For an overview of the twentieth-
century development of international law beyond recognition of the rights of states in the inter-
national arena to the individual and collective human rights of individuals and peoples, see Louis
B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States,
32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982) (esp. at 61). The idea of NGO and citizen standing has long since
entered the discourse of international law.
436 See, e.g., CHARLES R. BErrz, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 126-
176 (1979); BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 179-212 (1989); Onora O'Neill, Transnational
Justice, in POLITICAL THEORY TODAY, supra note 169, at 276-304.
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tered philosophical inquiry into justice briefly to the question of inter-
national justice, unwittingly laying down a scholar's gauntlet to test
the possibility of distributive justice in Rawls' ideal, international
realm.437 The depth and breadth of works on this topic make any at-
tempt to summarize them here impossible. It is possible, however, to
allude in broad strokes to the shape of a few theories of transnational
justice to demonstrate its relevance to the present inquiry. Whether
one agrees in principle with the concept of transnational justice or any
articulation of it is less important here than whether one sees how
such ideas may be reflected in the constitution of the regional polity.
For those for whom transnational justice is a desirable goal, the
FTA presents a distinct bridge between the ideal and the actual. It is
possible to view the NAFTA as a means to many different ends of a
story that is still in the telling.43 For some, it may be a vehicle for
economic hegemony, for others economic justice. The uneven wealth
of the world is a consequence of many factors, some natural, some
derived from human activity. Free trade enshrined in GATT's princi-
437 Rawls posited two principles of justice within the confines of a national community: (1)
civil and political equality of citizens in a system granting the most extensive liberty compatible
with equal rights to liberty and (2) regulation of social and economic inequality such that the
system affords the greatest benefit possible to the least advantaged (the "difference principle")
and affords equal opportunity to compete for offices and positions. BErrz, supra note 436, at
129-30 citing RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE at 302-03. He saw justice as mutual advantage and
impartial decision-making. In transposing his state-centered meeting of representatives in the
original position, he saw representatives of nations meeting behind his "veil of ignorance" which
concealed from them the particular circumstances of their own society and its comparative
power and strength and allowed them just enough knowledge to make a rational, self-interested
decision that would not take advantage of differences in position but would rest on an agreed set
of principles. BARRY, supra note 436, at 184-85 citing RAwLs at 378. This meeting yields princi-
ples of international justice that seem to reflect only Rawls' first normative principle of equality.
O'Neill, supra note 436, at 294. "There is no account of the second principle of justice, hence no
account of international distributive justice." O'Neill, supra note 436. For applications of and
critiques of Rawls that do yield principles of international and intergenerational justice, see
BEITZ, supra note 436, at 169-76 and BARRY, supra note 436, at 187-89. See also THOMAS W.M.
POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989).
Rawls himself has recently addressed the further application of his theories into the interna-
tional realm. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY
LECTURES 1993 41-82 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). The Law of Peoples, unlike A
THEORY OF JUSTICE, does not contain a difference principle requiring redress for inequalities.
It, thus, lacks a well-defined principle for establishing distributive justice between peoples differ-
ently situated on the world economic scale. Rawls believes that a fair principle of cooperation
between peoples will benefit all people over time. Id., at 64. He judges that this reasonable law
of peoples is better than a principle of justice as fairness based on mutual advantage in which
everyone's historical situation is improved. Id.
438 Some may argue that NAFTA is an obstacle to transnational economic justice. One basis
for this position is the threat that regionalism will fatally fragment the multilateral trading sys-
tem into a few large trade blocs. Developing nations, in coalition, have more power in a global
system. Developed nations have much more access and control in regional blocs.
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ples and practiced since 1948 has not led to a larger pie in which Ri-
cardo's theory of comparative advantage allows all to a fair sized
slice.439 Special programs by the developed world to give special and
differential treatment to the developing world outside the harsh re-
quirements of equal treatment for all have not only failed to decrease
the gap in wealth between rich and poor nations but have been ac-
companied by a widening of that gap." Regional economic integra-
tion represents the potential for economic distributive justice in the
sense that the lowering of trade barriers to allow increased access to
the huge and hungry North American market by Latin American pro-
ducers will spring them from the oppressive trap of the tariffication of
goods" 1 and will foster increased internal production with concomi-
tant raises in the availability and remuneration of employment and
greater purchasing power for individuals for whom the standard of
living will thus eventually increase."' In a regional market without
the handicaps of national tariffs and other barriers, production and
employment may resituate and imports may replace domestic goods
and services allowing capital flows, once dammed behind borders, to
flow more easily up and downstream. In the theoretical world defini-
tions of justice and redistribution are perforce abstract. In the real
world, the NAFTA defines the core principles on which redistribution
rests in this region." 3 It also presents the mechanisms to accomplish
it goals.
439 For a concise description of the classic theory of comparative advantage, see JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 10-15 (1989).
440 For an overview of the history of developing nations in the multilateral trading system see
ROBERT H. HUDEC, DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1987). Programs
illustrative of this ameliorative approach include the Generalized System of Preferences in which
developed nations agreed to allow duty-free entry of some products of particularly underdevel-
oped nations on the basis of need. For a discussion of this program in the United States, see
RoSSIDES AND MARAVEL, supra note 44, ch. 22.
441 As tariffs increase as the rate of processing on goods increases, developing nations often
found themselves in the difficult position of exporting raw materials (subject to lower profits
than materials with a higher component of value added and also to huge swings in world market
prices) to gain hard currency rather than investing in infant manufacturing and processing indus-
tries with the potential for higher employment and profits but whose output would be subject to
the burden of higher tariffs in the developed markets in which they would have to compete with
domestic goods. See Jackson, supra note 439, at 277.
442 In NAFTA's first six months of operation, Mexico's exports to the United States totaled $
23.5 billion, almost 21 percent more than the level of exports for the first half of 1993. Peter
Behr, NAFTAmath A Texas-Sized Surge in Trade; Six Months After Treaty's Enactment, Boom-
ing Sales to Mexico Overshadow U.S. Job Losses, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1994, at H1.
443 In its preamble, one does not find economic justice as one of NAFTA's purposes. One
does find, however, a commitment to the expansion of a secure market for the goods and serv-
ices of the Parties, the enhancement of competitiveness of firms in global markets, and, most
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One of the central problems of some arguing in favor of transna-
tional justice is the question of "to whom arguments about interna-
tional distributive justice should be addressed." 4 Another problem is
the need to motivate people toward justice once it is recognized in
principle.445 In a crude but very real way, the FTA provides solutions
to both these problems. Its function in these respects also illuminates
the questions of polity and governance in our inquiry.
The problem of the agencies of transnational justice encompasses
not only a need to identify the agents of change but also a need to
identify to whom they must be responsive." 6 Abstract discussion of
justice "fails to identify where the obligations of justice should fall,
and for whom the benefits or rights that justice might achieve should
be secured... If recipients of change are not identified, the changes
sought may neither find advocates nor meet the most urgent injus-
tices. In particular, it may prove hard to connect demands for eco-
nomic justice directly to claims of need and poverty."" 7
As a new agency of redistribution, the regional regime leaps over
substantive problems of how obligations cross boundaries. Its very
existence mediates a core problem. To the extent that economic
growth of the region as the result of integration may redistribute as
well as create wealth, the regional regime is responsible for managing
that transfer. It must implement and enforce what the NAFTA
prescribes as well as address future issues of policy. How well it works
as an agency of redistribution, however, may depend on how its mech-
anisms allow for flexible, specific response to need4 8 as well as to
charges that justice is denied. That brings us to the next question: to
whom must an institution of change respond and by what means?
To the extent that one may argue that justice entails a set of rights
and correlative obligations, the obligations must be allocated to a
specified agent or agency to have any real meaning.449 As we have
just seen, the regional regime answers this problem. It mediates the
transfer. Obligations and benefits of justice in the regional realm fall
on states and on individuals and their business entities. Both bear the
significantly, new employment opportunities and improved working conditions and standards of
living in all territories of the region. NAFTA, supra note 1, at 297.
444 O'Neill, supra note 436, at 276.
445 BARRY, supra note 436, at 357-66, Appendix C at 393-400.
446 O'Neill, supra note 436, at 277.
447 O'Neill, supra note 436, at 278.
448 Looking at transnational justice as a question of agents and needs is just one of many
approaches to the problem as noted by O'Neill, supra note 436, at 279, in taking that approach.
449 O'Neill, supra note 436, at 287.
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possible economic brunt or boon of any possible redistribution. To
whom should the agent respond? If a rights-based theory of transna-
tional justice is defined individually, then response of the agency with
the allocated responsibility of redistributive change to individuals is a
logical and principled conclusion.4 50 Without specific mechanisms for
such responsiveness, needs, such as those of Mexican workers to avoid
exploitation by regional producers and of U.S. workers to avoid the
burdens of job dislocations connected with exploitation, would go
unaddressed. Only public pressure in the United States forced the
three NAFTA nations to address these concerns in an explicit, albeit
half-hearted, way in the supplemental Labor Agreement. The inter-
ests of nations did not originally lead to response to questions of jus-
tice for workers.
If we define the new agency of redistribution as responsive only
to a constituency of states, we also prepare a ready bed for the seeds
of nationalist demands to grow at the expense of the nurturance of
transnational demands and obligations. By defining the new regional
government in this way, we may harden boundaries to justice that the
FTA itself has just made very permeable. Permeability for goods and
services is not sufficient. The polity must remain permeable to the
economic needs of a regional citizenry as they see them.
Direct responsiveness to a regional citizenry also connects to the
problem of motivation. Motivation to justice, in turn, connects to sur-
vival of the regime, one of the goals of economic development theory
discussed earlier. Citizens participating in a regional government
which is visible and accessible to them and that offers them a means of
addressing specific problems will be more likely to perceive the possi-
ble benefits of the system than those who remain at a remote distance
from the decision-making processes as passive recipients of whatever
benefits or burdens happen to fall upon them. The possibility of per-
sonal economic gain must be apparent.451 The success of the ambi-
tious cooperative venture of regional economic integration demands
that all involved in the enterprise play a part in it, convinced that sup-
port of the venture and its consequent success will leave them in a
450 Those arguing against any right to redistribution would also argue that all agencies of
redistribution are inherently unjust. O'Neill, supra note 436, at 289. On a contrary note, one
theorist of justice argues that distributive justice is a "virtue of institutions." BARRY, supra note
436, at 358.
451 In the original Rawlsian sense, each person must agree that the least well-off person in the
region must be made as well off as possible; in the real world, each must also be persuaded that
he or she might be that person. See BARRY, supra note 436, at 189.
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better position than would otherwise be the case.452 Self-interest and
mutual advantage are the motivating forces. Even in theories in
which motivation depends on the availability of impartiality as a pre-
vailing principle, one can argue in the context of the FTA that there
must be mechanisms of accountability to convince the regional citi-
zenry of the impartiality of the venture in serving the wide range of
interests in the region from the powerful multinational to its lowest-
paid worker.45 3 In its present form, the regional regime is a vehicle
for transnational justice. Changes in the government toward direct
citizen access and participation and toward accountability to a re-
gional citizenry may make it a more stable, efficient means to make
the trip.
C. The Reformation of International Lawmaking
In the classic view of international law, the sovereign state is both
a concept at the center of a series of questions and an actor at the
center of a series of transactions between and among other sovereign
states.454 Thus, questions of adherence to international law as a power
ceded by states, of state autonomy in the face of economic and polit-
ical interdependence, and of each state's moral, ethical and legal
rights and duties vis a vis other states predominate in the discourse.
4 55
In the traditional conception of international law, there was no room
for individual actors whose interests were represented by their sover-
eign states.456 With respect to the making of international law, the
focus has traditionally been on documents (treaties and conventions)
and custom made or recognized by states as having the binding char-
acter of law.457 Public international organizations have been institu-
tions of states dedicated to the various roles and needs of states such
452 See BARRY, supra note 436, at 360-61. Barry does not actually subscribe to this idea of,
self-interest, positing it as one theory of motivation. He defines justice as impartiality and as-
cribes to human nature the desire to justify individual conduct in an impartial way so that the
availability of impartiality is itself motivating. BARRY, supra note 436, at 363-65. Further, the
basis of justice is institutional, and the sanctions of institutions to force compliance fill the gap
left by those not moved by a sense of justice alone. BARRY, supra note 436, at 365-66.
453 See BARRY, supra note 436.
454 LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 25
(1989). See also Mark W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law", 78
AM J. INT'L L. 405 (1984).
455 See Charles R. Beitz, Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs, in POLITCAL THE-
ORY TODAY, supra note 169, at 236, 242-43.
456 See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ. 2347, 2349 (1991)
(describing the classic dualistic view of international law in which both individuals and domestic
courts were denied a meaningful role in the making of international law).
457 CHEN, supra note 454, at 3, 360-63.
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as negotiation of documentary law, interpretation of treaties, or settle-
ment of disputes.458 Traditionally, states have made and recognized
international law and mediated disputes with various but limited roles
for private international organizations and individuals. The United
Nations (U.N.), which has the most detailed system of international
governance, is a good model for describing the traditional role of
NGOs and individuals in the international legal process. While the
question of the role of NGOs and individuals in this process is the
subject of emerging scholarship beyond the scope of the present in-
quiry,459 it is important to describe briefly how the traditional process
is now slowly but definitely in transition.
Traditionally, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of
the U.N. has allowed consultations between NGOs and the U.N.
based on terms dictated by the ECOSOC's Committee on Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations. 460 There were categories of status, but even
the most privileged NGOs have had very limited access to U.N.
processes with extremely limited effect on policy outcomes.461 Except
as experts, members of delegations, or official bureaucrats, individuals
have not had the ability to participate at the U.N.462
With negotiations leading up to the so-called "Earth Summit"
(formally entitled "the United Nations Conference on the Environ-
ment and Development") held in Brazil in June 1992, pressure from
NGOs for greater access to and an active role in the process of negoti-
458 See HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-6 (1980) (defining in-
ternational organization broadly to cover any form of international government and any entity in
which states are associated for performing specific tasks).
459 Citizen and NGO involvement in other public international law arenas has been proposed
by scholars and advocates with respect to global environmental issues for several years. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal
Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 563-69 (1991) (proposing the incorporation of a role for
NGOs in governance and implementation of the Montreal Protocol including participation in
policy-making bodies); David B. Hunter, Toward Global Citizenship in International Environ-
mental Law, 28 WiLLAMErrE L. REv. 547 (1992) (essay proposing citizen participation in public
international institutions); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening" of
International Trade Law, 7 ENvm. L. & LrnG. 57, 97-98 (1992), text accompanying notes 172-76
(1992) (proposing reforms of the GATI' system such as NGO and citizen participation in negoti-
ation and notice and comment opportunities to align the system with international legal princi-
ples on transparency and accessibility); David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and
Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645
(1991) (essay proposing partnerships between U.S. and developing nation public interest groups
to advocate for environmental projects, funding, and'reforms and suggesting adjudicatory mech-
anisms for individual grievances to enhance citizen enforcement of international standards and
internal procedures by international institutions).
460 See SCHERMERS, supra note 458, at 107.
461 SCHERMERS, supra note 458, at 108-09.
462 SCHERMERS, supra note 458, at 111.
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ation led to de facto changes in this traditional structure. The institu-
tion was responsive because of the nature of the negotiations;
environmental agreements are "science-driven" and depend heavily
on expertise that international legal scholars and bureaucrats cannot
provide.463 This led, in turn, to recognition that formal inclusion of
non-state actors in the general process of making international law
was a matter that was already "on the table" for discussion.
Thus, even at the byzantine level of bureaucracy embodied by the
U.N., there is a dilation of the public space in which private actors are
permitted to operate in the system of governance. ECOSOC has re-
considered the rules of the game.464 Scholars are addressing the tran-
sition and the appropriate role for NGOs. Whether allowing non-
state actors as advocates, petitioners, negotiators, or experts with
broader influence in the process is a good idea is obviously a matter of
debate.465 The current momentum, however, is toward inclusionary
reform.
There are several ways in which the NAFTA fits into this larger
institutional framework and several reasons to recommend greater cit-
izen access and participation in regional institutions of governance as
part of this larger trend. The gradual opening of the processes of in-
ternational lawmaking beyond state representatives reflects a substan-
tive trend toward democracy as a principle of international law.466
NGO participation in the processes at a deeper, functional rather than
very limited consultative level reflects the idea of accountability of the
institutions of international lawmaking to a constituency now grown
beyond the once impenetrable bounds of sovereign states.467 Interna-
tional law becomes a product of a global democracy of citizens rather
463 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of
International Environmental Law, 68 Cm-KENT L. REv. 61, 65 (1992).
464 Open-Ended Working Group on the Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-
Governmental Organizations, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/AC 70/199411-1994n7 (1994).
465 Public choice theory applied to the international realm would decry expansion of the roles
of biased interest groups.
466 See Franck, supra note 392 (emergent norm of democratic governance should be enforced
by international norms and processes). Professor Franck does not equate an opening of the
processes of international law with enforcement of an emerging norm of national democratic
government, but his argument that international norms and processes must support and enforce
compliance with international entitlements to democratic national government is consonant with
an argument that other developments in international norms and processes should support and
strengthen democracy as a universal norm.
467 See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-
Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1, 22-25 (1993) (reconceptu-
alizing international law to recognize full participation of non-state actors and an international
legal order that is not state-centered).
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than states. There is reason to support this notion. When citizens
challenge the legitimacy and relevance of anonymous international in-
stitutional processes of governance, the very authority of such institu-
tions is subject to question.468 The inclusion of views not voiced by
official state representatives at an international level may lend an in-
creased perception of legitimacy, stability, authority and significance
to international governance. This perception becomes the reality. In
a world of inevitably increasing interconnection at every social, polit-
ical, and economic level, institutions of international governance must
evolve to meet changing demands and reorient themselves to a world
in which there are multiple sites of power.
The NAFTA is thus on a frontier of international lawmaking and
governance. The NAFTA reflects traditional notions; the supplemen-
tary agreements bend to the inclusionary pressures of a newly empow-
ered public. The institutions of regional governance have a chance to
evolve as new nations join the FTA. It is important in this new era of
international lawmaking in which the public and private blend that
state and private actors share the same stage. In the new economic
global space, conceptions of regulatory power should reflect the fact
that we have moved beyond a world in which states play the largest
part.
D. The State in Transformation
There has been growing recognition of the challenges to state au-
thority and autonomy posed by the necessities of sharing power in an
increasingly interconnected network of permeable borders, transna-
tional production and flows of goods and services, international mili-
tary, legal and administrative responsibilities, and participation in
many levels of international and supranational governance. The very
notion of the state is in transformation.469 The legitimacy and viability
of the state are at stake in this process.470 Instead of looking at re-
gional trading arrangements as akin to threats of obsolescence, it
468 Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the
"Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179, 186, 188-89 (1988) (responding to ethical challenges to the
theory). Even these two noted public choice theorists, arguing for institutional reforms within
which political actors are constrained, recognize that what they see as the 'myths of democracy'
may be essential to maintenance of an underlying popular consent of the citizenry to be gov-
erned, in the absence of which no tolerable stable political order is possible.
469 See Robert 0. Slater, Conflict and Challenge in the International System, in GLOBAL
TRAusFomAnToN AND Tm THmi WORLD, supra note 344, at 311, 316.
470 Slater, in GLOBAL TRANSFORMAION AND m TmnR WORLD, supra note 344, at 311,
316.
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would be more helpful to look at them first as mechanisms for striking
a balance among regionalism, internationalism, and nationalism. Af-
ter all, in FTAs, states retain significant power and autonomy. Then
we must look at them as mediators of the shift in power and authority
between the public and private spheres. It seems an antiquated no-
tion that states could hold onto their power by closing the processes of
government. 471 It also seems a dangerous notion, because in this way
lies the potential for states to provide a public face only for the power-
ful economic actors in this global market. In the remaking of the pub-
lic and private in the global market there must be room for all actors
in a space with Gordian economic and political dimensions.472
471 See Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence
Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 36 (1989). In reformulating the non-intervention
norm in international law to legitimize certain forms of transnational political activity, Lori Fisler
Damrosch identified an emerging customary law obligation for states to accord citizens the right
to participate in political governance, though not necessarily along western, pluralist democratic
lines. Id. at 40. Professor Damrosch was dealing with a set of state-centered principles of sover-
eign equality and political independence and citizen-centered principles of equal rights and self-
determination that were firmly rooted in an international system of states rather than new polit-
ical entities of interdependent states transcending classic notions of sovereignty. Nevertheless,
her identification of an emerging norm of citizen participation in the political process gives some
measure of support to the proposition that any government, even one of conjoined states, has a
duty to allow citizens a voice in political affairs and a means to effect political change directly in
that government. Id. at 50. If the FTA is responsive to a constituency of states, citizens are left
out of one part of the federal equation. They have access to only one level of government. One
may argue that access to the more local government is the only pragmatic course. This access
may be sufficient to meet the minimal requirements of an emerging norm of political participa-
tion whose contours are, as yet, amorphous. But a system in transition from a state-centered one
to a layered, federal concept of regional government may contravene the spirit of that emerging
norm by formulating the constituency of the FTA as a polity of states. Such a reactionary formu-
lation may work to deny citizen participation simply by redefining the contours of government.
As government moves beyond the boundaries of states, citizen participation must move with it.
472 See YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 365, at 112, 118. The New Economics of
Organization (NEO) gives some support to this view. In NEO, transactional cooperation re-
quires an institutional structure conducive to inducement of individual action to produce collec-
tive action or social outcomes. YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 365, at 112, 118. When
NEO focuses on a political organization (such as a state) as a trading entity, the institutional
structure must bolster cooperation among private and public actors across state boundaries. See
YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 365, at 124-25 (actors usually seen as firms and states).
Most NEO work focuses on the efficacy of cooperation of the group involved in creating the
institution. YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 365, at 130. From this vantage, the re-
gional governmental institutions of NAFTA that are responsive to states accessible to a manage-
able number of corporate players may be the best framework for an effective cooperation to
forestall opportunism at these levels of power. However, at its heart, NEO focuses on the rela-
tionship between the individual and the group. YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 365, at
117-18. It is, therefore, relevant to an analysis of cooperation to focus on the regional institu-
tions of government from the perspective of the web of relationships between the state, the
regional institutions, and all private actors, including citizens. YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH,
supra note 365, at 125 (web of relationships recognized between corporations and governments).
Constructing Democracy in the North American Free Trade Area
16:331 (1996)
In ceding political power to other states and international institu-
tions in the public realm and in creating space for private transna-
tional transactions in the global market, the state can forge a new role
as the fulcrum point for political balance. This is necessary in a com-
plicated web of vertical and horizontal pressure. The state cannot re-
tain and should not perpetuate governmental structures that do not
reflect this multidirectional dynamic. There will be demands from in-
terest aggregating structures of every sort. Global economies will cre-
ate new kinds of local politics of an unpredictable shape. The state
cannot remain accountable only to itself or its counterparts. In partic-
ipating in regional governance, states should take the unique opportu-
nity to shape processes of governance that are up to the task of
managing a huge market with national, multinational, and individual
players eventually moving freely throughout the hemisphere. A re-
gional government responsive to a declining state-centered power
base cannot provide the stability necessary for the economic develop-
ment envisioned for the entire region. A regional government open
to the inevitable evolutionary political dynamic of a new legal and
economic frontier will better serve its very purpose. In this way, it will
assure its own survival and that of its mission.
V. CONCLUSION
Free trade is a good idea, not a universal good. It has the poten-
tial to create wealth and thus, to enhance the standard of living of all
who are given the opportunity to share in its bounty. Free trade has
the power to effect individual, economic, and environmental justice.
It has the potential to free history and culture from national fetters as
it frees goods, services, and capital from national borders. It also has
If we define the collective goals of a free trade area as an increase in the wealth of its members,
fair distribution of that increased wealth, and an increase in the number and value of the eco-
nomic opportunities for corporate and individual participants (a necessarily limited definition for
present purposes), then the regional institutions must be structured to foster private, individual
loyalty to those goals, identification with them as coincident with individual goals, and commit-
ment to the state's continuing participation in the regional polity. Conceding that regional insti-
tutions responsive to the needs of states and those responsive to the needs of individuals may
both achieve success in regional cooperation, the key question is which choice gives a better
chance for success of the venture? By structuring the governmental institutions of the regional
polity to afford access and accountability beyond states to private citizens, we give proper atten-
tion to the importance of relationships between citizens and states and between citizens and the
region as political institution. We, thus, recognize both the state's reduced but critical role as a
mediator of cooperation in the regional environment and the necessity for the regional institu-
tions to reduce the likelihood of individual action at odds with the goals of the institution. In an
approach in which relationships and cooperation are key, the best institutional choice maximizes
the probability of cooperation at all levels.
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the potential for conflict, oppression, and the suppression of historical
and cultural identity. The institutional processes by which govern-
ments regulate the path and growth of free trade can give us the vehi-
cle to control and direct economic, cultural, and legal development
toward the former and away from the latter. Those institutions must
reflect the political and social impact of economic integration.
The use of government as an analytical focus has not been an
attempt to cast the new political and legal structures of international
trade relations back into an outdated mold. Its purpose has been to
show that the governments of the future must be a newly-defined en-
terprises in which state and non-state actors, businesses and consum-
ers all operate in a sphere that recognizes their interests and roles and
allows them the scope to act cooperatively. Government by states in
the area of trade relations is simply pass6.
The FTA is a regional polity. Its governmental structures should
reflect its regional character and its regional future. Responsiveness
to a regional constituency of citizens is an analog for a vision of the
future that transcends the limits of the nation-state. This vision is the
hemispheric imperative of the next century.
440
